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Consciousness in Transition: Phenomenological and Psychoanalytic Inquiry

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SZKOŁA DOKTORSKA DYSCYPLINA: FILOZOFIA

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ABSTRACT:

This dissertation takes an innovative approach to exploring consciousness, combining the perspectives of phenomenology and psychoanalysis. It introduces a novel perspective that combines the methodologies of these two disciplines, offering fresh insights into the origin of pathological conscious phenomena. It delves into the description of these phenomena as passive structures of experience that install non-standard logics inherent to the human mind, offering an interpretation of atypical consciousness associated with traumatic experiences. Historically, Western philosophical thought has emphasised rationality and normality, often overlooking alternative states of consciousness, including those experienced in trauma or mental illness. This paper presents a compelling critique, arguing that this exclusion is not merely an oversight, but rather a fundamental structural limitation in the way Western philosophy approaches the human condition.

It highlights how different dimensions of experience operate outside of conscious control and the process by which consciousness constitutes experience without active ego involvement. It discusses the challenges of combining phenomenology and psychoanalysis in this regard. It notes that phenomenology emphasises the transparency and accessibility of experience, whereas psychoanalysis focuses on hidden and repressed aspects of the mind. Thus, the analysis considers and compares aspects of consciousness from both perspectives as it extends its consideration to non-classical elements of subjectivity. Consciousness is examined within the following five thematic categories: Being; Logic; Language; Embodiment; and Self-realisation.

These include the logic of the unconscious, affect and the cultural or social formation of subjectivity. Some cases of brain impairment and their impact on the parameters that constitute well-being are considered in particular. Clinical vignettes are used to illustrate and support the research material. To approach the subject from a philosophical point of view, the author elaborates on the traditional ontological categories of self-reflection: 'Dasein' and 'Das Man'. The dissertation puts forward a critical argument for including a third category, 'Schattendasein', in the discussion. This concept modifies the notion of Dasein, referring to a non-classical interpretation of individual existence where self-awareness and choice define and condition one's being. The paper focuses on the representation of the opacity of impersonal, collective, or societal existence, in which individuals conform to cultural norms and lose their identity. The paper argues that trauma should not be viewed solely as a psychological or medical condition. Rather, it should be considered a fundamental

philosophical issue since, as with the repetition of a false belief or experience, trauma challenges the very foundations of subjectivity. Consequently, the author challenges the assumptions of rationality, selfhood and freedom that underpin much of Western thought. Heidegger's phenomenology is identified as offering a way of rethinking these issues by focusing on the experience of Being-in-the-World. However, suggesting that through logic of the desire individuals are alienated within their identity and cultural context. They exist in a liminal value-temporal paradox of the mind that is neither fully visible nor fully absent.

When human beings immerse themselves in their capacity for repetition, they may become trapped in a specific unconscious genesis. The thesis suggests that limiting consciousness to passivity reduces the possibility of claiming freedom. Consequently, the pursuit of freedom can be perceived as a metaphysical impasse. This is argued to be due to the conditionality and the value totalisation around the subject, which therefore subdues the various forms of passive synthesis. This applies to both the activity of the body and habits or knowledge. Subjectivity, nourished by affects, leads to the eternal return of itself. This results in a perpetual confrontation with the double. The alter ego, as opposed to the passive ego, contains the entire palimpsest of individuality. This double emerges and seeks to act in place of the subject. The thesis argues that such a metaphysical shadow is a permanent feature of the self's composition, haunting subjectivity until the very end and requiring constant awareness of one's various egoic emanations.

The thesis concludes with a thought experiment on the potential for self-understanding and self-realisation. It considers what kind of thinking and self-knowledge should accompany phenomenology and psychoanalysis. Finally, it asks how human consciousness can relate to the world and to itself after prolonged reflection on these matters. Thus, this investigation aims to reflect on the ethical issues of contemporary axiomatic self-consciousness.

STRESZCZENIE:

Niniejsza rozprawa doktorska przyjmuje innowacyjne podejście do badania świadomości, łącząc perspektywy fenomenologii i psychoanalizy. Wprowadza nowatorską perspektywę, która łączy metodologię tych dwóch dyscyplin, oferując świeży wgląd w pochodzenie patologicznych zjawisk świadomości. Zagłębia się w opis tych zjawisk jako pasywnych struktur doświadczenia, które instalują niestandardowe logiki właściwe ludzkiemu umysłowi, oferując interpretację nietypowej świadomości związanej z traumatycznymi doświadczeniami. Historycznie rzecz biorąc, zachodnia myśl filozoficzna kładła nacisk na racjonalność i normalność, często pomijając alternatywne stany świadomości, w tym te doświadczane w traumie lub chorobie psychicznej. Niniejsza rozprawa przedstawia przekonującą krytykę, argumentując, że to wykluczenie nie jest jedynie niedopatrzeniem, ale raczej fundamentalnym ograniczeniem strukturalnym w sposobie, w jaki zachodnia filozofia podchodzi do kondycji ludzkiej.

Podkreśla, w jaki sposób różne wymiary doświadczenia działają poza świadomą kontrolą oraz proces, w którym świadomość konstytuuje doświadczenie bez aktywnego zaangażowania ego. Omawia wyzwania związane z łączeniem fenomenologii i psychoanalizy w tym zakresie. Zauważa, że fenomenologia podkreśla przejrzystość i dostępność doświadczenia, podczas gdy psychoanaliza koncentruje się na ukrytych i wypartych aspektach umysłu. W związku z tym analiza rozważa i porównuje aspekty świadomości z obu perspektyw, rozszerzając swoje rozważania na nieklasyczne elementy podmiotowości. Świadomość jest badana w ramach następujących pięciu kategorii tematycznych: Byt; Logika; Język; Ucieleśnienie; i Samorealizacja.

Obejmują one logikę nieświadomości, afekt oraz kulturowe lub społeczne kształtowanie podmiotowości. W szczególności rozważane są niektóre przypadki upośledzenia mózgu i ich wpływ na konstytutywne parametry dobrostanu. W celu zilustrowania i wsparcia materiału badawczego wykorzystywane są winiety kliniczne.

Aby podejść do tematu z filozoficznego punktu widzenia, autor rozszerza tradycyjne kategorie ontologiczne autorefleksji, a mianowicie „Dasein” i „Das Man”. Tekst przedstawia krytyczny argument za wprowadzeniem do dyskusji trzeciej kategorii - Schattendasein. Zmienia ona koncepcję Dasein i odnosi się do nieklasycznej rewizji indywidualnych form egzystencji, w których samoświadomość i wybór na przemian definiują i warunkują bycie. Koncentruje się na przedstawieniu nieprzejrzystości bezosobowej zbiorowej lub społecznej egzystencji, w której jednostki dostosowują się do norm kulturowych i tracą swoją

tożsamość. W dysertacji argumentuje się, że trauma nie powinna być postrzegana po prostu jako stan psychologiczny lub medyczny. Zamiast tego należy ją postrzegać jako centralną kwestię filozoficzną, ponieważ trauma, jako powtórzenie fałszywego przekonania, podważa same podstawy podmiotowości. W związku z tym autor kwestionuje założenia racjonalności, samoświadomości i wolności, które leżą u podstaw większości zachodniej myśli. Fenomenologia Heideggera jest identyfikowana jako oferująca sposób ponownego przemyślenia tych kwestii poprzez skupienie się na doświadczeniu Bycia-w-świecie. Jednak, sugerując, że poprzez logikę pragnienia jednostki są wyobcowane w ramach swojej tożsamości i kontekstu kulturowego. Istnieją w liminalnym wartościowo-czasowym paradoksie umysłu, który nie jest ani w pełni widoczny, ani w pełni nieobecny.

Kiedy istoty ludzkie zanurzają się w swojej zdolności do powtarzania, mogą zostać uwięzione w określonej nieświadomej genezie. Teza sugeruje, że ograniczenie świadomości do bierności zmniejsza możliwość domagania się wolności. W konsekwencji dążenie do wolności może być postrzegane jako metafizyczny impas. Wynika to z warunkowości oraz pełniejszej totalizacji wartości wokół podmiotu, która podporządkowuje sobie różne formy biernej syntezy. Dotyczy to zarówno aktywności ciała, jak i nawyków czy wiedzy. Podmiotowość, karmiona afektami, prowadzi do wiecznego powrotu samej siebie. Skutkuje to nieustanną konfrontacją z sobowtorem. Alter ego, w przeciwieństwie do pasywnego ego, zawiera cały palimpsest indywidualności. Ten sobowtór wyłania się i stara się działać zamiast podmiotu. Teza dowodzi, że taki metafizyczny cień jest stałą cechą kompozycji jaźni, nawiedzając podmiotowość aż do samego końca i wymagając ciągłej świadomości różnych egoistycznych emanacji.

Rozprawa kończy się eksperymentem myślowym dotyczącym potencjału samorozumienia i samorealizacji. Rozważa, jaki rodzaj myślenia i samowiedzy powinien towarzyszyć fenomenologii i psychoanalizie. Wreszcie, zadaje pytanie, w jaki sposób ludzka świadomość może odnosić się do świata i samej siebie po dłuższej refleksji nad tymi kwestiami. W ten sposób badanie to ma na celu refleksję nad etycznymi kwestiami współczesnej aksjomatycznej samoświadomości.

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Introduction

Γνῶθι σεαυτόν

The phrase "know thyself" precisely defines the Socratic turn in philosophy, which includes the path to the discovery of self-knowledge. This path has been traced through the centuries of Greek, Roman, Christian, and Arabic thought to the point of its scientific rectification in the modern era. Thought eventually strove to conform to the Aristotelian ideal of being adequate to objectivity. This was particularly justified when calculus or other methods of exact science were employed to generate knowledge.

Based on this scientific paradigm, Edmund Husserl's solution was to build the rigorous science of human self-understanding, especially for philosophy. Not surprisingly, Husserl's thinking unfolded as a repetitive demand for apodicticity and mathematically fashioned patterns. Meanwhile, Sigmund Freud's theoretical models of the psyche were devoted to the emergence in terms of hydraulics or thermodynamics (Tran, 2018).

This was an equally repetitive attempt to find a universal method. This scientific intention should be seen as deontic to its time - the inevitable demand for a way of thinking. Therefore, when considering phenomenological or psychoanalytical perspectives on consciousness in this research, we should adhere to this methodological premise.

i. Definitions of Consciousness

The contemporary term 'consciousness' is often associated with the Latin *conscientia* and the Greek *συνείδησις*. These terms are rooted in the verb 'to know' and cover different aspects. The Latin *scire*, *scientia* and *conscientia*, as well as the antonyms *nescius* and *inscius*, give rise to terms such as *conscientia* and *consciousness*. The German verb *wissen*, on the other hand, gives rise to words such as *Gewissen*, *Gewissheit*, *bewusst* (*unbewusst*), *Bewusstsein* and *Bewusstheit*. In most European languages, these definitions are grammatical tautologies with different historical meanings. These tropes eventually formed stable concepts in the philosophical vocabulary of Western thought.

With the rise of philosophy in ancient times, human consciousness and self-knowledge became linked to moral action and the establishment of life values (Cassin, 2004). However, Greek thinkers separated the consciousness from the rational capacity of the soul, in the concept of '*Noûς*' to develop the ancient cosmology of self-knowledge. Consciousness was reflected in the individual acts of self-awareness and action. The Stoics, in particular, began to reflect more on the subject's thinking about its own actions and conscious presence. Meanwhile, the world was viewed as an eternal cosmos and an emerging reality where truth was considered an emanation of eternity, necessitating exceptional intellectual guidance. In other words, it was no longer the mythological connection of nature and man that was decisive for moral action, but rather the decisive for moral action inner dialogue that Socrates associated with the voice of the *Daimon* (Laertius, 2020).

Ancient thinkers were primarily concerned with self-realization, appealing to a particular ethical dimension, the spirit of the ancient age. The aesthetics of their thinking, in terms of the transcendence of the mythological attainment, required the philosopher to skim the surface of being in search of how things work, in order to define their correspondence to proper moral action and truth. Images of Pythagoras and Socrates have always been associated with the image of the seeker who doubts the limits of possible understanding or its transcendence in the hope of becoming wiser. Although ancient philosophy is considered contemplative and theoretical, as it was primarily concerned with abstract and general forms of reflection, on contrary, it was grounded into reality *par excellence*. Thales of Miletus, for example, used the image of water as the first principle of things, denoting in his thought their formless origin and implying a kind of primordial and homogeneous principle. Eventually, after reconciling the incomprehensible and the invisible, philosophy fortunately explored

transcendental/idealistic levels of thought, equating the existence of consciousness with the existence of morality. Thus the quality rather than the quantity of consciousness was regarded as a legitimate methodological premise, enabling moral values to be privileged.

Ancient philosophy approached the nature of consciousness specifically: to be conscious meant to be moral, and to be moral meant to be conscious, *spiritual*. Human existence was understood as necessary to unfold around the realization of certain moral choices, thus pointing to the horizon of the spiritual dimension in human development. The actual emergence of ethics was a logical consequence of the need to use reason to master the passions of the soul and to acquire virtue. This development determined a certain ideal of life, whereby the individual was educated to live in harmony with the world. Whether it was the way to master the virtue of wisdom or the golden mean, the key to a happy life was to cultivate a certain intellectual habit, *ethos*, that would regulate one's existence with others. Such considerations of virtue led through the thought of the Greeks, in particular Plato, to the concept of the Supreme Good, *Summum Bonum*, which determined the further perspective of religiously and philosophically oriented thought in the West. This attention to moral agency established a firm link with consciousness for self-reflection and ultimately presupposed its incorporation within superiority of the law in ancient Rome (Hegel, 2001).

It should also be noted that the idealism of ancient thought was based on mythological beliefs focusing primarily on the immortality and substance of the soul, thereby preserving its contemplation associated the spiritual with a moral nature ontologically. To a greater extent, this ultimately established the primacy of soul-wise optics in most studies of consciousness, defining thought as arising from a particular kind of nature. Even Aristotle's psychology, which took into account the embodiment of the psyche and attempted to update psychology, claimed: "The soul is the cause or source of the living body. The cause is defined as that from which the movement first proceeds" (Aristotle, 2016, 429a18). He defines the soul as the *first actuality*, consisting of life potential. The soul is a force that drives the body to live. Despite his opposition to Plato and dedication for a more distinctive and relevant approach to the study of the mind, he continued to philosophise about its nature as the soul, assuming its specific monadic and *immortal* structure: "The intellect is a part of the soul and the principle by which we think and understand. It does not depend on the body and is separable from it" (Aristotle, 2016: 415b8-9). Therefore, he avoided objectifying or reducing the soul to a mere emanation of the body, and instead presented it as a separate sort of being: an immanent

realm for the hierarchy of consciousness arousal, in which subjective experience is the transcendent soul's appearance of particular kinds.

Such introspection into the nature of the soul, philosophical inquiry has addressed the nature of the mind, using philosophical terminology and reasoning that is distinct from contemporary experimental attempts in psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science, AI theories, and more to create adequate non-humanistic and reductionist models of consciousness. Therefore, on the one hand, this may seem like a misguided view, far removed from modern scientific thought, as if it weren't meant and irrelevant for "contemporary" research. However, it still makes it possible to consider consciousness through the singularity of this moral lens, since it preserves its implicitly intelligible nature. Indeed, how could morality be thought and conceived without overt conscious experience? Although it's ancient, it truly separates the thinking of what is intelligible in the human mind, building up philosophy as a consequent infinite number of forthcoming conceptual alternatives with which to develop ontology, epistemology, ethics and other areas of philosophical reflection. The nightmare of behaviorism that avoids separating consciousness for the sake of rigorous science based on the muscular habit of the organism (Skinner, 1965). In this research we will also follow this line of inquiry and study consciousness as intelligible matter.

A similar mentioned mixing in thinking can be seen via the methodology that follows from the Kantian distinction between *der Verstand* and *die Vernunft* (Kant, 1998). The first type of reason is known to reflect how notions are formed from sense perception, building a perceptual scheme of a single concept of a thing, the realm of pure reason. The other reflects the activity of the mind in the realm of ideas that have nothing to do with perception, the enclosed singularity of the ideas and the practical reason. Methodologies that profess to be scientific are in fact aimed at building on the Kantian concept of *Verstand*, attempting to reproduce acts of perception and thought related to sensory experience in behavioural, cognitive or computational models, etc. The domain of ideas associated with *Vernunft* is not relevant to such thinking, and thus forms a gap between the two. The ancient model of morality, although it analyses actual reality in its reflection, reflects rather a vision of reality in the light of a certain idea, but not its embrace. This separates the realm of the mind, which is inherent in metaphysics and the history of ideas. The same distinction eventually led to the separation of the natural sciences from the humanities.

Traditionally, there have been three main transformations of consciousness as the concept in classical European thought. The ancient and medieval understanding was the first

step in the reflection of self-consciousness as *conscience*, referring, as mentioned above, to a person's ethical awareness in situations requiring moral interpretation. These inner actions distinguish in mind what is called *inner judgment* and postulated the *axiomatic patterns of consciousness*.

The subsequent second chapter of the study was written by the thinkers of modern philosophy. Here, consciousness was no longer interpreted as playing a leading role only in human moral life. Instead, the focus was on the level of cognitive functions, stripped of ethical reflection. Consciousness is therefore the ability to critically analyse one's mental faculties in order to properly observe nature, being methodologically self-conscious. Louis de la Forge described thinking as a "surprising function involving perception, awareness, or inner knowledge that individuals directly experience when they perceive themselves, their actions, or internal processes" (Cassin, 2004). Here, self-knowledge focuses and shifts on its cognitive self-reflection rather than on the ethical examination. Similarly, Antoine Arnauld reinforced this tradition by equating the Latin term *conscious esse* with a "virtual reflection present in all our perceptions" (ibid). He defined thinking as a gnoseological possibility of such an introspection. John Locke eventually proposed a classical, crystallized definition of this reflective function: "Consciousness is the perception of what goes on in man's own mind" (Britannica, 2024). Although thinkers of this era also reflected on the ethical dimension, laying the foundations of natural and other rights, for example, as in works such as Locke's on political system, pedagogy and natural law (Brandt, 1981). Such thought definitions were called to maintain strives for the arousal of modern science, therefore re-categorised self-reflection, since they focused on legitimizing priority for knowledge and perception. They emphasized that consciousness is witnessing of *conscious*. Which eventually brought to the table a consideration of the phenomena that constitutes the acts of perception and self-givenness as pre-assumption for the epistemological recommendations in science and knowledge (Niiniluoto & Wolenski, 2014), thus developing the foundations of the *epistemic patterns of consciousness*.

This line of thinking eventually led to the subsequent, third major reflection of consciousness, which questioned its status as the *transcendental pattern of consciousness*. While the epistemic pattern tends to reveal foundations of knowledge, the transcendental focuses on self-knowledge. Which is more concerned with issues regarding it in terms of the Ego genesis, a specific monadic structure. Since then the epistemic enquiry fluctuated indefinitely between arbitrariness and associatism of the mind as in 's bundle theory of David

Hume and the Cartesian *Cogito* - the rational spirit that occupied the body, expressed in French as *le Esprit* and in German as *der Geist*. Perhaps influenced by the theological gaze, modern philosophical thought intervened with classical metaphysics in an attempt to pose a substantiated mind for consideration. At this point, it is crucial to recall Gottfried Leibniz' intuition: "Monads are endowed with perception, and each perception in a monad is unique to it" (Leibniz, 2012: §14). The monadic structure can be understood here as an updated description of consciousness, epistemically secularized soul-wise perspective. However, Leibniz' apperception as "monadology" refers to the mind's perception of unfolding ideas within itself, allowing it to contain a part of itself - a particular kind of self-knowledge in the form of innate ideas. Although, this thinking regards the apperception as not fully knowable and incapable of providing an ultimate analysis of the reason; and so it merely indicates the possibility of its partial cognition.

The challenge of revealing its structure was an attempt of Immanuel Kant's transcendental apperception, engaging in a similarly oriented reflection, but reaching different conclusions regarding transcendental analysis due to the deduction of the categorical system of the mind. Kant's philosophy was formed as pre-grammatical framework of thought:

But though all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience. For it is quite possible that our empirical knowledge is a compound of what we receive through impressions and that which the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (merely occasioned by sensible impressions). Suppose our faculty of cognition makes any such addition. In that case, it may be that we are not in a position to distinguish it from the raw material until long practice has made us attentive to and skillful in separating it (Kant, 1998: B1).

Thus, we do consider transcendental consciousness to be a definite reflective pattern and the *a priori* "cause" of knowledge. Kant's theory aimed to uncover the universal, *a priori* conditions of all possible experiences, as if they were pre-individual or pre-collective. He, therefore, shows the subjective to be defined through logic and claiming: "There is, therefore, a transcendental condition which precedes all experience and makes experience itself possible. This pure form of sensibility is the transcendental aesthetic. The synthesis of the manifold is the transcendental analytic" (Ibid, B204-205).

In order to differentiate this new pattern of consciousness for philosophy, Kant understood consciousness as confronting the transcendental consciousness to its empirical instance. Transcendental thought is the perception of embodied ideas and always denotes knowledge of our representations of objects; it combines intuitive and conceptual elements.

Thus, at its core, consciousness would be a set of transcendental categorical rules that project declinations in thinking. Self-consciousness becomes an act of artificial self-revelation because what happens is unnatural: individuals reflect on the conditions of their actions and experience as a categorical syllogism. This step, *per se ipsum*, expands the individual and defines their inner explicit essence, which ultimately postulates in thought and partially confirms the expectation of the separate soul-wise structure of consciousness.

Although, the foundation of transcendental apperception at some point must be more evident to clarify consciousness, as otherwise considerations of such origin could become trapped in abstract logical recursion. Georg Hegel made the important point that the ego, which Kant calls the unity of apperception, is not an abstract, empty identity, but a concrete, living spirit: "This idealism is not true knowledge, for only in the unity of apperception lies the truth of knowledge" (Hegel, 2018: §238). In this step we could observe the beginning of a shift away from a monadic consideration of consciousness. Treading the history into self-reflection, Hegel moves thought to a relational view of consciousness, installing footsteps for non-metaphysical and non-classical *relational patterns of consciousness*.

Here, consciousness is understood as being connected to the real world, encased in the cultural network of *mutual acknowledgement*. In a way, this thinking about the *Objectiver Geist*, expressed the need to transcend metaphysical considerations of consciousness and step into the perspective of life's temporality, the multiple diachronicities of unfolding history and living consciousness (Oehl & Kok, 2018). In the non-classical view, consciousness evolves as a specific matrix of relations. Here, consciousness is no longer understood as self-sufficient, autonomous and subdues slow unsubstantiation, since it has evolved from the cultural environment. Previously philosophy considered custom as a form of tradition, for which the totality of its impact was not adequately emphasized as pointed on the priority of individual moral acts in comparison to such tradition. Hegel was the first to describe the role of objectivity and the Other in forming human experience. As instance of this point, his successor Karl Marx wrote:

The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation on which a legal and political superstructure is built and to which certain forms of social consciousness are attached. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men which determines their existence, but their social existence which determines their consciousness (Marx, 2008: 20).

The Other, as the objective spirit in a broader perspective, was often overlooked by earlier philosophy, which focused on the constitution of experience as a one-mind authority.

Ultimately it passed by the properly considered impact factors of the socio-cultural environment: language, tradition and history. Hegel's dialectical thinking combined here different approaches to create his own. Values and culture correspond to the consciousness we have discussed in relation to ancient reflection. Transcendental patterns of consciousness provided the basis for the formation of objective idealism, while epistemic patterns served to establish a special dialectical science of reflection. For European self-understanding, it was a revolution to change the focus and to understand consciousness as a product of the Other. According to this view, as Marx illustrates, the modes of production in material life determine the general character of the social, political and spiritual life processes. It is not the "consciousness of man that determines his being, but, on the contrary, his social being that determines his consciousness" (Marx and Engels, 2022). This changes the understanding of the human condition towards examining economic interactions and using ideas such as the historical "struggle of classes" to interpret social progress. This brings the thought into historicity and helps to describe consciousness in terms of the birth of capitalism as a kind of dialectical materialism, etc., drawing on the impending advance of non-classical thought. Here the superstructure socially defines consciousness as the basic constitution for intellectual becoming. Such thinking would eventually develop numerous competing and mixed perspectives on the thought genesis as set out by Hegel's relativity.

As with the instance of a non-classical view, psychoanalysis is also reflected in monadically implicit intuitions and the classical soul-wise structure. Although, its tropes of understanding do immerse in history of the subject and ideas of organismic energy regulation as the basis of mental enaction. This approach updates its method as hybridized for consciousness research and often sparks the discussion. In their "Anti-Oedipus", Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari criticised these naturalized elements of desire shown in psychoanalysis: "Psychoanalysis reduces all desire to Oedipal structures, thereby domesticating and controlling it" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1997). They saw desire as an inherent human essence, elevated to a more metaphysical (however, claimed to be anti metaphysical) perception than a form of fulfillment or compensation for repressed desires or unresolved conflicts. Elevating its role and virtual origins, considering it in a more *relational* perspective led French authors to an alternative and radical ontology of the social consciousness as being of the desire.

This is the attempt to bring radical reduction of metaphysics into thought and representing human beings as a part of historical machinery that produces its own. Hegel and

Marx were not as rigorous installing their relational patterns of consciousness. Furthermore, the consideration of the *conscious* as a machine makes it more problematic as it reduces the subjective dynamic to the logic of association and dissociation with contemporary pictured desire. This method decentralizes the subject between schizoid (non-obeyful) and paranoid (obeyful) structures. In our research, however, we return to considering phenomenologically the forces of subjective logic that correspond to the treatment methods e.g. transference, repression, etc, appear in experience via psychoanalytic logic of the unconscious. It is, of course, fair and productive to interpret biographical postulates by the priority of power structures, as this marked a significant shift in the view of the origins of subjectivity. However, this approach excludes the classical understanding that occurs at the microlevel of pathology and the traumatic experience, thus, corresponds to a superstructurally constituted being and it limits itself by the radical exclusion of the center.

The ontology of impersonal machines of desire easily replaces the cogito-oriented desire: "Desiring machines operate according to principles of connection and production, not of repression or lack" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1997). However, this research does not discuss the forms of self-reflection as presented in Deleuze's schizoanalysis, which is a phenomenon of radically unsubstantiated consciousness. This topic is beyond the scope of the original research, which is more about revealing the dynamics of *conscious* from a first-person perspective, an area of the study that is more relevant to phenomenology and psychoanalysis. However, it is important to emphasize the aforementioned non-classical shift in the understanding of human consciousness. It has led to a significant changes in philosophical perspectives of reflection within subsequent centuries of modern philosophy, such seen in Friedrich Nietzsche's genealogy of morality, Claude Levi-Strauss's anthropological insights, Jacques Derrida's grammatology, or reflections of Michel Foucault and Giles Deleuze on the impact of power structures on thought and society (Roudinesco, 2008). Consciousness appears here as a co-dependent state of the human being "subject to something", structured or defined in advance by, as in any example, by the objective spirit.

Therefore, our current understanding of consciousness lies between two poles: viewing consciousness as a uniquely autonomous and complex phenomenon of human personality, describable in abstract logical terms (e.g. transcendental analysis and phenomenology), while at the same time acknowledging the multiple presuppositions and anticipations inductively within subjectivity, that are explicitly expressed in the multiple logical terms of the socio-structural layers constituting experience (e.g. dialectical

materialism, psychoanalysis, structuralism, schizoanalysis, and science). These two poles reveal a twofold patterning of consciousness: on the one hand, as an abstract idea of a certain *a priori* and on the other hand, as an inductively given image. Surprisingly, they are limited to these fluctuations of two extremes. The methodology which implicitly looks self-destructive. Therefore, this study will examine consciousness from different perspectives in order to avoid the aforementioned limitations.

ii. Phenomenological and Psychoanalytic Perspectives

The philosophical study of consciousness, or phenomenology, began with Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. His aim was to justify the universality of logic as a counter-reductionism presented in contemporary to him psychologism, empiricism and naturalism in science: "Logical principles are not empirical generalizations, but a priori truths that are necessarily and universally valid, independently of any contingent facts of experience" (Husserl, 2001: 66). Its inherent logic indicates inner congruence and universality of phenomenal experience, and is therefore of its own kind. Husserl therefore argued that the study of consciousness is not deducible from scientific intuition alone, but requires a special setting. Consciousness can be associated not only with universal qualities and logical judgments, but also with the specific matters of experience. Phenomenology aimed to develop a theory of consciousness based on its uniqueness, intelligibility and apodicticity. Like Kant, he sought to uncover and legitimize the fundamental structures of experience. Therefore, his phenomenology initially aimed to become a descriptive psychology, investigating the most primordial acts. It eventually developed into philosophical reflection in terms of transcendental patterns of consciousness and culminated in the theory of the transcendental ego. Husserl asserts:

The transcendental ego is not an object among other objects in the world, but the condition of possibility for the appearance of any object to a subject. It is subjectivity that constitutes the world and all its meaning. This phenomenology moves away from investigating objects as real and concentrates on describing how mental acts (conscious experiences) occur (Husserl, 2001: §5).

In order to explain this universality, Husserl defined intentionality as the fundamental property of consciousness: "The general thesis of intentionality, which states that every act of consciousness, precisely as consciousness, refers to an object, is the fundamental insight of phenomenology" (Husserl, 2012: 227). For him, there is no pure consciousness; rather there

is always a specific consciousness of something, as expressed in the famous motto of the phenomenologist: "All consciousness is consciousness of something" (ibid.) Thus, consciousness is a flow of representations, never itself, but part of the other: a flow of differences. In this sense, the Transcendental Ego is the possibility of this intentionality. In particular, these differences are pre-conditioned for thinking by ideation, as with *Vernunft*, which is the ability to contemplate essences or objects as intelligible intuitions. He defines it as follows: "The aim of ideation is to reach the pure essence of any lived experience, to grasp it in its ideal form, free from all empirical contingencies" (Husserl, 2001: 585). Husserl's efforts went beyond Kantian transcendentalism as he transcended objectivity in the classical sense by discovering his Transcendental Ego. As such, a transcendental interpretation replicates Descartes' and Kant's attempts to establish ontological-cognitive properties and duplicate consciousness. Husserl eventually arrived at the radical formulation of the Cogito. And even despite his intention to build a rigorous science, to develop more transcendental arguments for the epistemic patterns of consciousness, the existence of this transcendental ego and its adequacy to reality could remain vital subjects of debate. This may be because the trap of Kant's vicious transcendental dialectic has been overlooked, and we are on the verge of demonstrating specific conscious modalities in thought. This brings to mind the consequences in regard to the unconscious, as criticized in terms of the existential freedom and its priority of choice over any sort of repression within Sartre's philosophy. This is pursued with a critique of transcendental prejudices, which are deemed irrelevant to actual presence:

From a phenomenological perspective, Sartre formulated a well-known critique of the substantially understood unconscious. Since nothing could causally determine the meaning of a phenomenon, the strong understanding of the existence of drives and their representation, including the unconscious, lost its validity (Leder, 2007).

But could we really accept the existence of a more complex transcendental subjectivity, or any other form of unconsciousness as the *substantia prima*? To what extent is any notion of transcendental subjectivity adequate in representing human beings? As Andrzej Leder points out a similar methodological problem: "Subjectivity without objectification, without consciousness - essentially unconscious - must be made manifest through objectification [...] can we assume that this objectification preserves the essential meaning of what is objectified? (Ibid.)

Without any *egologisation* of subjectivity, our consideration of it would be reduced. The same applies to unconscious mind dynamics: if we only consider the presence only as the

conscious choice and responsibility, we would pass by insights provided by psychoanalysis. On the other hand, something would always be lost in objectification. This brings us back to the repetition of being within the bipolar methodologies. Therefore, a lack of criticality, at this stage could lead to the dominance of authority and ultimately a simplistic attitude towards consciousness. Instead, the maximum compromise in contemplating mental phenomena should be defined as the realm of intentional:

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not quite unambiguously, a reference to a content, a direction towards an object (not to be understood here as a reality) (Brentano, 1995: 88).

This shows consciousness as an unfolding pattern of intelligibility. The possession of objects, as a *relation* to the content, and the orientation or directiveness towards an object should not be understood as something real, but rather as an intrinsic, objectively expressed subjectivity or “immanent objecthood” (Husserl, 2012). This trope brings us back to the argument about intelligibility, showing its matter from a different perspective. Phenomenology is supposed to answer the following: "The task of phenomenology is to explore the nature of pure phenomena and to describe how these phenomena present themselves to consciousness" (Husserl, 2012: 44). The question of how the mind can explore the essences and interconnections of things establishes a tradition of phenomenological procedure, describing the emergence of intentional and ideational self-consciousness. However, these forms of objectification in the understanding of subjectivity raise concerns about whether essential meaning is preserved, since the inherent flux of consciousness precedes its categorical definition. Thus, the only fully legitimate consideration of phenomenology is the prospect of intentionality. As a method, it enables the exploration of subjectivity and brings multiple phenomenologies to life.

Martin Heidegger responded to this significantly by developing hermeneutic phenomenology. By introducing the dyad of ontic and ontological, he distinguished the realm of philosophical thought: "Ontological inquiry is primarily concerned with being; ontic inquiry is primarily concerned with entities and the facts about them" (Heidegger, 2008: 31). The German philosopher emphasized the need to re-examine the ontological nature of philosophy and the dominant entity - the human being - as a question of being. This is a critique of the scientifically oriented epistemic patterns and a reinterpretation of transcendental patterns that address axiomatic consciousness and history. Therefore, this philosophy preserves the metaphysical trace and is not limited, claiming its difference from

the scientific non-thinking, which frames the thought for the sake of rational, comprehensive goals:

"Science does not think". This is a shocking statement. It is meant to be, although it is not meant to denigrate science. It is meant to lead us to the real state of affairs, which is that science, as it is currently practised, is a form of non-thinking that conceals the true nature of being (Heidegger, 2004: 8).

Heidegger criticized scientifically oriented pure consciousness, stressing the importance of historicity and hermeneutic questions of presence. He preferred to retain his thought to contrast Husserl's phenomenology and its *onticity*, which fit consciousness ontology into the aesthetics of Minkowski's space-time. This ontic dimension is influenced by the structure of modern thought and negates being, thereby undermining its existence. When viewed as part of a specific method, it is not contradictory for transcendental consciousness to emerge as a consequence of the ontic philosophizing about human subjectivity. Instead, Da-Sein, which means to question existence *in the flesh*, fully corresponds to the ontological demand. It can be understood as the inequivalent substitution of the empirical consciousness (~~Bewusstsein~~), representing intentionality and human existence as Being-in-the-World and historicity.

After revising Aristotle's categories, Heidegger proposed an alternative predicative categorization of human beings - a specific perspective that must be philosophically accepted. By introducing unique categories inherent to human beings - the Existentials - aimed to describe perspectives for subjective self-opening in alternative existentialist terms relating to one's own being (Heidegger, 2008). Heidegger repeatedly departs from Husserl's epistemological considerations and emphasizes that consciousness interprets its place in life through hermeneutics grasping the meaning of its existence. This perspective combines aforementioned old medieval thinking that emphasises the importance of values, with the questioning of "whatness" and monadic Da-Sein. It shifts the focus on human subjectivity to be seen as *non-objective* or phenomenal, within the existential categories: Being-in-the-World, the care, thrownness, anxiety, and so on. This approach is similar to ethics in that it examines the reasons, meanings and goals of human life. However, it retains the first-person perspective of modern/transcendental thought, which continues to strive to understand the foundations of the mind as an almighty observer. To some extent, historicity reconstructs the figure of the Other here and maintains the need to view consciousness as corresponding to the world. This preserves some space for a non-classical view of

consciousness. It unites with the peculiarity of the methodological supplement, revealing the deep, pre-conscious, existentialist structures of experience.

Further explorations of consciousness within the phenomenological tradition - such as the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, Roman Ingarden, Emmanuel Levinas, Michel Henry, Marc Richir, and many others - have given rise to numerous arguments on constitutive, ethical, historical and aesthetic issues, among others. Some specific investigations extend to hermeneutics, existentialism, theories of embodiment, ontology and social being, as well as aesthetics, implementing various patterns of consciousness in self-reflection. This has provided different points for phenomenological development, creating a broader spectrum of phenomenological regions (Spiegelberg, 1994). However, this research would only consider these cases at a high level since the initial intention of this study is to specifically focus on different issues and uncover the constitutive elements that profoundly shape patterns of consciousness in both phenomenology and psychoanalysis. In order to enable the method to reflect ontologically and psychologically on the human being, we should implement specific hybrid considerations of phenomenally inherent radical apodicticity of conscious experience and remain between abstraction and embodiment.

Unlike phenomenology, psychoanalytic theory emerged from the practical experiences and clinical observations of Sigmund Freud and his followers. Psychoanalytic research is based on empirical experience from everyday life. On such an instance, he wrote: "Repression is a primary factor in causing trauma, and the essence of the traumatic situation is that it overwhelms the capacity of the mental apparatus to process stimuli, leading to a persistent state of arousal" (Freud, 2011: 30). This demonstrates the emergence of unsolved internal conflicts that influence one's mental life, forming the content of the patient's personal dramatic confusion for the sake of treatment. In psychoanalysis, the mental process unfolds differently and has its own rules. Implemented as inductive thinking, it concludes consciousness after focusing on its content. In particular, it investigates the traumatic events that, having been repressed in the depths of the psyche, repeat and manifest themselves as opaque facts of conscious life. At this point, such a search for consciousness coincides with the aforementioned approach to ethics, since the axiomatic search for meaning, which lies at the heart of psychoanalysis, is initially centered on life's values. Freud notes:

The superego represents all moral restrictions, the advocate of the impulse towards perfection. It represents the demands of the ideal as well as the limitations of the ego, and therefore comes into conflict with the latter (Freud, 2018: 37).

Thus, Freud conceptualizes non-sovereign consciousness as an axiomatic contradiction, but pro-monadic, as part of a tripartite psychic structure. This makes the Ego "not master in his own house. It is subject to the demands of the Id, the Superego, and the outside world, and must find a compromise between these competing forces" (Freud, 1995). The Id represents desires, while the Superego functions as a constraint and an executive adaptation mechanism. In this framework, consciousness experiences the ethical conflict between the id, the superego and the world. This functional logic indirectly addresses the three basic strategies revealed in the methodology of meta-ethics (Hursthouse & Pettigrove, 2023). The Id, thus, represents utilitarian ethical discourse, requiring one to act in a way that: "I do this because I do feel pleasure", which can sometimes consist of a naturalistic fallacy: "If this brings satisfaction, it is good". The superego, on the other hand, adheres to deontological ethical narrative: "I shall do it only this way", while the ego is aligning with consequentialist ethics, stating: "This act will cause this consequence if I do it". From this perspective, subjectivity is aligned with the ethical relationship to external objects and events, immersed in dialectics of different ethical discourses. This makes psychoanalysis consistent with the ancient-medieval tradition of acquiring virtue and embracing consciousness. The confusion in mind contributes to the argument that arises between different normative sets to construct and justify action, entangling initial, unresolved psychic complexes to the mind. This is especially the case, when it is connected to *naturalistic fallacy* (Moore, 2018), which enables the false obviousness of any pleasure to be certainly good and covers the prospects for initial neurosis and the *jouissance*.

Psychoanalytic technique describes discrete mental acts based on their classification as atomic manifestations through the categories of connected sensation-thought-emotion. Therefore, the consideration of the mind in the context of its long-term or continuous manifestation is important, as it enables demonstration of the repetitive subject through the naturalistic study of the behavior as in behaviorism, or as the holistic step-by-step completion as in Gestalt psychology (Koffka, 2013). However, the psychoanalytic repetition is a more complex return of an unconscious cluster, which can be compared to an encrusted Platonic remembrance of a singular act of understanding (Dolar, 2023). Which opposes atomic acts of unconscious modulation to be an appropriate methodology only for psychoanalysis.

Unlike psychoanalysis, phenomenology does not attempt to deconstruct intentions. Such phenomena as neuroses, complexes, etc. seem also to be understood as part of the *Natural Attitude*. When it comes to phenomenology, it takes such mental emanations "inside

the brackets". These presuppositions about things define and confuse the act of intention. In this research, therefore, we seek to deconstruct such the Natural Attitude, as if it was not only a part of mental life subordinated to a particular system of attained knowledge, but also as an emanation of the unconscious logic and thus interesting for the consciousness' research.

The leading pattern of consciousness and the meaning of subjectivity change depending on the point from which it is possessed. " $S \in P$ " might be also understood conversely as the subject being subordinated to something " $P \in S$ ". In this case, we declare someone is subject to the Natural Attitude or a certain state of affairs. This negates the sovereignty of consciousness and diminishes the agency of the subject. It is unclear now who or what processes the will of subjectivity, either internal forces of moral conflict or the guidance of the structures of desire and their principal unattainability. Locke's definition of consciousness proves inadequate when applied to Freud's theory. Pawel Dybel has remarked on this point:

The latent meaning of the symptom, the meaning that is found in it in a state of permanent denial, remains closely linked to a traumatic scene from the patient's past. It is essentially the meaning of the scene itself that the patient's self-knowledge is unable to accept (Dybel, 1995: 125).

By introducing the concept of the unconscious, Freud eliminates the possibility of directly accessible conscious knowledge of the self. This causes individuals to rely on interpretations made by analysts using specialized techniques and methods. The meaning of mental activity is influenced by non-obvious factors, making it impossible for individuals to consciously understand their actions. Finally, Jacques Lacan would define it more complexly by expanding on Freud's desire and the logic of the Tabou with a more structuralist premise of historicity: "The symbolic order is the order of culture, the world of words, language and laws, and it is through the symbolic that the human subject is integrated into society" (Lacan, 2002: 215). Will, desire and action are driven by forces (values) embodied in the symbolic. Human beings are subject to a specific Oedipal structure that remains active even in the most unnoticed and insignificant actions. Thus, the inner law, or axiomatic consciousness is constructed, through confrontation with the constitutive function of the Name-of-the-Father, which maps the tropes of desire. Which sets the polarized field of value and its denial, makes one available for reflective thought only as *post factum*. In this context, the functions of the unconscious can be seen as an inverted form of intentional consciousness that provides meaning through *Nachträglichkeit*, or afterwardsness. This meaning might subdue unobvious and subtle changes in its expression, storing the unconscious via metaphor or metonymy and

maintaining it through repression. Freud defines it as follows: "It is a well-known fact that trauma is not fully experienced at the moment of its occurrence, but only in a delayed reaction" (Freud, 2011: 32). Thus, when interpretation occurs as a result of something *else* than perception, the completion and deconstruction of the psychic syllogism extends far beyond the average timeframe of the logical syllogism. This makes psychoanalysis the study of conscious that falls out of usual linear dependency and proposes an unconventional and non-obvious way to the primordial meaning-making. In this model, the shortest distance between two points is not a straight line, but rather a complex temporal deconstruction, as being explicit through parabolic vision.

The crucial distinguishing accent is that both phenomenology and psychoanalysis are relevant to this research since they have investigated the foundations of the mental experiences in everyday life, which, however, are characterized by both an axiomatic pattern and its transcendental structure. Therefore, while preserving for consideration the quality of the intelligible subjective experience in both cases, we can partially reconcile contrary methodologies with the phenomenological requirement: ethics bridge the unconscious to make it a solid property of the mind. In psychoanalysis we consider the case with respect to the individual and their biographies, whereas phenomenological considerations focus only on the contemplative, general and ontological aspects of subjectivity. In psychoanalysis, consciousness is reflected in an inductive and questioning way. In contrast, phenomenology approaches it through intuition and reduction, with less methodological attachment to linguistic considerations and more to the constitution of direct representations, transcendentalism and cognition. It ignores the importance of the signification, desire and complex immediacy of the symbolic forms.

To this end, Sartre's distinction between positional and non-positional consciousness is useful. Positional consciousness is the inclusion of the subject in the horizon of immediacy and having direct awareness of perception: "What a nice tree!". Non-positional consciousness is the transition, due to the phenomenological reduction, to self-contemplative apperception, "I do see the tree that I found to be nice!". From this point of view, psychoanalysis studies aspects of positional consciousness, as constituting the history of ideas, and phenomenology that is inherently concerned with most general aspects of non-positional consciousness. As Mathew Boyle demonstrated, the situation of the analyst will also inevitably require a transition to non-positional consciousness (Boyle, 2024). Therefore holding the requirement for both, we preserve the deconstruction of immediate positional subjective inclusion which

is not, however, seen to be transparent simultaneously, thus creating the different task for each the phenomenologist and the analyst.

At the same time, this could equalize phenomenological and psychoanalytic reflection at this point. Psychoanalysis, thus, has its own transcendent aspect, which is hypothetical yet logical and connected to the transcendental. In this sense, consciousness appears as an emanation of the unconscious logic. Introducing his own method of analysis Freud, analogously to Husserl's *epoché*, steps to suspending the usual assumption of the transparency of consciousness and delving into the unrevealed realm. However, instead of uncovering a transcendental structure, Freud discovers elements of the unconscious dynamics to uncover variable resistive patterns of thought. The focus is therefore on "the relationship between what depends on a person's will "le volontaire" and what is independent of the will "l'involontaire" (Drwięga, 2020). The psychoanalytic process involves the patient becoming aware of the underlying conditions that give rise to inner conflicts or tensions. The treatment is a change and clarifies ethical attitudes. Things and events are therefore to be re-experienced, redefined and reintegrated. Since the process aims to dispel the illusions that hide behind the phenomena of everyday life, it becomes a kind of individual philosophical clarification - hermeneutics as a psychoanalytic step.

Jacques Lacan revolutionized psychoanalytic reflection on the unconscious by introducing a structural-linguistic method to psychoanalysis (Vincent, 2020). In contrast to Freud's attempt to ground the unconscious in mechanistic theory, Lacan rejected ontological inquiries into its nature, affirming instead its connection to the symbolic. However, what is common to both - they share the technique to deal with the unconscious, balancing either tension between psychic instances or fulfilling a symbolic absence in the Borromean knot of the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real. The Lacanian perspective corresponds to the update of the structuralist research method, in which all phenomena are treated as emanations of linguistic structures. The analysis involves the study of these structures and their influence on our cognitive abilities, in prolonged scope as habitual behaviors. However, it removes any importance for ontological considerations and regards the unconscious as an irrelevant question with a side-effect for being. If consciousness is mediated by language, it would shift self-reflection from self-sufficiency to interdependence with the Other, enforcing a relational pattern of consciousness. Ricoeur emphasizes that: "the unconscious - the thing is that it is neither being nor non-being; the unconscious is unrealized" (Ricoeur, 1977: 468). For this

and other reasons, Lacan's proposal of the optics of mental behavior via language would be very useful for this research.

Another interesting alternative to mention considering the development of a hybrid perspective on conscious experience in a therapy is the exciting fusion of psychoanalysis and phenomenology, exemplified in existential psychoanalysis, which was initiated by Sartre and further developed by Ludwig Binswanger. This approach offers a modification of Heidegger's philosophy through a unique understanding of psychoanalysis constituting itself as humanistic psychology, as opposed to either the conditioning of the experimental approach or the psychoanalytic striving for depth. Binswanger states: "Daseins-analysis, or existential analysis, seeks to understand the individual's existence by placing his experiences in the context of his Being-in-the-World" (Binswanger, 2003: 196).

In this regard, it is interesting to look at the case of Ellen West in Binswanger's analysis (Binswanger, 1958). The young woman experienced deep anxiety, depression, and eating problems, particularly severe dietary self-restriction. This frustration eventually drove her to suicide. Interpreting this event as an experience of existential guilt, Binswanger points out that the gap was between her real and her imagined self, since she believed that she deserved more from life. This unrealized fantasy caused her depression and anorexic control reactions. The problem lay in her inability to accept herself as she was and to stop punishing her body by trying to live up to ideals. Instead Ellen needed to take responsibility for her life and accept herself. Such existential reasoning correctly explains the situation surrounding existential therapy. They proposed that *the patient's search for meaning* was a philosophical extension of the original psychoanalytic quest. Rather than returning to a Freudian sense of the unconscious, they went the other way: "Existential analysis goes beyond the mere examination of psychological symptoms to explore the unique way in which each person inhabits his or her world" (Binswanger, 2003: 205). In Dasein analysis, however, the ability and necessity of individuals to give meaning to their reality is underestimated due to the importance placed on the self in providing a crucial interpretation of life. The paradox of freedom, of complete togetherness, is impossible without responsibility. The crisis of human existence arises from the absence of this inherent sovereignty in the attribution of meaning. When existential psychotherapy advocates the analysand to clarify the goals and the meaning of life, it is conducting an analysis of Dasein and its authentic presence - a common feature of philosophizing psychoanalysis in an existentialist way. At this point, an insecure and unhappy

consciousness is followed by a lack of meaning. This theme has become increasingly prevalent in general psychotherapeutic thought, particularly in humanistic psychology.

Logotherapy and Viktor Frankl took a similar approach: “Man's main concern is not to gain pleasure or to avoid pain, but rather to see a meaning in his life” (Frankl, 2006: 115). Frankl proposed that the absence of meaning is an existential vacuum, a state of absurdity in human existence. This makes it impossible to be fully present and alive; instead, life is lived among false beliefs. Therefore, in order to overcome this vacuum and false belief, a person should be guided by the method of *de-reflection*, which simplifies over-reflection on oneself by encouraging consideration of events and a more direct involvement in reality. The world itself will give meaning to action. This introduces a more realistic picture of existence than narcissistically built theoretical reflection, which creates the identity based on false beliefs and, consequently, suffering. These false beliefs form a Natural Attitude, a double of the personality, that leads one away from the real vision of things. The point is to clarify one's own position. Interestingly, although Frankl criticises psychoanalysis for its punditry and determinism, he consequently postulates freedom of choice and meaning, which sometimes turns out to be contradictory. When he uses the method of the paradoxical intention: a person becomes acquainted with their fear by approaching it or turning the intention against itself. For example, the fear of insomnia can be overcome by the intention to stay awake, which eventually eliminates the fear and allows a person to fall asleep peacefully. However, isn't Frankl referring here to the unconscious repression inherent in the human condition, and isn't he working with the psychoanalytic method? Of course, this may be an exaggerated fear on the part of the psychoanalysts, but not the real intention, which is to deal with and explore the variety of repression. The movement towards wakefulness in a sense compensates for the importance and inaccessibility of sleep in the fear of insomnia, thereby reducing negative expectations and stress. Therefore, although logotherapy and existential analysis are quite successful in continuing the tradition of humanistic psychology, the importance of the structures of the unconscious still remains important.

Every psychologically oriented discipline involves a certain theoretical pre-paternalisation of consciousness in order to create its vision. Thus, phenomenology also undergoes a transformation, moving away from the epistemic and transcendental patterns of consciousness towards more axiological and relational patterns. Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, attempts to adopt an axiological perspective, viewing it as an ontological reality and transforming the epistemic pattern to create a special science of the unconscious. While in the

following transcendental pattern, it assumes hidden structures rather than speculatively accessible ones. Existential psychology makes a similar shift, but in the aspect of the transcendental pattern it does not seek alternatives to the unconscious elements of dynamic and its ruptures, but constitutes distribution of existential freedom by overcoming various kinds of existential vacuums. Accordingly, the consequences and breadth of self-reflection are unfolded to its methodological guidelines in terms of patterns of consciousness.

While experimental psychology was initially more speculative in Wilhelm Wundt's time, based on introspection and the sensation-thought-emotion model, it has become an increasingly radical and dehumanising discipline. Atomic acts of consciousness are increasingly seen as an epiphenomenon of more general bodily behaviour or as part of a continuum of embodied experience, or as a habit. Behaviourism, in particular, eliminates any transcendental consciousness by revealing the subject as a scientifically observable entity. This expresses a radical form of epistemic pattern of consciousness in which the demand for scientificity and naturalism has reached such limits that it reduces inherent self-consciousness to observable animal behaviour. While Pavlov's conditioned reflexes and the reaction time investigations rightly showed the bodily component of experience, but as we have seen, it departed from the study of subjective experience in general focusing on sensory awareness and quantifying axioms and values rationally (Wertheimer & Puente, 2020). However, in the cognitivist approach the epistemic pattern of consciousness, comes along with a purified scientifically transcendental pattern. By implementing their own method, they pose consciousness as a complicated brain functional evolutionary integrated experience, and try to explicit monadically subjective in terms of its own science. Both approaches are also in accordance with relational patterns of consciousness, tightening up the habits and behaviour of the subject with the same scientifically oriented, purified intention.

What distinguishes this research is that it focuses on broadening relevant questions about human consciousness and meaning in other specific ways, that avoid framing thinking in existentialist or positivistic terms. Philosophical interpretations often overlook the profound insights of psychoanalysis by relying excessively on the assumption of complete self-transparency, which is empowered by the idea of the almighty Cogito. Methodologically, psychoanalysis is defined by the relational pattern of consciousness and by the *two-body psychology* rather than by the autonomous Cogito: "In the analytic experience, there are always two bodies at play, that of the analyst and the analyzand, and it is through the discourse between these two bodies that the unconscious can speak" (Lacan, 2002: 126).

Consequently, the truth of the subject only emerges between the two participants in the process. The sufficiency of psychoanalysis rests on the critical role that conversation plays in exploring the extent to which human beings could be responsive and hermeneutic without the other. As one of Freud's patients described it: "I wish only one thing, that all my patients have such a wonderful 'talking cure' as I have had" (Freud and Breuer, 2000: 81).

The language leads to affective nominalistic incrustations of the self and conversation aims to uncover those of an individual's underlying concerns, allowing repressed feelings, etc., to surface through tears and pain. This approach challenges the linear understanding of cognitive processes. Therefore, we should agree with Pawel Dybel that psychoanalysis should be considered a specific kind of hermeneutics. He noted:

For this reason, abreaction is a very clear signal of success in therapy. It is a hermeneutic phenomenon; it signals that even seemingly purely emotional, drive-driven behaviour of the patient, remaining in close connection with the sense of the repressed, can only be read and understood because of this sense (Dybel, 1995: 137).

Reciprocity in treatment and the deepening of dialogue in setting are necessary conditions for the development of treatment as such. Awareness alone does not lead to the incorporation of the repressed unconscious: it must be complemented by the progressive elimination of the resistances that prevent its communication and cherished self-reflection. This establishes an increasingly close link between the unconscious as a logical agency and its verbal expression. Generally, the psychoanalytic approach interprets the dynamics of the unconscious and provides an interpretation of its own movement. As an alternative to the metaphysical view, this is consciousness shaped by inherent layers of memory, unfolded in an axiomatic paradigm.

A medical mentality drove Freud and his followers to alleviate suffering from mental pathology and to proclaim the possibility of dissolving psychic complexes. For them, that necessitated therapy by changing internal judgements about past events. Thus, the appropriate reintegration of traumatic memories into the realm of consciousness becomes a critical factor in treatment. For Cogito, however, these pieces would remain invisible. They would be unable to appeal to its omnipotent narcissism and would never acknowledge that what was missing is back. When faced with the emanation of resistance as transference, the analyst must identify the sensitive aspects of the individual's psychic constitution and world representations in order to transform their evaluation from negative, as causing neurotic effects, to neutral or positive (Jones, 2004). By altering the evaluation of an event, the

patient's conscious attitude to that particular act is changed, subsequently improving the analysand's quality of life. Therefore, the boundaries of the ego are mutable and fluid. It becomes clear that, within the realm of the unconscious, internal systems and rules operate according to their own settings, ultimately influencing the trajectory of consciousness. Consequently, we can view psychoanalysis as offering ethical solutions.

In contrast, other conclusions about consciousness, those of an ontological nature, arise from Freud's creative induction and naturalistic intuition. While Reciprocity in treatment and deepening dialogue are necessary conditions for developing treatment. Simply being aware of the repressed unconscious is not enough: this must be complemented by the progressive elimination of the resistances that prevent communication, as well as by cherished self-reflection. This establishes an increasingly close link between the unconscious as a logical agency and its verbal expression. Generally, the psychoanalytic approach interprets the dynamics of the unconscious and provides an interpretation of its own movement. As an alternative to the metaphysical view, consciousness is shaped by inherent layers of memory that unfold in an axiomatic paradigm. Freud and his followers were driven by a medical mentality to alleviate suffering and pathology and proclaim the possibility of dissolving psychic complexes. For them, this required therapy to change internal judgements about past events. Thus, the appropriate reintegration of traumatic memories into the realm of consciousness becomes a critical factor in treatment. For Cogito, however, these pieces would remain invisible. They would be unable to appeal to its omnipotent narcissism and would never acknowledge that what was missing had returned.

When faced with resistance in the form of transference, the analyst must identify the sensitive aspects of the individual's psyche and worldview in order to transform their evaluation from negative (causing neurotic effects) to neutral or positive (Jones, 2004). Altering the evaluation of an event changes the patient's conscious attitude towards that particular act, subsequently improving the analysand's quality of life. Therefore, the boundaries of the ego are mutable and fluid. It becomes clear that, within the realm of the unconscious, internal systems and rules operate according to their own settings, ultimately influencing the trajectory of consciousness. Consequently, we can view psychoanalysis as providing ethical solutions.

In contrast, other conclusions about consciousness, of an ontological nature, arise from Freud's creative induction and naturalistic intuition. While these conclusions have philosophical significance, they may also be the result of an excessive mythologisation of a

particular realm of being. This is evident in the well-known negative arguments about sexuality in psychoanalysis: "Freud overemphasises the role of sexual conflict and neglects the importance of social factors and individual striving for superiority" (Adler, 1998: 27). Instead, this research aims to explore the ideas of consciousness proposed and implied within phenomenology and psychoanalysis from a specific methodological perspective. These investigations invite critical examination of the mind, as well as challenging the reconciliation of these contrasting disciplines. Contemporary thought often greets these approaches with scepticism, viewing both phenomenology and psychoanalysis as outdated and biased theories. Consequently, we might consider this intention as natural and consistent: to question the relevance of some of the theories, despite they may nevertheless have very productive and heuristic potential.

Phenomenology has also undergone a series of transformations, beginning with Husserl, who sought to establish apodictic foundations for the experience by preserving the abstractness and necessity that follows epistemic and transcendental patterns of consciousness. However, Heidegger's philosophy, often seen as a traditional successor and critic Husserl's, turned phenomenology on its head by establishing a hermeneutic ontological phenomenology, similar to Marx's transformation of Hegel's philosophy. Perhaps he wanted to transform Husserl's transcendental epistemic patterns of consciousness with an existential shift, back to axiomatic consciousness, in order to create an advanced study on human beings. Subsequently, many phenomenologists shifted their focus to detailed analyses of phenomena and the realms of human existence, inspiring existentialism and various experiments in anthropological inquiry. The most compelling aspect of phenomenology for European thought is the phenomenological method (Pham, 2021). This method demands individual commitment and poetically asks each thinker to take a personal risk in identifying the processes of thought and the constitutive foundations of subjectivity. Recognising intentionality as a fundamental constitutive structure gave twentieth-century philosophers hope for a new understanding and freedom of thought. What may sound paradoxical is that freedom of thought is possible as demanded if there are already presupposed requirements of apodicticity.

Interestingly, philosophy, or the philosophers who pursued it, found themselves at the crossroads of the real and the imaginary. Truth emerged at the boundary between the visible and the invisible and the nature of objects and non-objects had to be re-installed as a question of intentionality. Constantly enveloped by new perspectives from the hidden, they were

waiting to be revealed and spoken. It is what makes philosophy charming and inspiring. This concept was later expressed as Being-in-the-World, which implies a specific openness and requires the hermeneutic capacity to glimpse this openness. Nevertheless, it still holds an exposition of a different kind of Cogito structure, which is well preserved in the tone of the First Cartesian Meditations and has inspired modern philosophy. It represents the image of the thinker as a Cartesian experimenter who found itself in thought - a universal symbol for phenomenology and philosophy as a whole:

But immediately after this I observed that, while I thus wished to think that all was false, it was absolutely necessary that I, who thus thought, should be something; and as I observed that this truth, I think, therefore I am, was so certain and of such evidence that no ground of doubt, however extravagant, could be raised by the sceptics who were able to shake it, I concluded that I could without scruple accept it as the first principle of the philosophy for which I was in search (Descartes, 2017, §2).

Thinkers cannot confine themselves to specific knowledge. In their thinking, they aim at constant questioning and doubting - a search for truth based through vague introspection and intuitive adequacy. Like a phenomenologist, a scientist always runs the risk of being misled in their thinking. Such an act can be disruptive and challenging to established identities and the stability of conscious existence - the process of change and convergence. Truth requires the courage to overlook established perceptions and to transcend repetitive psychological or logical mechanisms. In the psychoanalytic sense, however, truth embodies a distinct constitutive aspect of conscious life. In everyday experience, the seemingly simple question "Why did you turn right instead of left?" may hold more significant cognitive potential for understanding specific subjectivity than a merely exploring of habit or repetition built into intentionality. The choice of direction when leaving a building is more important to one's life because a person unconsciously follows the trajectory laid out by numerous unconscious repetitive structures. Phenomenology ignores these individual and subtle facts of life.

Here, we observe the first intersection of phenomenology and psychoanalysis in relation to intentionality, albeit in different forms. Both disciplines seek to explore the foundations of behaviour, thought, perception and knowledge; however, their approaches to observing these phenomena diverge from the everyday perspective. Psychoanalysis also pursues logical forms, but its conceptualisation and *episteme* operate within the realm of non-linear, symbolically oriented everyday anthropology. Meanwhile, transcendental phenomenologists strive to bring to self-reflection the aesthetics of the beholder the algebraic

and geometric epistemes. The phenomenological method resembles the seek for the philosopher's stone, as the dialectical method, dedicated to be as ultimate self-doubt, was once considered a quest for omniscience of the *a priori*. As Heidegger noted:

Husserl's emphasis on the ideal of omniscience overlooks the fundamental finitude and historicity of human existence. Understanding is always situated within a specific context and history and cannot transcend its temporal and spatial limits (Heidegger, 2008: 40).

Psychoanalysis also tries to claim omniscience, but it is more deeply connected to biographical inclusion and transference. We have always been able to see the exact difference between the two, but with a different empirical aspect of inclusion. Phenomenological consideration of abnormal states of consciousness should cease, as these could destroy absolute phenomenological apodicticity. In other words, we should ignore the thing in order to build a well-structured system. This limits the scope for phenomenological consideration. In a sense, this is a common trait among philosophers who try to grasp the essence of being within a certain universality, recalling the contradiction of the Faustian spirit of European culture. Oswald Spengler points out:

The Faustian soul regards the world as a problem to be solved, an infinite space to be conquered, a task to be accomplished. It is characterised by a boundless striving and a will to power that drives Western civilisation towards exploration, innovation and expansion (Spengler, 1991: 183).

The phenomenological method might be more valuable as a humanistic perspective than as a scientific *mathesis universalis*, competing with its rival to establish an epistemic pattern of consciousness. Similarly, psychoanalysis has been criticized in regard to scientific psychology. The first editions of the International Classification of Diseases were based on psychoanalytic terminology and Cartesian distinction between mental illnesses as of bodily and non-bodily origin. However, with the emergence of numerous alternative therapeutic approaches, the imposition of censorship, and the critical reassessment of medical and social terms, psychoanalysis and Cartesian views has often been debated to have a wrong ideological commitment, weak empirical background, pharmacological inadequacy insufficiency as others (Shorter, 1997). These and other negative events in its history have often led to the illusionary *downfall of idols* and positioned psychoanalysis as unnecessary, insufficient or irrelevant. However, the meta analytic data on other therapies that show superior short-term therapeutic effects, such as Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT), gives better results only within the first 18 months. The long-term results of psychoanalytic treatment prove to be significantly more powerful, leading to the attainment of integrated autonomy for the patient. In this respect, the meta-analyses agree on one point:

Long-term psychoanalytic therapy has been found to produce significant and sustained improvements in a range of psychological disorders. Meta-analyses indicate that these benefits tend to increase over time, suggesting that psychoanalysis may have lasting effects (Leichsenring, 2008: 1558).

These quantitative indicators suggest a fundamental misunderstanding of their depth rather than the superiority of one method over another. CBT aims to redirect patients towards more productive and positive behaviours quickly by changing destructive habits and cognitive narratives. In contrast, the subject of psychoanalysis seeks to delve into the essence of a particular habit and become a *passent*, with the aim of achieving symbolic dissociation and becoming a *passent* — someone who has transcended their desires. Lacan defines this as follows: "The end of analysis involves a passage in which the subject crosses the fantasy and confronts the real. The pass formalises this transition and allows the analyzand to articulate the change that has taken place" (Lacan, 2002: 615). From then on, the subject should become aware of their inner constitution, similar to the choice of turning right or left mentioned above. CBT discourages certain direction of choice, whereas psychoanalysis seeks to uncover the underlying reasons for the chosen direction. Lacan made similar criticisms: "American psychoanalysis, especially in its form of ego psychology, is a betrayal of the Freudian discovery. It focuses on adaptation and the ego at the expense of the unconscious and the drives" (Lacan, 2002: 158). He accuses American thought of turning psychoanalysis into a psychology of success - a methodology focused on achieving efficiency. In his view, this approach distracts from the essence of the inquiry and avoids the goal of the search: causes and essences. There are various reasons why phenomenology and psychoanalysis repeatedly fight for their relevance. This is not only due to the prevalence of alternative theories of subjectivity, dominant in poststructuralism, postmodernism, literary criticism, naturalistic thought, cognitive science, and other human anthropologies, but also due to the inertia of positivism or banal neurotic repression. Positivism instils the expectation that each successive theory must surpass the previous one in perfection, diminishing the importance of the previous one and failing to take into account the possibility of falsifying specific hypotheses. This makes it impossible for humanistic views to become fully scientific. However, within the realm of the mind, all phenomena possess a self-sufficiency in that they possess individual subjective testimony and its description. This is something that occurs

with repression and through the disruptive power of truth. Its dynamics of this must be contrasted with our familiarity with objectivity in order to reveal its specific nature.

Any form of identification serves as a means of self-preservation and self-limitation. It constitutes the hermeneutic process which is unique to the humanistic disciplines that encourages the scepticism of science. This carries with it the dangers and risks that one must be prepared to face in order to establish something scientific. Psychoanalysis is also repressed because of its association with sexualisation, which is considered unworthy of respectable individuals. Ironically, social norms have inevitably underwent significant changes in the XXst century due to sexual and feminist revolutions. Perhaps that is an indicator of importance rather than inappropriate focus (Heuer, 2010: 120).

Furthermore, psychoanalysis does not consider sexual relations to be *natural*. According to Lacan, sexual relationships are contingent; there is no such thing as 'how men and women relate to each other in the act of love'. It is merely part of a symbolic-imaginary attitude that is open to deconstruction. Compared to the success of Buddhism and its preoccupation with the mastery of desire, psychoanalysis thus became an instrument of liberation. Yet, for many, phenomenology and psychoanalysis are seen as passing trends or styles of thought. But this is not about trends; philosophy transcends the formal and moves towards the pre-formal. Both provide us with rich tools. The future of this philosophy depends solely on having the courage to rethink and reassess, to master the ability to go beyond the limits of understanding, prejudice and expectation.

Contemporary empirical approaches to the study of consciousness seek to address questions about the embodiment of consciousness. This brings us to the modern distinction between the "easy" or "soft" and "hard" problems of consciousness - namely, the problem of the origin of experience in the context of brain science. This approach rightly distinguishes between different levels of experience and givenness. For instance, what happens in perception is an element of sensory *awareness*. Which is accompanied by an inherent phenomenal experience that is not reducible to the previous one. Its character is intelligible, and it is defined by phenomenal categorisation or qualia. This is called *phenomenal consciousness*. The field in which they both manifest for contemplation is called *access consciousness*, or reflective consciousness (Lanfranco et al., 2023). If we were to compare phenomenological thought with this, we would quickly see the similarities between the noematic levels of constitution and the noetic correlates of consciousness as inherent categories of experience. It also reveals the similarities between pure consciousness

performing acts of phenomenological and eidetic reduction. Just as in the Kantian distinction between *Verstand* and *Vernunft*. The same aspects of consciousness that are not empirically studied from a phenomenological point of view are the same aspects of the justification of perception that form the gap between perception consciousness and subjective experience. In the first case this is called the hard problem of consciousness, in the other it led to the various approximate concepts of passive synthesis, which in principle constitutes the fact of a certain genesis of experience. When it comes to the realm of the subjective for methodological reasons it does not interfere with it empirically. Therefore postulated superiority of naturalistic methodology eventually faces irreducibility of subjective experience. David Chalmers describes it as:

The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whirl of information processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel put it, there is something about being a conscious organism. The complex problem is to explain why these processes are accompanied by experience (Chalmers, 1995: 200).

For this and other reasons, this dissertation's study of consciousness is more concerned with describing the implicitness of subjective experience. However, it also considers the 'easy' problem of consciousness in relation to the logic of the appearance of atypical intelligible constitution. It therefore takes a partial approach to the relationship between intelligibility and embodied cognition, based on neuropsychanalytic observations from the clinical vignettes in Chapter 4. This methodological approach builds on the quest to specify subjective experience in relation to its embodiment. Another attempt of the hybrid methodology that coincides with Chalmers' statement: 'The easy problems of consciousness are those that seem directly amenable to the standard methods of cognitive science, where a phenomenon is explained in terms of computational or neural mechanisms' (Chalmers, 1995: 205). We will use some of these perspectives' terms to distinguish the different aspects of conscious experience production. From a phenomenological perspective, we retain the methodological disregard of content and noema, whereby thought considers itself via noesis. Conversely, in psychoanalysis, all mental acts and their products have heuristic value in elaborating on the embodied unconscious, pre-noesis and pre-noema, in relation to affective stimulation and various atypical experience formation. The hard problem demonstrates the limitations of such thinking; therefore, the explication of embodied constitution may reveal crucial yet problematic dependencies of consciousness.

Another topic that reveals consciousness through phenomenal research is the concept of minimal phenomenal experience (MPE), which describes the simplest form of consciousness. This is characterised by an absence of familiar content, such as thoughts, emotions, bodily sensations, temporal or spatial reference points, and a sense of self. This state is often associated with deep meditation and is described as 'pure awareness' or 'consciousness itself'. This approach is based on the idea of minimal manifestations of the phenomenal, and the inherent emptiness of intentionality. Consistent meditative dissociation from habitual, natural inclinations aligns with the notion that controlling the data of experience during contemplation enables one to break free from established patterns of association and embrace pure, unadulterated contemplation or conscious presence (Metzinger, 2013). On the one hand, this approach helps us to understand the peculiarities of experience on a small scale. This is particularly evident when such acts are associated with minimal brain activity during the non-REM sleep stage, as revealed by MRI diagnostics. This allows us to identify the boundaries of the mind's manifestation in the body and in direct awareness. In the future, a map of mind-brain integration could enhance our understanding. However, the implications of these studies for macro-levels of phenomenal experience remain to be discovered, bringing us back to more traditional approaches.

The analysis focuses on individual dynamics surrounding consciousness, whereas phenomenology seeks to understand it through generalised concepts. The phenomenological method requires an unbiased viewpoint and postulates an ideal of knowledge that is synonymous with experience. Psychoanalysis, with its complex interpretation process, provides a means of understanding and exploring subjectivity. Therefore, it is worth considering whether phenomenology provides a distinct tool with which to understand psychoanalytic phenomena, despite its terminology resembling abstract logical contemplation, by ignoring the collision between cogito and two-body psychology.

At first glance, both seem to contradict Wittgenstein's covenant for the proper use of language in science, which involves filtering out meaningless statements. 'What we cannot talk about, we must pass over in silence' (Wittgenstein, 2010: §7). Which is similar to Kant's critical approach, where the unverifiable, irrational aspects characteristic of philosophy are relegated to the realm of historical inventory. From this perspective, phenomenology and its methods might ultimately be categorised as an exaggerated form of introspective psychology, while psychoanalysis can be dismissed as pseudoscience concerning the pathological consciousness of an uncertain inner self. Nevertheless, non-scientific modes of description

are not only possible, but also necessary. The status of consciousness presents inherent difficulties from the outset. It is impossible to ascribe objective qualities to consciousness, despite it often being described in synonymous terms. The linguistic self-enclosure of consciousness, with limited access to sensibility, may seem to restrict the possibility of investigating any subjectivity while unifying it. Human consciousness, knowledge and coexistence would only emerge as shared perspectives — functions of attributive language. Furthermore, consciousness is always intertwined with and enacted in the world, and we should investigate this interdependence. The correlation of consciousness with the world endows it with objective and transparent features. This concept is similar to Hegel's definition of logic as something familiar yet unknown and abstract (Hegel, 2010).

The awareness of the nature of our conscious experience is inherent in human beings, but this is not self-evident. Similarly, large groups of psychologists and philosophers often underestimate the cognitive nature of psychological matters. Conversely, attempting to divide the psyche into two or three distinct entities complicates philosophical understanding rather than clarifying it, as it repeats the search for the transcendental ego. Therefore, we should hybridise our perspective and reconsider our adherence to beliefs about the mind to recognise their deep connection to both conceptual and affective aspects, for the sake of a different unity. As Antonio Damasio refers to Descartes' error:

The abyssal separation between body and mind, between the sizable, dimensioned, mechanically operated, infinitely divisible body stuff, on the one hand, and the unsizable, undimensioned, unpushpullable, non divisible mind stuff; the suggestion that reasoning, and moral judgement, and the suffering that comes from physical pain or emotional upheaval might exist separately from the body (Damasio, 2005: 250).

Thus, this way of thinking requires us to re-evaluate the affective. Since both consciousness and affect are connected to the body, their phenomenal presence should adhere to the mind's logical structure. Therefore, any hypothesis of affect must be developed as a thoughtful inference.

Repression is a response to real-life situations that are often perceived as negative or challenging experiences. When there is no understanding or plan for what is happening, these instances are seen as dissociated ethical expressions of human existence. However, considering the distinction between logical and affective aspects raises other questions. For instance, why are ethical representations connected to affect? And how does therapeutic catharsis through conversation lead to emotional release? Such an approach must pay attention to the logic presented through the affect and how this alters the game. Therefore, it

is reasonable to assume that certain conscious matters are neither purely affective nor transcendental, but rather hybrid by nature — what we might term quasi-transcendental. This hybridised unconscious represents different levels of mind integration into the constitution of experience. Here, we might consider certain elements of rational involvement in the unconscious constitution. As mentioned previously, the content of the unconscious is axiomatic, so we might conclude that it is the expression of teleological intuition representing the transcendental faculty (Kant, 2008). This constitutes the intentionality mixed with the specific regulatory idea alongside perception. This consideration assumes the logic of judgement in connection with an aesthetic faculty of imagination that transforms certain objects of perception into an inverted aesthetic manifestation. The latent contents of dreams are connected to this hybridised logic. Freud noted the following in this regard: 'The dream work then transforms latent thoughts into manifest content. This transformation is brought about by means of condensation, displacement, and considerations of representability' (Freud, 2010: 311). In the novel *1984*, Winston's recurring dream of the Golden Country symbolises freedom, rebellion and the power of nature. This contrasts sharply with the oppressive, controlled world of Oceania. The dream is an escape from the Party's influence, representing a desire for a natural, untamed life (Orwell, 2021). The case represents the means of changing the representation of thoughts in dreams implementing a different set of the content modulations via signifiers in the mind, representing unconscious transformative and aesthetic function. Here, the mind preserves the logic of spontaneous causality, while subduing concrete form and dependence on the core meaning, making it possible to analyse. Thus, certain transcendental structures in the mind are involved in forming dreams and linking the unconscious to a transcendental framework.

It is interesting to consider why Husserl did not investigate the nature and structure of affect and imagination in relation to the constitution of phenomenal experience. Even in situations of anxiety and mood swings, their correlates demonstrate that they directly influence the representation of reality. So why has apodicticity diminished this other apodicticity? In psychoanalysis, affect would signifies the inherent extension of the phenomenon and could even fit into the logic of the *objet petit a* to indicate its incorporation to the individual unconscious. The desire modifies the meaning of phenomena as a representation of transformative noesis. Thus, the thesis develops a specific methodology for the studying patterns of consciousness.

According to Husserl, the phenomenological tradition is based on the fundamental premise of its method, known as phenomenological reduction: "Phenomenological reduction is the method by which we suspend our natural attitude towards the world and its objects in order to concentrate purely on the conscious experiences themselves" (Husserl, 2012: 227). In their quest for knowledge, philosophers must uncover the implicit, constitutive structures of experience in order to draw universal conclusions about them. The pursuit of universality in phenomenology requires the congruence between experience and expertise. This excludes any atypical states of consciousness associated with mental health issues and individual diversity. Consequently, phenomenology seeks to avoid cases of 'alternative' consciousness that are unhealthy, and this requirement is both well founded and self-limiting. Thus, the method is realised as a descriptive procedure that explores only the inherent, linear, *a priori* dynamics of experience. For example, with the reflection of time in the form of retention or protention (Husserl, 2019).

Psychoanalysis or the psychodynamic approach works with an opposing discourse. Since the therapist's goal is to help others with their emotional difficulties, they also engage with a universal experience. However, with the material of everyday life, when conscious matter is comprehended as internal conflicts, psychic dissociation is in the search for reconciliation. Thus, phenomenology provides the basis for the archaeology of knowledge and being, while psychoanalysis deals with the lived experience of human beings *per se*. Each of them shows the presence of its own disciplinary perspective, but limited to a broader picture.

The point is that there are many psychic phenomena, such as moods, hallucinations, etc. that do not have referents like those of perception or desire, nor do they fulfill Brentano's demand to be intentional. Instead, they are co-intentional with subjectivity; their temporality is a mere blink. Nevertheless, they influence the noesis mentioned to the relation to the interpretation of the fact. It is, in a sense, drastically obvious. Which is analogous to the transformation of Dr. Jekyll into Mr. Hyde, in which two distinct ethical personalities coexist within the same body (Stevenson, 2016). To show that emotions, which were previously considered hopelessly subjective, irrational and unimportant, have a specific certainty that can be considered objective or even intersubjective. There is hardly a need to emphasise this, although the experience of this analogue of theoretical self-evidence does not in itself guarantee its indisputability — just as is the case with uncritical self-evidence in the theoretical domain.

We need to address another of these paradoxes. In Husserl's philosophical writings, and even in some of his published works, there are programmatic statements about epochal discoveries that are expected to emerge from the 'infinite horizons' opened up by his phenomenology. However, there is a striking disproportion between the long delay and the lack of fulfilment of these promises. Phenomenology simply had to proclaim itself as imminent. The same can be said of the extensive history of his manuscripts, which number an astonishing 40,000 pages of italic text, withheld and postponed for the future in Husserl's archives in Louvain. This disproportion also reflects the oscillation between extreme pride in his new achievements for the phenomenological method and uncertainty surrounding the specific phenomenological terminology. This temporary despair led to a variety of new developments within the established framework of his followers. In other words, his work could be viewed as a comprehensive, self-contained system, meaning any new philosophy would necessarily have to 'overcome' it. Their approaches are valid because they focus on specific aspects of experience and fulfil their original aims. History shows that phenomenology has encountered such barriers, as exemplified by Heidegger's attempt to shift the focus of thought from constitution to Dasein. Similarly, so-called 'late' Husserl overcame himself by shifting the focus to the analysis of the Life-World: 'The Life-World is the world of simply given objects with their particular properties, in their simple definiteness; objects of direct experience and of simple manipulation' (Husserl, 2021: 118).

Nevertheless, this provided a valuable tool for contemplating essence. Important work was also done on acts of generic experience, descriptions of changes in consciousness, intentionality and ideation, which had been overlooked by traditional empiricism. Universalities of the mind and qualia, such as the essence of a colour, are only grasped intuitively in individual instances. This demonstrates the dependence of thinking on the act of conceiving, as it is a primary type of experience. Thinking cannot be reduced to the isolation of abstractions or selective attention, as these can only isolate individual objects and lack the capacity for universalisation with regard to the logic of presence.

Similarly, psychoanalysts can make arguments. Their task of helping individuals become aware of their self-ignorance does not require the creation of a philosophical system. Indeed, such a requirement may indicate the analyst's lack of training, rather than that of psychoanalysis itself. Consequently, some levels of self-reflexivity become obscured, reducing the philosophical component of the analysis of consciousness as it relinquishes its own purpose in favour of resolving emotional conflicts. The main aim should be to reveal the

inherent structures more broadly, rather than merely declaring the benefits of mental health practices — besides which, both aspects are necessarily intertwined.

In light of these consequences, the proposed research sees a cross-complementation of the data from the studied approaches, specifically the philosophical extension of psychoanalysis and psychopathology. This involves reinterpreting them in search of a priori unconscious psychodynamic mental constitutions, thereby filling the gap left by phenomenology. Subjectivity is implicit in being and provides an alternative methodology. A similar expansion can be seen in Francisco Varela's contemporary neurophenomenology. After reconsidering phenomenology in light of the increased focus on embodied cognition, Varela stated: 'Cognition is not the representation of a given world by a given mind, but rather the enactment of a world and a mind' (Varela, 1991: 9). Since the body determines every action, thinking remains empirical. This is analogous to our research, which seeks to extend classical transcendental considerations to a specific quasi-transcendental region in order to investigate the psyche's structures involved in consciousness formation. Consequently, this dissertation will explore phenomenology as a framework for psychoanalytic interpretations of consciousness. The focus is therefore on the interdependency of constitutive foundations — relations that might jointly explain consciousness in a specific and comprehensive manner. As a complementary point, we can recall Kant's statement: 'Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind' (Kant, 1998: 193).

The post-Hegelian understanding of consciousness seems to subordinate it to something else, as in the relational patterns of consciousness. It constitutes an alternative ontology of subjectivity, a de-anthropocentrism. On the contrary, phenomenological philosophy incorporates the corpus of concepts and configurations of self-consciousness attributed to the philosophy of modernity. Although it also includes the argument on intersubjectivity, it does not seem more than a description of the constitutional acts, with no consideration of contextual historicity or normativity (Husserl, 2013).

Situated between two epistemes, the possibility of new interpretations could appear at the focal point of their perspectives. The unconscious is always trying to reveal itself through *another*, via the logic of substitution, so that we can look at it again. Freud said: "Consciousness may be compared to a fountain playing in the sun and falling back into the great subterranean pool of the unconscious from which it rises" (Freud, 2010: 105). The unconscious is a part of subjectivity that strives to become a whole - an element of perception and everyday life. This intuition has become a core of the European tradition of

self-reflection, which, despite its repression, returns in various forms to the discourse of philosophy until it finds its *recognition* in the reflective disciplines.

iii. Structure of the Research

In this work, we will consider the issue of consciousness from five thematic perspectives. Each perspective projects subjectivity and consciousness within the following categories: being, logic, language, embodiment and self-reflection. We will use phenomenology and psychoanalysis to understand these relations and how they are categorically experienced via consciousness.

The first section focuses on grounding the temporal structures of experience. The phenomenological interpretation of time is fundamentally different from that of psychoanalysis. In everyday life, consciousness shows that the temporal characteristics specific to subjectivity vary from person to person, being more or less intensified. At the same time, for phenomenology, the elements of experience remain as descriptions of immanent consciousness. They do not change. In psychoanalysis, which proposes another temporal approach to interpretation, sees time as the key to uncovering subjectivity as consisting of unconscious phenomena. It is seen as a process of *working through*. Freud explains at this point:

We have learned that the patient cannot remember the whole of what is repressed in him and that he is obliged to repeat the repressed material as a contemporary experience instead of...remembering it as something belonging to the past. These reproductions, which emerge with such unwished-for exactitude, always have as their subject some portion of infantile sexual life—of the Oedipus complex, that is, and its derivatives, and they are invariably acted out in the sphere of the transference, of the patient's relation to the physician (Freud, 2018).

Repressions, projections, etc, thus indicate the temporal nature of the unconscious phenomenal sequence and modulation. They also emphasise their retentive nature complexed in the unconscious, that recalls itself in actual moments. In a roundabout way, they prove the transcendental character of its structures, thus legitimising its transition to philosophical consideration. First and foremost, the obvious and elusive aspect of consciousness is its temporal nature. As we could follow Kant's:

Time is a necessary representation that grounds all intuitions. In it alone can any reality of phenomena be represented. These same phenomena can be annihilated in thought, but time itself, as the universal condition of their possibility, cannot be so annulated (Kant, 1998: A31/B46).

Consciousness has ceased to be merely a mirror reflecting flawless nature or a moral centre of action. Instead, it has been revealed as a complex *a priori* structure of inherent logic. Dealing with this issue raises fundamental ontological questions. It is not as simple as saying that the categories of consciousness are unified to make our experiences possible. Recognising things as they actually are is not effortless; philosophers spend considerable effort contemplating the temporal intricacies of knowledge and mental processes. Empiricism without a specific approach remains naive.

Time is associated with motion, since it defines its quantity and change. The question of the connection between motion and time has a long history and has been crucial and essential to ontology since Plato. This is beautifully illustrated in Plato's dialogue, *Parmenides*, where the problem of motion and time occupies a significant place and would be considered in terms of the research' interest.

What else can we say about time itself, which seems incomprehensible to us? Time is an intrinsic part of existence and things, revealing itself in thoughts' continuous flow of representations. How to distinguish the time givenness properly. As Zeno demonstrated:

The second is the so-called "Achilles," and it amounts to this, that in a race the quickest runner can never overtake the slowest, since the pursuer must first reach the point whence the pursued started, so that the slower must always hold the lead (Aristotle, 2023: 239b15).

We encounter an apparent impossibility in his paradoxes, such as when Achilles cannot overtake the slower or the tortoise. Aristotle solved this problem by considering the impossibility of this aporia due to substituting the concepts of infinity. Potential infinity implies the unfolding imaginary division constituted over time of an event in a specific virtual space and time, while the thing of it lies in indivisibility, the limitation of the actual infinity in thoughtful misuse of concreteness. Thus, thought within potential infinity replaces actual infinity with inappropriate division of time-space and makes Achilles' success impossible. Also, if we consider this situation as a kind of physical equation, we realise that time is not included but implemented as infinite discrete portions. As a result, Achilles can never overtake the tortoise, because their timing could not be synchronised. However, if we introduce time into the equation, Achilles will eventually catch up. The problem, then, lies in the distribution of the idea of time in thinking or via the changes it appears in the thought. This study of time was central to ancient thought and is presented as an example to convey a more profound message on the matter of Being. Alongside this, Socrates asserted:

Then what we call learning is really just recollection of those forms which our souls saw before they entered our bodies. Such is the case with the idea of equality, beauty, goodness, and every other form (Plato, 2023: 75a).

We do not know the pure idea of beauty, goodness, or any other; they show that our ideas are bound to the intuitive elements of the physical world. For example, we perceive a beautiful tree and acknowledge its beauty. This beauty really belongs to the tree, but in our perception of it, it is in the eye of the beholder. So they couldn't coexist without themselves. The ancient philosophers seemed to reach a point of transcendental analysis and phenomenological reduction without having developed the specialised terminology as Kant did. They used a more natural language that could not compensate for the impossibility of fully expressing the essence of the One or the Ideas.

Merab Mamardashvili's interpretation of Plato's *Ideas* represent consciousness as the *One*, a realm that contains and distributes meanings attributed to things, as it does with time (Mamardashvili, 2009). They understood time or being in time as a distributed idea that describes the temporal qualities of material existence. Time is defined only by the human mind and has no apparent reflexive nature. Movement is present, but time is not intrinsically involved. Thus only human beings can perceive, differ and recognise things as temporal entities - the mind reveals itself as temporality. It is not like structuralism's search for non-temporal structures, inherited as historicity and its implicit influencing factor. It is, therefore, an inverted recognition of time as something transcendental and unchangeably inherent; consciousness is inevitably defined by its various temporal premises.

In phenomenology, this leads to general notions of the *retention* and the *protention*, which will be discussed in more detail in the relevant chapter. Time is thus understood as a synthesis of experiential elements within the flow of perception, unified in the conscious act of the subject. Such consideration of the temporal aspect can appear somewhat geometric, or akin to an arithmetic consideration in which we count and compress sequential moments. Even when we imagine a particular moment in the past or present, we still acknowledge the sequential flow.

So the first step in defining the quality of time was to understand that consciousness is a synthesised stream of elements, the flux. So it would be fair to ask whether it is sufficient to describe consciousness solely as a flowing sequence, syntaxis, and leave it at that. If the answer to this question were so simple, we would have found it by now. There are perhaps other ways and dimensions of understanding waiting to be explored.

In contrast to phenomenology and philosophy in general, psychoanalysis has a distinct approach to time. Lyotard's case of Emma can illustrate this: a young girl of about 13-14 years of age who feared being shamed and ridiculed in public. This fear mainly confined her to her room and she was reluctant to venture outside. At first it seemed puzzling why Emma was afraid to go out, so she sought analysis to understand her condition and find a way to overcome her fear. During the analysis Emma recalled an incident when she was 12 years old. She was walking past a merchant's shop where she saw the merchant and his friend laughing and talking. Emma perceived their laughter and assumed that they were mocking and harassing her. This incident affected her deeply and led to her fear and avoidance (Lyotard, 1988).

At first glance, one might conclude that Emma misunderstood the situation, attached the wrong meaning to it, and was subsequently frightened. Some people might find this explanation satisfactory saying she is just afraid to be herself in front of others, saying that her reaction was a pure exaggeration. But Lyotard noted:

Emma is one of these victims. She is the one who suffers an injustice but who cannot prove it. She knows it with certainty but has no way to make it heard, to present it according to the rules of the established idiom of the tribunal (Lyotard, 1988: 13).

As Emma delved further into her analysis, she recalled another memory from when she was 8 years old. She had visited the same merchant's shop and interacted with him. Some of these memories suggested that the shopkeeper had been kind and had played with her that day, triggering additional associations of shame. This event had no negative significance for Emma at the time, as it was seen as mere playfulness. However, as she grew older and entered puberty, encountering the same people and hearing their laughter caused her to feel ashamed due to the *afterwardness*, or *nachträglichkeit*, meaning in post-identification. Thus, shame existed not only as an unresolved conflict but as the sum of particular encounters and meaningful dissociation, which we can call the "second scene". Which is generated by the afterwardness effect, creating the false belief of being ashamed and ridiculed. This case aims to illustrate the particular aspect of the temporality of consciousness and, one could argue, of unconsciousness. At this point, we consider time not linear but cyclical, as the appearance of repetition from the past. The repetition through syntax of remembrance. The perception of time within phenomenology is very different, since the primal scene has a primary position. While within analysis we see that the primal scene is the subsequent scene and the last is the

first, retroactively. This results in a different chronology of time and a fundamentally different understanding of temporal events.

Phenomenology is built on the premise of potential infinity, psychoanalysis – actual infinity. In therapy, the focus is often on the archaeology of memories, repressed pain and its impact on well-being. But it is no longer just about the possibility of experiencing these events. Instead, it is about understanding how the layers of personality are constructed and recreate themselves. Phenomenology explores the processes within consciousness, while psychoanalysis delves into the deconstruction of subjectivity to guess how different unconscious elements come together to form a unique human personality. The issue of temporality in phenomenology and psychoanalysis raises crucial questions about how each approach perceives it. This defines them as having different epistemologies of time. Heidegger's position is in line with this exploration. He seeks to understand the nature of human existence by moving away from transcendental analysis into the study of human existence itself. In this sense, the transformation of phenomenology within Heidegger's framework is more closely aligned with psychoanalysis, as it aims to uncover the construction of the human personality, history and its destiny. Consciousness, thus, is considered as the implementation of personal time. However, it does not consider mind enough in terms of actual infinity, which would be discussed later.

Since the subjects of phenomenology and psychoanalysis do not coincide epistemologically, they should coincide ontologically. The proposal is to extend Heidegger's ontological definitions for self-reflective modes of *Dasein* and *Das Man* within a psychologically oriented and hybridised temporal methodology. Moreover, this thinking still avoids consideration of atypical states of consciousness and demands a definition of subjectivity that is not entirely necessary. Thus, the chapter will elaborate on new perspectives of hypothetically intervened ontology for both disciplines, using the term *Schattendasein* as the category. Recent psychological publications that refer to this include: *Schattendasein: Das unverstandene Leiden Depression* (Müller-Rörich, 2013) or *Aus gegebenem Anlass: Beendet die Gruppentherapie ihr Schattendasein in der ambulanten Versorgung?* (Voderholzer, 2017). It is connected to a term used in common German language to describe an invisible phenomenon in a state of oblivion as an abandoned building, book or path. It might also be used to note a particularly acute situation of a human being in which a person is alienated from responsibility for his or her life and does not realise their full potential. For example, a person who is depressed misses the opportunity for

fulfillment and drops out of life. He immerses himself in such a way that they disappear from the world.

Dasein coincides with the intentions and fate of the analyzand. At this point, however, the analysis of Dasein is limited because it avoids a deeper archaeology of subjectivity. We propose an extended logic for this ontological reflection to solve this problem. The human being should be understood as unfolded not just within modes of authenticity, but also as meta-authenticity. This expansion would be developed by using the Hegelian triad of the Universal, the Particular, and the Individual. Which he defines it as:

The concept as such contains the moments of universality. (as the free sameness with itself in its determinacy), particularity (the determinacy in which the universal remains the same as itself, unalloyed), and individuality (as the reflection-in-itself of the determinacies of universality and particularity, the negative unity with itself that is the determinate in and of itself and at the same time identical with itself or universal). (Hegel, 2010:§163)

The *Das Man* would be reinterpreted as *the Universal*, the mode of subjective concept committed to the Symbolic order. Here the impersonal intentionality of the individual fades into culture, something accidental and spontaneous - the structural premise of the *Symbolic* as the Other. *Dasein* is the mode of *the Particular* and logic of those who chooses to attain the essence of authentic personal accomplishment. This striving for self-understanding and choice repeats the desire of the analyzand.

The Individual, or *passent* and last elements of the triad should transcend mentioned existential modalities. To mark the levels of influence on consciousness associated with the unconscious, the logic of psychological trauma and healing. The aetiology of traumatic contingency creates an ontological specificity for personality, an unconscious shadow factor of subjective archaeology. It represents a specific self-consciousness in contradiction of both culture and the individual. It is precisely this existence that is excluded from view, the marker of psychic imbalance as a marginal *umbehagen*, repressed and unsatisfied. Schattendasein would conclude the ontological syllogism with *das Man* and *Dasein*. Here the subject masters itself in such a way as to reveal and coexist with these shadow factors. In gaining mindfulness, the subject must meaningfully reintegrate itself into the world. Whether it is ordinary neurosis, psychosis as Lacanian foreclosure or Heidegger's hermeneutic quest, trauma always means a lack of interpretation and requires an act of different interpretation. Thus, in this chapter, we will indirectly consider the possibility of what makes the

philosophical and therapeutic acts synonymous in terms of the clarification of events and the teaching of self-possession.

The second section examines the intrinsic logic of phenomenological and psychoanalytic thought. Phenomenology is closely related to logic because it adheres to the exact requirements of apodicticity and universality. However, the logic of phenomenology is not about the rules of thought in the classical sense, but about the patterning of consciousness as the constitution of being and knowledge. Husserl asserts: "It must be our aim to set up a phenomenology, more specifically a phenomenology of cognitions, construed as a theory of the essence of pure cognitive phenomena" (Husserl, 2015: 37). The creation of the logic of consciousness as a subject. This is reminiscent of the discursive account of the nature of subjective logic as knowledge in Hegel's philosophy, the transcendental definition of consciousness. Here, however, dialectics is eliminated, and logic remains the essence of consciousness, a dynamic of perception and truth. The requirement of apodicticity as a condition for phenomenology leaves no room for particular or inherent subjective logic. It raises the question of whether we lose the completeness of the world picture in this quest for transparent universality.

Since phenomenology seeks to reveal the world in its original givenness, so why not try to find a method of describing logic of the subjectivity that might fulfill this gap? For this purpose, this section will explore an alternative logic of the subject that uses elements of psychoanalysis. We choose the psychoanalytic method as an instrument of the subject to articulate this particular logic. The main consideration for this logic implies Kant's ideas of the logic of the judgement. However, in this case, the thought covers non-obvious things that require specific intuition. That is well seen in repression: "The essence of repression is simply to turn something away and keep it at a distance from the conscious mind" (Freud, 2024: 147). Here, predicates are expressed not by ordinary signifiers but metaphor or metonymy. This logic is dedicated to displacing everything that looks like *truth*.

The logic of the unconscious is different and elusive, and making substantial claims about it is sometimes uncertain because the subject cannot be fully aware of its desire. This logic is still present in consciousness, but specifically that part of it which operates autonomously and predicatively. The unconscious consists of utilitaristic desire, which is linked to the restrictive function of the *Name-of-the-Father*. They both build the *inner conflict* in the psyche, which eventually end up as specific statements of repression, rejection, or forclusion. To describe such an invisible and non-obvious logic and overcome this paradox,

this section proposes considerations for developing the theory of passive synthesis. It can become a working model for an alternative logic of subjectivity where the unconscious is linked to affect, cultural determination, and transference.

If we consider the unconscious to represent the symbolic order, we could also agree that it is the axiomatic foundation for its further enactment. As in the case of psychoses, it depends on the subject's acceptance of the logic of dominance: "The role of the Name-of-the-Father is to introduce a fundamental law, a law that regulates desire and structures the unconscious, and its exclusion leads to a collapse of this regulatory structure in psychosis" (Lacan, 2002: 186). This reactive, destructive logic of the psyche builds a particular portrait of personality that does not correspond to the *Law* and declares forclusion as the following operator of this logic.

Therefore, we could define its two basic operators of this subjective logic: *domination* and *negation* or *substitution*. The first is about the constitution of axiomatic consciousness, the second is its *acceptance* by the subject. Different types of psychic acceptance, such as neurosis, perversion and psychoses, represent three consequent types of negation: repression, rejection and forclusion. At this point, the unconscious sketches the trajectory of the intentional modes of Being-in-the-World. Therefore, when we consider the logic of the desire we should adhere to its entanglement with the law as cultural determination. Lacan defines it: "The law is not the law of the father or some Oedipal institution, but the symbolic order as such, insofar as it is language in its pure state that is the law" (Lacan, 2002: 276). The phenomena of knowledge and consciousness are not expressed here in linear relations. They show a rather complex diversity of human reflexivity. We can define the central hypothesis as follows: to describe affective, axiomatic or intersubjective aspects of the unconscious we need different levels of logic opposite to the rational logic of classic syllogism.

To elaborate on affective passive synthesis, we would use the ideas of Jaak Panksepp, a pioneering neuroscientist. Although empirical studies seem to contradict the form of phenomenological reasoning, the data related to the study of affect may indirectly be fruitful for the development of its logical interpretation. Panksepp's affective neuroscience, aiming similarly to mentioned earlier Damasio¹ - to overcome the Cartesian error of separating affect from mind. On his theory: "Affective neuroscience has shown that there are primary-process emotional networks, located deep in the mammalian brain, that contribute significantly to the emergence of psychological processes such as mood and affect" (Panksepp, 1998: 25). He

¹ (Damasio, 2005: 250).

identified several primary emotional systems in the brain, such as seeking, fear, anger, lust, care, panic/grief, and play. We can think of these systems as basic, evolutionarily conserved processes that underlie our emotional experiences and thoughts.

More recently, these ideas have been interpreted in Mark Solms' neuropsychanalytic explorations and have brought great and fruitful matters to the study of affective consciousness. Neuropsychanalysis - an interdisciplinary field that seeks to bridge the gap between neuroscience and psychoanalysis. By incorporating principles and methods from neuroscience, psychology and psychoanalysis, it aims to investigate the relationship between the brain, the mind and subjective experience. It aims to explore the neural basis of psychological processes and subjective experiences such as emotions, dreams, unconscious thoughts, identity formation and the self, etc (Solms, 2021). This perspective would be used to discuss affective consciousness from the standpoint of passive synthesis. Its goal is to show how individual acts of interpretation can be linked to the affect as the modulation of natural drive. Being in the thrall of Cartesian thought, phenomenology might give to the affect its due importance.

The case of cultural interpretation differs since it is no longer so closely linked to the natural affect and drive and requires specific psychoanalytic consideration. It reflects defining itself with *objet petit a*, a concept that carries an important element of the subjective intention through the symbolic order. It represents the cause of desire, the marker of dominance of the symbolically defined drive, that strives to compensate for the disruption made on the mirror stage. Lacan defined it as: "The objet petit a is that which in the real suffers from the signifier. It remains irreducible in the emergence of the subject through the signifier" (Lacan, 2006: 185). If we would like to interpret it phenomenologically, we might assume that indirectly demonstrates denotation to world objects, the surplus value of desire as the noetic surplus to noema, modified intentionality. The unattainability to coincide symbolic and imaginary provide transformative energy of the unconscious that constitutes and balances the flow of experience. The meaning given to certain phenomena, thus, is not determined by the objects themselves but by the individual passion, encircled in the post-truth. This subjective vision and implementation of the desire represent purely phenomenal nature and is simultaneously constituted by the logic of the Other. McIntyre defines this as: "Post-truth is an assertion of ideological superiority by which its practitioners seek to compel someone to believe something regardless of the evidence" (McIntyre, 2018). Phenomenological descriptions of psychoanalytic terms could refer to modifying phenomena by attaching the

object's value. This noematic update constitutes the *Natural Attitude*. Therefore, this question leads to a reflection on the need for such an alternative logic in order to expand the understanding of the constitutive conditions of experience. This brings new challenges – conscious acts thus are cases of alternative constitution.

This foundation of unconscious gives a possibility to represent subjective development within the logic of the desire. The collision of *objet petit a* within the Law updates the logic with drive and introduces the concept of *jouissance*: "The fundamental paradox of *jouissance*: it is the pleasure that comes from transgressing the law, from going beyond the limit" (Lacan, 1998: 177). It is about the force breaking axiomatic consciousness, resistance to the law, that makes one behave in self-destructive repetition. The law catalyses the experience of desire and directs intentionality. We might then ask how phenomenological thought, with its subject-object predicate logic, could retain its inherent intentions while the logic of desire changes any initial value.

Consciousness likes to play rather than act epistemologically. It follows the principle of pleasure. The game continues, that is, the repetition of pleasure, as in the absence of combat, the battle does not cease. Therefore, the goal should be to overcome traditional logic, formulated by Aristotle's fundamental laws. Thus, it strives to repeat its extension by inclusions of logical modality, as it does by the Lviv-Warsaw School of Logic. Lukasiewicz claimed: "By introducing modal concepts and the related idea of many-valued logic, I have tried to extend the boundaries of formal logic beyond those established by classical logicians" (Lukasiewicz, 2009). This modality is more spontaneously defined for the unconscious, as it becomes clear that it operates according to a different logic, with its own rules and definitions. The logic of the unconscious is primarily based on the dominance of the desire, drive and affect. It is intertwined with a particular form of negation, where something must always be acknowledged in order to become desirable. This attitude departs from the formal logic, adopts a non-formal approach and predicts an alternative syllogism for experience.

Social realm constructs a set of rules, restrictions, goals, objectives, etc., on the thought predicate modality through desire. In this context, the unconscious should be seen as a particular form of intelligence that concludes phenomenal modifications. Psychoanalytic intervention techniques such as free association or dream interpretation are often used to unravel this unconscious logic.

Here, predicates take on different meanings than in formal logic but still persist. Lacanian analysis in particular incorporates a radical Sapir-Whorfian deterministic

perspective (Ottenheimer, 2009). The meaning of events is under total definition from the shared personal value matrix of symbolic. For Lacan: "Every moment of experience shows the subject what he says rather than what he thinks" (Lacan, 1988). Therefore, the logic of a desire is shaped by different circumstances of how the object has been constituted in perception through language. Some parts of subjective experience become personal only in their realisation, as they do with the influence of affects and individual acts of interpretation and speech.

The dynamics of the unconscious processes show clear symbolic characteristics as they are reactively transformed to become conscious. It helps to describe the psyche in predictive terms of the automata involved in the constitution of subjective experience. We may see some cases of these automata, as intellectual faculties to represent mental disorders as self-organised acts of experience, as the created nature is similar to Spinoza's concept of *Natura Naturata* (Spinoza, 1992). This section will explore the possibility of extending the theory of passive synthesis to bridge the gap between the unconscious and formal logic. In general, it is intended to describe single acts of interpretation from the personalised logic of an individual living consciousness. The modalities of possible predicates might arise as numerous causes: not only from neurotic or psychotic structures but also from affective memory and transference. It precedes the next part which describes consciousness and its dependence from the perspective of the Other as the cause of production, *Natura Naturans*, in a more historicised and socialised field of dependence.

The third section focuses on the transcendental structures of the world constitution, in terms of relational patterns of consciousness such as language, discourse, and culture. The consideration is close to that of the previous chapter. However, here the patterns that explore dependent consciousness are within the framework of objective logic. It is not the logic of the individual act but the logic of participation. The way the genesis consciousness is subdued by the language, *Natura Naturata*. Hegel describes this logic as follows: "Objective logic has the form of a development in which each particular concept passes by its own nature into the next, and all together form the totality - the one absolute concept" (Hegel, 2010: 842). In this sense, we use alternative optics as some external structure that defines intentionality.

For phenomenological intentionality, language serves as a tool for signification and difference, for indexing the world. Heidegger wanted to update and overcome this by proclaiming its ontological primacy: "Language is the house of being. In its house man dwells. Those who think and those who create with words are the guardians of this house"

(Heidegger, 2010: 193). We observe language as a determinant of truth for the subject's situation. However, it can also be seen from another angle, as a situation in which the subject becomes hostage to an external rule determined by grammar. Language determines not only the meaning, but also the entirety of connections in space and time. The totality of the entire *continuum* of the subject as a group of connections of the past, future, and present of the synthesized reality. Sapir-Whorf perspective is crucial for the genesis of consciousness. Language is the body for perception, as its body, all intertwined in the chiasm. The symbolic dehumanisation and thinking at the brink of nihilism. The opposite tendencies challenge subjectivity and ultimately lead to specific determinatives and constitute the sovereignty of the personal discursive horizon with regard to social class, gender, nationality, etc. This chapter will therefore examine the strategy of self-identification based on the discursive constitution of the single empirical consciousness.

From the Lacanian perspective, language also represents the environment of the subject's morphology, meanings and values, which are encoded by linguistic structures. It is through language that people learn to act and desire, forming axiomatic consciousness to serve as an external instrument for uniting subjectivity and objectivity. Lacan asserts: "It is the world of words that creates the world of things—things which at first, in the meaning of the law, are confused in the *hic et nunc* of the all in the process of coming into being" (Lacan, 2002: 65). Since intentionality cannot be expressed without language, how much can one trust the established connections of our minds when the entertainment of alternative paradigms declares language to have an autonomous legitimacy for meaning? For this perspective, we go beyond the processes of definition and the predicative functions of language. They appear as subsequent logic or as another case of passive synthesis. One that becomes a necessary condition for the emergence of consciousness, as with the higher functions of language, to be a system of reciprocal definitions of Saussure: "In a language, as in any other semiological system, what distinguishes a sign is what constitutes it" (Saussure, 2013: 108). Now, the connection between the signified and the signifier is left behind, and the focus is on the nature of discourse as a function of *le langue*. To describe the fact of its omnipresence, Lacan invented the neologism *linguist rie*, composed of the words *linguistique* and *hyst rie* (Lacan, 2013). The question is whether intentionality is self-sufficient in regard to language shaping its movements, tropes and inherent connections. Language serves as a source and medium of various aspects within the *Life-World*. Language serves as a source of acknowledgment. However, as a discourse, it is not just a simple set of

meanings, but the dominant dynamics implicit in the Big Other. This system creates a subjective denotation of the evaluation of the individual, a logic of desire consisting of the following elements of *objet petit a*, but not signs - as part of the integrated whole. This places it in the position of dominance of the predicated, modifying the syllogism of intentionality as the meaning of something.

Therefore, we can approach individuals as engaging in social existence in terms of four environments that pose subjectivity within certain structural frameworks: the discourse of the master, the discourse of the university, the discourse of the hysteric, and the discourse of the analyst. The focus is not on individual acts of interpretation, but on the general instantial logic of *acknowledgment* and *linguisterie* as premises of consciousness. Here, the logical consequence is guided by the logic of desire and acknowledgment. Consciousness is directed towards recognition by the other and performs a spontaneous act of value identification. Furthermore, the logic of the unconscious has its own meaning in the social and cultural dimension, so the syllogism of individual thought is attached to the Other as a timeless, thoughtful synchrony. This places the *objet petit a* in the position of dominance of the predicated, *universalia* of the psyche modifying the syllogism via the grammar and the meaning of something.

The *acknowledgment* is always linked to ideological and power structures as the picture of communicative strategy and a necessity for subjectivity. Structural linguistics, for example, provides insights into the role of language as the structure of belonging, Roman Jakobson responds to this: "The six constitutive factors of any speech event or act of verbal communication are: context, addresser, addressee, contact, common code, and message. The six functions are referential, emotive, conative, phatic, multilingual and poetic" (Jakobson, 1960: 353). He showed that existence in a language means being in a superposition of linguistic relations. Its assertive power allows the expression of conscious experience as the interconnection with others. Conversely, when something happens unconsciously, it lacks assertiveness. Thus, the aim is to construct diverse descriptions of mental acts, incorporating heterogeneous perspectives on the world picture and fitting subjective existence between figures of world relations and action among others.

The logic of transference also illustrates this fundamental enrootness. In this way, the Other appears not only as the addressee of the message, but also as the one without whom the message has no meaning. The other must bring recognition of the subject's competency, the essence of the claimed statement and vice versa. One cannot exist without the other, affirming

the perspective of the subjective as intersubjective. Along with the desire and recognition the Other is the center of the projection of affect. This points to a hybridized structure of intentionality: the experience of the other includes not only interpretation, but lived experience as affect in transference being a sign for interpretation. Reflection of unconscious repetition through the other. This aspect is vital in the analyst's work. After all, live communication involves the direct actualization of the unconscious, which manifests itself at different levels. It is no longer an act of reasoning, but an act of interaction.

On this basis, the genesis of consciousness is also in the *here and now*, but in terms of alternative temporality. Phenomenological consideration presents the perspective of the purified formation of consciousness through the inherent temporality of its acts, without the inclusion and real integration with the Other. Here, the immediacy of interaction includes the entire living being with the diversity of its experiences in its intentionality. It is this aspect that subsequently enables the analyst to reconstruct the subjective experience of the analyzand. The sort of the hybridised intentionality, which contains signs of desire and affect. We can consider the fullest involvement of the unconscious. The analyst is seen to extract the *objet petit a* out of the analyzand and seeks to represent the subject multiple interpretations as the retentive structures of acknowledgment. This means that in this case, the structures of the naturalized *here and now* implement the cyclical structures of time and memory. They create an individualized retention, and with the imposit in other specific expectations of acceptance.

The logic of transference represents, in this case, a *passive synthesis* of the specific intersubjective kind. In particular, the disposition of the Other is a precondition for the Self, to consider how introjection and acknowledgment are possible when it is part of a broader picture of consciousness within the superstructure. As Levinas noted: "The proximity of the other is the presence of the infinite which, in the face of the other, calls me into question" (Levinas, 1998: 91). Thus, in order to research consciousness, we should elaborate more to alternate considerations on intentionality as complex reverted *givenness*. Especially if we consider the structures to play a crucial role in the constitution, as would be shown on the *graph of desire*. The object that appears in the graph represents a complicated logical formation rather than a consequence of rational ideational contemplation—the chain of unconscious thought. The phenomena that highlight the importance of exploring the relationship between consciousness and logic within the intersubjective framework of phenomenology and psychoanalysis.

Which, on the other hand, might be considered a partial premise for further meta-hypothesis in regard to the passive synthesis of atypical states of consciousness. This synthesis is considered as a specific temporal entanglement and core concept of unifying phenomenological and psychoanalytic thinking. This hypothesis offers a picture of the genesis of heterogeneous intelligible acts on heterogeneous principles of temporality, and thus, conditions of conscious dissociations. Both phenomenology and psychoanalysis, in common formation of temporal flows as phenomenal logical connections standing on different coordinates of infinity.

The fourth chapter, analyses the body and its constitutive principles for consciousness. The complexity of bodily existence and its impact on cognition is a vast area of research. The problem of the mind-body connection has been around for centuries. Despite the various problems in this discussion, researchers have suspended any final conclusions, as Colin McGinn notes: “We have been given a brain that cannot fathom itself, and the result is that we are left with an explanatory gap between the brain and consciousness that may never be closed” (McGinn, 2018: 5). In spite, there is always an assumed specific synchronicity between mind and body - mostly it remains unclear. Therefore, the analysis of embodiment in this chapter draws connections between the thoughts of Solms' neuropsychanalysis, Lacanian psychoanalytic ideas and Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology.

The research proposed in this section attempts to complement the issues of the dynamics of consciousness in relation to bodily impairment. It is shown as the extent to which embodiment is a prerequisite for logic and has a separate autonomous legacy. Pathological states are prerequisites for specific expressions of consciousness. Therefore, they require a focus on embodiment architecture and presuppose an architecture of consciousness. Dysfunctional brain and body activities are self-sufficient to form elements of conscious experience. They should more closely rely on the structures of passive synthesis and complement a comprehensive understanding of its complex constitution.

This chapter will explore the relationship between consciousness and the brain. However, methodologically the exploration will be more relevant to the search for explication of intelligible phenomena and conscious experience in neuropsychanalysis than the reduction of any conscious experience to matter, e.g. neuronal networks, affects, etc. Marc Solms conducted a relevant research by exploring the relationship between brain surgery and specific cognitive functions, comparing it with clinical vignettes revealing connections

between mental malfunctions, experience manifestations and amputations. They described several types of deficiency, followed by an alternative modulation of conscious experience

An iconic illustration of this phenomenon involves a Solms patient, Mr. S., who suffered long-term memory problems as a result of brain surgery. His trauma affected basal ganglia, specifically the substantia nigra, resulting in severe Parkinsonism. This condition severely restricted his movement and expression, but his cognitive functions remained intact. This patient could not be fully retentive in the present moment and instead remained immersed in his memories. Having spent most of his life in Johannesburg, he firmly believed he was still there, although he had visited Solms in England for a laboratory experiment. When they both saw the Tower of London or falling snow, Solms insisted that they were in London. The patient disagreed, humorously responding, "If you eat pizza, that doesn't mean you are in Italy" (Solms, 2021: 9). While this may evoke amusement, it is a poignant tale of a person's ability to grasp their current state of reality with impairment, filling the gap of memory and perception with confabulation. This is a fascinating example of how conscious experience can be balanced by following significant changes in brain structure. It shows that consciousness is not a single entity, but a composite of heterogeneous appearance.

In this case, however, we consider atypical embodied experience as the misintegration represented as a *lack* of psychic function. Its diversity follows the diversity of maladaptive consciousness. To define this set of disordered phenomena, we would expand the Lacanian term *lack* into the naturalistic root of phenomenal experience: "The subject is constituted by a relation to a lack, to something that is missing. This fundamental lack drives desire and shapes the structure of the psyche" (Lacan, 1998: 103). The lack might also be seen as a fundamental subjective embodied characteristic. However, it not indicates the inaccessibility of the object, but shows even greater remoteness of the subject. It declares existence to be vulnerable, fragile and inconsistent, it asserts the dysfunction of the mind as an expression of lack. Merleau-Ponty's insights resonate with this concept; chiasmus is to explain how the human body not only interacts with the world but is intertwined with it in a unique system of "embodied" perception, where the boundaries between the inside and the outside become blurred:

The chiasm, the intertwining, the crossing, is the idea that every perception is doubled by a counter-perception: when you look at something, you are also looked at by the thing; when you touch something, you are also touched by it (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 215).

He emphasises the entanglement of the body, the world and mind. As one inhabits different cultures or places, the body becomes incorporated and engaged within those contexts as connected to disruptions and deformations of the subject's embodiment as compared to Lacan's *lack*. The *lack* brings a modified view of chiasmatic fusion, its disruption and synchronicity. As mentioned in the example, pathological consciousness, which cannot fully hold the *here* and *now*, creates a semblance of balance for perception, an illusion for comfort and well-being. It allows fragmented subjectivity to remain connected to the world, to be whole, and to maintain a sense of security. This chapter considers intelligence as functionally preconditioned by a specific embodied passive synthesis. Despite the lack, it is still a synthesis of intelligible experience.

It is important to note that this chapter admits difficulties to offer considerations and reflections on dysfunctional patterns of consciousness. Thus, we would stay at the point of the dissertation to focus primarily on exploring aspects close to the *soft* problem of consciousness. The aim is to show what might happen to intelligence or consciousness itself. Nevertheless, the intention remains to demonstrate the functionality of consciousness, to shed light on its complex relationship with the body.

In the fifth chapter, we will delve into the question of consciousness and its relationship to Ego formation and development from phenomenological and psychoanalytic perspectives. However, we should go beyond traditional reflexive phenomenology, which describes acts of consciousness as that we would be shown, in terms of one-sided temporality and Egology, to defocus on the essential problems of the constitution. Psychoanalysis, understands the ego formation as dependent on culture, super-ego, attachment patterns, etc. This makes the quality of reflexive acts dependent on the incompleteness of conscious experience. Thus, defines subjectivity as not fully available, disturbed, and surrounded by a fundamental lack, being in permanent acquisition with symbolic. Personality structure, defense mechanisms, relationship patterns and other forms of interactive consciousness may vary. Still, there is no transparency, that is of alternative non-sovereign subjectivity, pointed out by Lacan with this sign:



Figure N: Non-sovereign subject

In research, we combine specific preconditions for subjectivity to inevitably ask what anthropological and ethical conclusions will emerge from the exploration of such reflection.

It examines the incomplete nature of human beings and their quest to recompose their own existence by revealing dependence on the symbolic to grasp the affective experience and social reality. Human beings strive to integrate themselves into their working life patterns rather than think in terms of the Transcendental Ego, pure analysis of being, and the *Life-World* phenomenology. This chapter does not describe the mere conditions necessary for ego development. It is to question the ethical paradigm that should arise. Subjective experience often represents a subjective interpretation of the world's designs rather than an accurate reflection of reality. This partial non-transparency highlights the discrepancy between subjective experience and knowledge. At this point Heidegger remarked:

We ourselves are entities to be analyzed. The being that this entity has as its own is always mine. Thus, Dasein is the being of a being. Dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence and a possibility of itself: to be itself or not itself (Heidegger, 2008: 68).

This raises the question of the kind of anthropology that should emerge and what kind of self-reflection we get when phenomenology and psychoanalysis collide. After all, philosophical and psychological approaches diverge to a large extent. Being deployed in different systems of temporalities, logics, and identifications these disciplines limit the subject; it is therefore proposed to follow consideration in mutually complementary terms. To do so, we conduct a thought experiment on what kind of self-understanding should accompany such a consciousness, and even more, what should be the hypothetical image of the *ultima persona de philosophiae* that has gone through the stages of phenomenological and psychoanalytic self-reflection? What kind of self-consciousness and what kind of perspective on subjectivity would emerge? How can we understand the nature of human subjectivity, given the complexity of its realisation in the world and the diversity of its relations with it? Husserl defines: "Transcendental phenomenology is accordingly a phenomenology of the transcendental ego, that is, an egology. As such, it brings to light the universal structures of pure consciousness and its modes of constitution" (Husserl, 2013: 46). We could ask to what extent does the possibility to postulate another inverted Egology is fair, so that the diversity of human experience, in the philosophical sense, might receive its universal legitimation? This dissertation aims to present a certain kind of anthropological issue of contradictory consciousness as its conclusion. A pure description of consciousness without considering its potential for self-awareness would be futile, as it is codependent on structures of unconscious logic and social being.

The concept of consciousness has been so widely defined and used that it has lost its reflective quality. This is well illustrated by Marx's notion of *false consciousness*. He describes the delusional wanderings of false perceptions that promote the capitalist system and develop inequality. He said: "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force" (Marx and Engels, 2022: 172). Certain consciousness might be directed towards representation of reality but not itself. As it repeats the *false consciousness* of Hegel, where the self-understanding is trapped in inability to accept oneself as the essential reason of all things. Recognising that the specific collective unconscious influences people's choices requires an alternative view of subjectivity, as was the case with Dasein and das Man.

Subjective experience lies between perception and understanding. The internal narrative of the subject can influence the difference in perception. Mental disorders are often stigmatised and ignored. Yet they can provide insights into the ideal of proper functioning by understanding dysfunction. Mental disorders, especially those not associated with brain tissue damage, can be seen as destructive narrative patterns, to the extent that we might ask whether psychic inconsistencies, under specific ontological conditions, are a specific kind of passively formed, preconscious conflict. Mental disorders manifest as maladaptive thought patterns and behaviours. They contain some logic that preserves features of the mind, making it transcendental.

This perspective explains the popularity of cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) rather than psychoanalysis. CBT focuses on helping people to reframe their thoughts. It also helps people to take deliberate action based on specific advice and common sense. Cognitive strategies address the narrative level of subjective experience. At the same time, behavioural interventions aim to modify behaviour and provide naturalistically alternative subjective experiences. The aim is to help individuals think differently, change their lived experiences and reduce the intensity of negative emotions or symptoms. By promoting changes in both narrative and behavioral experience, CBT aims to reduce excessive anxiety and reshape behaviour. This looks more like a methodology of success than a philosophical reflection. The individual, as already mentioned, does not become the *passent*.

In the 20th century, philosophy witnessed an enormous enrichment of ideas, theories, hypotheses and scientific achievements. As we enter the 21st century, one might wonder what new challenges philosophers will face in contributing to our knowledge. With thousands of thinkers who have gone before, it is becoming increasingly difficult to offer truly new

insights *ad spacium aeterni*, to delve into the eternal space of possibilities and expand our understanding of existence. It is important to note that although philosophical discussions often dwell on the over-intellectualisation of subjective experience, it is a vast and diverse subject. It encompasses both conscious and unconscious perception, the first is deeply intertwined with our being, while the second occurs independently and spontaneously. Understanding the complexity of subjective experience requires the exploration of both its conscious and non-conscious aspects.

This dissertation touches on many problematic issues in the description and interpretation of consciousness, in particular how and by what means it is formed. However, as is often the case, each method is self-limiting. Therefore, here is an attempt at an update of the anthropology of human subjectivity by looking at the intersection of the two disciplines and the extent to which it is relevant to the complex phenomenon of consciousness.

We assume that the hypothesis of a broadening of the ontological definition of the human being in terms of traumatic experience is constitutional. It is intended to elaborate on the ontological syllogism described in the first chapter, *Schattendasein*. In this case, we raise questions about the ontological foundations of trauma and healing, for the prospects for the updated review of the ontological status of Dasein at question. As happens at the end of analysis, the subject, or *passent*, comes to know itself through a psychoanalytic understanding of *truth* and the development of its own analytic function. This function expands temporal self-reflection by point of actual infinity. From such a changed perspective, the possibility of assuming pure *telos* would no longer be considered legit for phenomenological temporality as is limited at its premise. Thus, it is proposed to redefine following Heidegger's definition:

The essence of truth is in the freedom of letting beings be. This letting-be is a lighting of being, in which the concealment of beings as a whole is lit up, and the truth as freedom becomes manifest (Heidegger, 1998: 136).

The position from which the *Lighting of Being* (die *Lichtung des Seins*) as it is supposed to speak comes with language, without it human beings face incompatibility with reality. However, since this circumstance human being is considered in this research as not as a *project* anymore, what puts the subject in a paradoxical situation where he knows himself but cannot predict it. It has to balance in confusing situations because no experience of knowledge coincides with the Real; its flow also is supplemented by various passive structures, including multiple variable influences of traumatic experience. Thus, faced with

the alternative difficulties of interpretation, we try to establish "trauma-oriented" guidelines for thinking in order to find solutions to the existential challenges.

Traumatised people often perform *jouissance* and *act out* behaviours that are fruitful expressions for the death drive. That is why we should talk in this regard on consciousness as the maturation and the implementation of the *reality principle*. This is the only way to master oneself: "In the course of development, the ego develops the reality principle, which aims at postponing the satisfaction of desires until the situation is favourable for the attainment of pleasure and the averting of unpleasure" (Freud, 2010: 602). Its subject's existence to be codependent on memory and the symbolic, inherits ethical pre-reflective configuration. Conclusions that follow from *jouissance* show the human being's intentionality to grow around the drive. Three grammatical voices structure its paths: "Truth is reached only by one who does not stop at the level of phenomena" (Lacan J, 2023: 310). The personality is thus always on the edge of transcending the language. The reassessment of atypical consciousness at this point and the search for alternative models of personality do not look very optimistic due to the common impossibility of its communication. It is possible to reconstruct something in the imagination, but never to communicate the answer. At this point, the reconstruction of atypical consciousness would be an infinitely variable horizon of narrative. Despite this reasonable limitation, such a consideration still seems possible.

The one who is positioned in an analyst's discourse is not just moving back to the initial cause but steps to meta-symbolic questioning, since he transcends the arbitrariness of language and the desire at the edge of imagination. It brings a specific form of intentionality and setting. Therefore, we would question it as Schattendasein factors assuming the possibility of such hybrid intentionality. The Borromean knot of dependencies for self-consciousness, respectively with patterns of consciousness from Hegelian, Heideggerian and Lacanian philosophy. Where registers of self-knowledge and temporalities lay one on another in self-reflection. It would therefore be consistent to ask what philosophical value the latter categorisation might bring to the discussion. In particular, as a goal of the experiment by asking what the figure of such the philosophic completion would be, *ultima persona de philosophiae*. Whether this personality should possess specific features of intentionality and reflection in order to transcend towards the truth due to the complications mentioned for the definition of consciousness.

Also this focus is considered in concern to the issue of Bartleby, Herman Melville's character. As for those who have made *the end of analysis*: "the sinthome can only be defined

as the way in which each subject enjoys [jouit] the unconscious, insofar as the unconscious determines it" (Lacan, 1975: 107). Bartleby also tries to resolve his *sinthome*, as to get out of this condition. However, it was radical and unfortunate. Either, as the example, connected to the case of obsessive-compulsive disorder, or the psychosis within a particular ritual of rejection it serves as a factor in fusing elements of internal conflict and substituting desire. Therefore, those who are able to identify their *sinthome* will eventually be able to legitimize their pleasure and align their internal structure. Change is thus seen not as a gradual and smooth movement in a straight line, but as an abrupt transition from one discrete structure to another. The emphasis on synchronous or timeless structures should bring new perspectives on these issues. Since, defined as the category of self-reflection, *Schattendasein* marks the horizon of the constitutional past, so we can assert that thought had to come also to its inherent questioning. When such questioning occurs, does it not place the questioner into the specific position of moving into his shadow-side? Moving into a situation of *knowledge* (acknowledgement of the *sinthome*) would inevitably involve a state of suspension and contemplation. It is at the same time a difficulty for ethical determination and phenomenological reduction as mainly the thought is moved in paradoxical conditions. This recalls Richir's idea of phenomenological *epoché* and hyperbolic reduction that involves the radical suspension of all pre-existing beliefs and judgements in order to return to the phenomena themselves. It is a radical act of questioning, a way of opening up to the depths of lived experience beyond the sedimented layers of habitual thought (Richir, 2000).

Chapter I. Being and Consciousness

*Über allen Gipfeln
Ist Ruh',
In allen Wipfeln²*

The question of Being rarely coincides with the universality and totality of this concept. It is also said to be the most general and empty concept (Aristotle, 2014). Furthermore, once named, Being is no longer identical to itself, and it most likely leaves a trace among the words of language. What should one rely on in thinking to be sure that the questioning of Being does not turn into a surreal auto-poem of language, driven by the aesthetics of individuality, which takes away thinking by its flux? Although the one never excludes the other, how can anyone say that auto-writing is devoid of being, or even name something outside of being? This contradiction is reminiscent of the definition of the Tao Te Ching: the Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao. Or the way it is called is not an eternal way (Tzu, 1999). For Chinese thinkers, the Tao is the way of all things, the "seiende", the prospect of advancing existence. Since the Tao and Being do not coincide with their referents, they have a logical similarity in connection with the essential.

On the one hand, this logical connection can be limited to existence, reducing the being to a grammatical "copula". But this will only stifle thought and lead to no conclusions. For things and their existence are seen to be finite. As Nancy noted: "In its very existence, the finite is never simply one thing among others; it is this relation to its finitude that constitutes it as an existence" (Nancy, 2000: 30). So, if we consider human beings to be finite, is it possible, following this logic, to ask whether being is predestined in a particular way of being? The consequence would be to demand a Tao-like idea and to seek a connection between all things in order to define existence more productively. We should therefore assume that multiple ontologies are implicit in European thought, and that some must be co-explicit in different ways. Human thought is unique in that it is the only one fortunate enough to question being, to be the most meticulous witness to it among all living beings, and ultimately to reflect it. Being as such is timely unfolded, and consequently being timely unfolded means being in perspective, which might imply that some structures are similar to the Tao. Therefore, other traditions of thought that presuppose such the perspective or the *continuum*, considering the human essence should coincide with ontological search

² Over every mountain-top, Lies peace, In every tree-top (Goethe, 2015).

requirement and thus become philosophically significant. In this way, we want to arrive at the assumption of this chapter that psychoanalytic thought as a project, despite its application to the psyche, has its own ontological framework, as good as that of other philosophical schools. Is this not the same thing that could be considered in a psychoanalytic quest?

The central question of this quest is to ask what human consciousness is and in what patterns it is understood in phenomenology and psychoanalysis. In doing so, we assume the possibility of an unfolding ontological understanding of consciousness. In this chapter, therefore, we propose to follow Heidegger's distinction between the ontic and the ontological to consider the question of Being: "Ontic is the way of being of things that one encounters in the world. Ontological is the kind of being of those entities whose being is an issue for us insofar as we inquire into it" (Heidegger M., 2008: §7). Thus, the ontic is something that cannot be questioned because it is something other than a human being - the material presence of things. Therefore, in order to speak ontologically, this must be done in a specific way.

§1.1 Temporality

The passing of things has naturally aroused curiosity. The human intellect strives to grasp its nature and relationships, especially the inherent nature of time. Philosophically, it is seen as a fundamental structure of human thought. Its connection with things should reveal the temporal characteristics of things as a temporal manifestation of human existence.

The generalisation of essences, the displacement of the world picture into the register of the theory of ideas, and their distribution among things - led to the familiar identification of thought and being. The temporality of both is obviously a common characteristic of science or Being-in-the-World and vice versa. If temporality were not inherent to them, they would never be identified in terms of human cognition; they would become non-being. On the other hand, they could represent one of the fundamental problems in the cognition of time: the danger associated with the potential tautological trace of this concept, since if we define the same thing by itself, we could fall into the vicious circle of repetition. How can we quickly bring to our experience something that is immediately intuitively understood? Or are we in a so-called Natural Attitude? The example of implication of the temporality on existence can be confusing, because questions about the origin of a particular phenomenon can sometimes lead to deductions *ad infinitum*. This Natural Attitude could also be described

as Heidegger's view on the one of the most important dissections, everyday individual existence in its tendency to flee from itself and to fall into inauthenticity, *Verfallen* into Das Man. Heidegger defines this as:

The Das Man, who provides the answer to the question of the "who" of everyday Dasein, is the "nobody" to whom Dasein has already surrendered itself in being one with another. Under the mask of the "they", Dasein can be constant in its everyday concern. The "they" itself, however, is nothing definite; it is rather the being of everyday Dasein, which is there - with and for the sake of others" (Heidegger, 2008: §27).

As such, it presupposes the lack of selfhood and self-importance of the subject, who is referred to in German by the impersonal pronoun man, "they," or "human". Time, though, is introduced as "a possible horizon for understanding being", a formula that regards time as the most promising prospect for correlations and even the key to understanding being. The human being cannot just search for its own being and existence as it is, from an authentic experience of time. It remains metaphysically unaccountable for its fatal preoccupation with "what is" and the neglect of the fundamental theme of being as such a phenomenon. Words such as 'consciousness', 'subject' and 'substance' are products of metaphysical theories that have blocked our access to phenomena. In this respect, even Husserlian phenomenology, with its independence, remains full of presuppositions for Heidegger, and so on. The task of phenomenological reduction, therefore, is to free us from our unconscious attachment to all possible metaphysical prejudices.

A similar, but scientific conception of time increasingly incorporates the framework of views when constructed within scientific epistemology. Even in the context described for cases of special relativity, it suggests that velocity slows down the course of events by fractions of a second. The course of events changes under the conditions of relativity, but the course of events itself does not disappear. In science, time has nothing to do with human existence. Since the speed of events depends on the observer, he experiences something similar to Poincaré's creatures, who were unable to recognise the dimensions of spatial transformation in relation to their own size. If we were to imagine an animal infinitely small, space would be reduced in the same proportion for it, making it impossible to differ; they might still see the same "thousands of stars twinkling in the firmament" (Poincaré, 2014).

They would not be able to tell if anything had changed. From this perspective, time is a physical measure tied to a specific standard and extreme utility. Whatever the consequences of various physical theories, they are generally definitions used to describe natural phenomena and will never be as useful for philosophy. For a philosopher, however, time leads

a thought to consciousness and to the revelation of its constitutive principles, the preconditions of experience. What time itself is and its nature within subjectivity. Husserl, therefore, distinguishes between inner and outer time, the latter being the measure of things and the former the a priori horizon of phenomenal experience. What is of interest to the philosopher and the psychoanalyst will always be related to this internally intelligible time, so here we will show how phenomenology and psychoanalysis address the issue of time.

Husserl, in formulating the phenomenological method, demanded absolute universality and apodicticity. We suppose, however, that there are transcendental elements of the unconscious that reveal the essence of the subject, and that the only way to uncover these structures is through the individual's exploration. In this case, the methodology of phenomenology may need to be supplemented. Why should we use only deduction to establish most principles? The demand for rigorous universalism is admirable, but what if it is also just a trace of individual preference? Every existence appears in thought through tropes and modes of thought that resonate with personal aesthetics. For instance, Husserl's commitment to the perfection of mathematics influenced his choices. Why should the aesthetics of geometric thought limit the truth of subjectivity with rationality? Why should we see it as the only way to apodicticity? In other words, if we consider the unconscious as what conceals universal truths in human beings, why not consider analysis as a parallel path to the other universal structures, with conclusions drawn inductively that can complement the reductive ones? It is as if some truths cannot be reached by reduction.

In the second paragraph of the introduction to his *Lectures on the Phenomenology of Time*, Husserl emphasises the difference between psychological and phenomenological approaches to understanding time. For Husserl, time is vital to condition the constitution of an act of experience, whereas for psychology, time is significant in relation to specific aspects of human existence. Regardless of where Husserl's thought leads, it constantly strives to distance itself from psychology by adhering to a transcendental, logically rigorous paradigm. He defines it as follows:

The psychological approach to time is concerned with empirical facts and causal explanations of temporal experience, whereas the phenomenological approach seeks to uncover the essential structures and conditions of the possibility of temporal experience itself. It is not a question of how time is experienced by individuals, but rather of revealing the transcendental structures that constitute the experience of time itself (Husserl, 2019: 3).

In this way, the thinker seeks to comprehend reality through the gaze of the ideal, *sub-specie aeterni*. Thus, in one way or another, by seeking the apodicticity of his thinking,

he does not clearly define how psychological phenomena to be constituted as absolute time:

The absolute flow of consciousness is not itself something temporal in the sense of the objective time of things; rather, it is the source of all time. A universal form of time is constituted within which all temporal objects are given. Therefore, this absolute time-constituting flow is the ultimate foundation of all temporal determinations (Husserl, 2019: 84).

Husserl uses the concept of "absolute subjectivity" to describe horizons where reflexive time-transcending thinking is possible, similar to the space-time in Zeno's paradoxes. This consciousness moves towards a definition of time in the same tradition of appealing to higher categories, a priori - the enclosure of transcendental consciousness, the idea of the modality. If we suppose consciousness to be understood as a temporal structure or pure temporality, in this case, any consciousness can be involved in the synthesis of temporal intervals, in which it constitutes its displacements, in order to distinguish individual elements from the general flow and to combine their fragments in thought. However, it's important to distinguish differences in its constitution.

Absolutism continues to weigh heavily in the thinking of something unrelated and absolute. Is it not related to the so-called existential anxiety and the awareness of mortality, which elevates temporality to the level of sacred concepts, as it could be with the concepts of soul, God and death? We should therefore abandon contexts that lead us astray and reflect on the horizon of temporal realisations, apart from being witnesses to any process of various phenomena, such as the drying up of water, the transition from an opera to an intermission, or descriptions of when a certain state of the subjective came to an end: I slept, I spoke or I laughed. In these cases we identify different transitions in objectivity or subjectivity. Why not consider another relation of temporal forms, namely, what do the sequences of states of consciousness mean and provide for human existence in general, where different experiences and perceptions alternate?

Husserl proposes a phenomenological reduction of time as a procedure for reaching the foundations of its constitution at the level of consciousness. This attempt introduced the basic characteristics of experience and the essential temporal functions: the primary impression, the retention and the protention. Husserl said:

In the consciousness of time we do not have a series of distinct "nows", for time is not composed of a series of "nows" in the way that a line is composed of a series of points; in a certain sense the "now" is a mere limit for time, just as the limits of the visual field are mere limits for the spatial (ibid).

Thus, for consciousness, the perception of time is a specific integration of perceptions. Like a flicker, this perception creates the conditions for a primary impression, which refers to the constant "here and now" that accompanies every perception, the primary inclusion.

Retention should be understood as a conscious delay and where the association of a particular series of phenomena into one is active, as happens in the perception of a symphony in the experience of the listener. Husserl wrote: "Retention is the intentional consciousness of the just past, a consciousness that does not itself constitute the past as an object, but as something immanently past, still included in the temporal flow of the living present" (Husserl, 2019: 41). Thus, the ego is indeed constituted in a particular temporal form, the present form of apperception, but this present always has a retentive edge of what is no longer. The power of association, active eidetic and aesthetic imagination united in attention create the phenomenal manifestation of empirical time in consciousness.

Protention, a prospective realisation, occurs through the imagination. It forms expectations for the future and draws material from the past, making future predictions possible: "Protention is the intentional anticipation of the immediate future within the flow of consciousness. Just as retention holds the past in a modified present, protention reaches into the future and provides a continuous horizon of expectation" (Husserl, 2019: 43). However, it is also a form of memory. Protention is thus a more complicated case of retention. Here, the difficulties of intentional analysis: expectations then, refer to the sequence of events from the present - active memory in an expectation. It opens a horizon in the future of what is remembered.

The primary impression aims to describe the primary atoms of experience, which are intuitive and obvious. It is the awareness of something, the primal intuition. For psychoanalysis, the primary impression is associated with the activation of unconscious contexts and the rhythm of the repressed. The unconscious tries to shape every experience as part of an interpretation, as part of the past. So the primary impression is often in the shadow of transference, so it is not as primary as the Cogito would like it to be. Also it represents cyclical structure of time as the present moment's genesis enrooted in the past.

If phenomenology was satisfiable with describing any act of primary impression well enough, for psychoanalysis that act would be a pre-primary expression at this point. Some of the personality disorders and their symptoms, such as depersonalisation or frustration, are examples of radically and unhappily dissociated consciousness. It is linked to psychic

problems that follow a state of not being present and aware, of not being included in a particular moment. For example, Mark Solms points out, the case Mrs. M. that had severe amnesia due to damage to her hippocampus:

Mrs. M. could not form new long-term memories, but she retained the ability to perform tasks she had learned before her injury. She could still hold a conversation and respond to her environment, but she could not remember events from one moment to the next. This case illustrates the role of the hippocampus in memory and how other brain functions can remain intact despite its impairment' (Solms, 2021: 132).

Thus, primary impressions could not even occur if the imagination came from unfixed memory: physical presence, with little awareness. Types of partial presence in which subjectivity is detached from the exact reflective *now*, however anchored to the present by perception. Therefore, we can assume that psychoanalytic reflections on subjectivity, because of their concreteness, will always appear in broader content, since they do not limit themselves as phenomenology does.

Retention forms the act of apprehension and the association of perceptions. It enables reflection by presenting a series of intelligible events in the imagination or in self-reflection as a whole. Thus, introspection is the sum of acts of thinking and apperceptions. For psychoanalysis, however, this is not the case. The analytic process is the consistent detective search for the trace of inner personal associations that connect inherent complex pieces. Thus, retention is the pattern for the "primal form" to deconstruct psychic complexes, leading step by step to their original core, the primal scene.

This "primal form" in psychoanalysis is formed by punctuation, a specific term that describes the points of connection between the imaginary and the symbolic, or *Point de Capiton*, as defined: "The points de capiton are the points at which the signifier stops the otherwise endless movement of the signified. It is through these points that the subject is able to give meaning to the world and its own experience" (Lacan, 2006: 303). They constitute the initial patterns of perception and image of the world. They leave their traces in the unconscious, non-transparent mode, which is played out in rational utterance. It must therefore be mapped into a logical form that requires the external interpretation of the analyst and the participation of others. This mapping is a form of temporal differentiation. At this point, Jacques Derrida said:

The a of différance, then, is not a mere spelling error; it is the mark of an important shift from a sense of "difference" understood as spatial distinction to a sense of "difference" and "deferral" as the temporal unfolding of meaning (Derrida, 1982: 3).

Time, in particular as the structure of retention, is interesting because it might fit the structure of the repressed content. Layers come one after the other, unfolding internal associated stories, the values of Symbolic in the individual retentive elements. Retention is thus the creative component of the mind that is necessary to plan and predict future events, which is a purely imaginative activity. Retention and protention have the familiar characteristics of being a product of mental synthesis, differing only in that retention inherits inclusiveness into the "primary impression".

Meanwhile, the protention is more a process of projection, creativity and expectational synthesis. From an analytical point of view this is fascinating because protention can express the unconscious, not just the imagination. Its random elements possible for exploration with the technique of free association, defined as:

We must not forget, however, that it is essentially a particular kind of mental activity, a rule of procedure to which one must submit. This technique consists of simply getting the patient to say whatever comes to mind, holding nothing back and suppressing nothing, even if he thinks what comes to mind is irrelevant, nonsensical or too distressing to relate (Freud, 1995: 288).

Thus, in the theoretical consideration of time for analysis, protention should be understood as a temporally structured group of signs expressing the truth of the individual unconscious. Protention is constitutive of thought, as an act of synthesis and expectation. This associative constitution brought about the *objet petit a* in the discourse of the mind. The possibility of self-reflection arises in terms of all possible worlds, human destiny, freedom and self-determination.

The Ego emerges as a constitution of the self as a project. Temporal structures of consciousness made it possible to integrate human existence into the cosmic picture of space, time and matter and to impose its own historicity. Time is therefore associated with two processes: synthesis and differentiation. A famous example from Husserl:

Let us look at a piece of chalk, close our eyes and open them again. We now have two perceptions. At this point we see the same piece of chalk twice. In this case we have temporally separated displacements; we perceive a phenomenological temporal divergence, "away from", but in the object there is no division; it is the same: in the object there is duration, in the phenomenon - change (Husserl, 2019).

The chalk is an intelligible phenomenon, an immediate givenness, which occurs in consciousness as a series of perceptions held in retention and identification. Consciousness distinguishes and unites the objects from the stream of perceptions. Temporalism thus fully grasps the subjective. Objective time, as the givenness of being, plays a secondary role in this

consideration. The exploration of time, or its transcendence into consciousness, makes thinking the horizon of reflexive subjectivity. This kind of subjectivity, as identified above, stays in the relationship between being and thinking, which leads the thought into the realm of ontology. To avoid tautology and demonstrate it clearly, let us recall Rene Descartes' idea of the problem of the constancy of the world. For him, the world itself is in a process of constant maintenance. For him, God is the one who maintains its existence: "It does not follow, therefore, from the fact that I was in existence a little while ago, that I must be in existence now. Unless some cause at this moment produces me anew" (Descartes, 2017: 18). Descartes speaks of the cause of things that renews him, the cause of consciousness. For phenomenologists, this God would be called transcendental synthesis.

In psychoanalysis, time does not flow but emerges. It emerges from a forgotten moment and echoes into the very present; it does so with a rhythm that comes from the past. The unconscious is seen as a space where repressed traumatic experiences, ethical bundles and buried secrets originate. These repressed thoughts have a temporal dimension in the sense that they are often events from the memory that continue to influence the present. The unconscious can be understood as anchoring the timing and pace at which these repressed memories resurface or are uncovered. An exciting aspect is that, in the context of time, the primary scene serves as the last scene, and vice versa through resistance and *Nachträglichkeit*. Freud, first considering the case of Emma, remarked:

We always find a repressed memory which has become a trauma only through the postponement of the action of afterwardness. In Emma's case, it was only later, after puberty, that the memory of the event was awakened and acquired its traumatic significance (Freud, 1979: 356).

In this way, trauma should become a consequence of thinking, terrible assumptions that are difficult to imagine. French psychoanalysis emphasises the non-linearity of time and the heterochrony of the psychic apparatus. Bernard Chervet considers the analyst to be the "keeper of time", while the patient lies on the couch, the analyst observes as they attempt to bring their eternal unconscious to life (Laplanche, & Pontalis, 1988). This eternity always returns as a rhythm, as repetition more or less intensified. Therefore, this would be a way of working with the energetic potential of the psyche, which is associated more with resistances and repressions that organize the flow of consciousness.

An analyst's interpretation always takes place during a psychoanalytic session. Their reflections are based on the dynamics of the process, capturing certain key moments and observing the analysand's resistances. An excellent example of this approach is Carl Jung's

associative test. It has been implemented with a stopwatch to measure response intervals, demonstrating a direct link between the association and the word being tested. Thus, we can identify time intervals as fundamental fragments in the analysis, as they indicate the subjective characteristic dynamics of resistance. Conversely, it is crucial that by participating in the analysis, the analysed person expresses his or her consent and desire to articulate. This creates a specific dependency: the expression must eventually take place despite the repression. The delay is a marker of significance. Thus, no matter how much the subjects maintain their negativity, they are ultimately denying this negativity itself. Therefore, according to this hypothesis, any time constraint can become a stimulus for expression. Lacan implemented a similar interpretation in his practice by limiting analysis sessions to an arbitrary number of minutes, decided by the analyst, in order to stimulate dynamic processes. The variable duration of sessions is an essential element of the analytic technique. The session may be long or short, but what is important is that it is not determined by the clock. Lacan claims that the session should end when "something significant happens, when there is a moment of realisation or insight" (Lacan, 2002). The illusion is not deduced or deducible, but it does reproduce the same formative force - an elementary phenomenon. Unconscious processes can involve the repressed past as if it wanted to flow into the present to unite with consciousness.

Freud's ideas about repression and the return of the repressed are central to his understanding of how the past continues to shape the present. Psychoanalysis places a strong emphasis on the importance of early childhood experiences in shaping an individual's personal and pathological traits. Psychoanalysts such as Erik Erikson attempt to extend Freud's work by proposing psychosocial stages of development that unfold throughout a person's life:

Each stage becomes a crisis because incipient growth and awareness in a new part function is accompanied by a shift in instinctual energy and yet also some incapacity in that new part - thus early childhood is a time of extreme helplessness; later childhood is a time of docility; adolescence is a time of rapidly shifting identifications and guilt; and maturity is a time of the fruition of various forms of generativity (Erikson, 1994: 63).

In this case we view again the aforementioned constitution of the human destiny via the attachment to reality as the value-time continuum. Where human beings are linked to the past - repressions create a certain negation in the unconscious logic. The negation becomes more robust as the conflict grows and fortifies the way thought would appear. Albert Camus was right to observe that man is the only "creature who refuses to be what he is" (Camus,

1991: 11). Especially when it comes to self-knowledge, this lack of it should be understood as lack of reflective self-being, which diminishes the project focus on existence itself. This unawareness coincides with Das Man dissolving the subject in the unattainable Symbolic. Time in psychoanalysis is mainly related to latency or the moment of interpretation, as in the case of Little Hans:

It is true that Hans's anxiety broke out suddenly when he was five years old, but a large number of earlier influences, experiences and impressions were required to make it possible for the anxiety to be set in motion by an event as seemingly unimportant as seeing a horse fall down (Freud, 2018: 7).

In this way, we might think of time as an accumulation of meaning. For Lacan, time is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon that intersects with different dimensions of the psychoanalytic process. He argued that the unconscious is structured like a language and as such exists outside of linear time. The unconscious is not governed by chronological order, but operates through a system of timeless signifiers and associations. Dreams, for example, can compress past, present and future elements into a single scenario.

In the "mirror stage", the infant's identification with its own reflection marks a pivotal point in their development. The moment of incoincidence between the imaginary and the symbolic creates an initial difference. It embraces unattainability and gives the primordial strive for harmonic fulfillment: *the objet petit a*. Primal deformation within intentionality, the visibility of voice to seem real. This moment is not strictly aligned with chronological time, but represents the momentum of order. As Lacan claimed:

The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation - and which produces for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies ranging from a fragmented body image to a form of its totality which I will call orthopedic - and finally to the assumption of the ahmour of an alienating identity which, with its rigid structure, will mark the entire mental development of the subject (Lacan, 2002)

The tripartite relation of the psyche into the real, the imaginary and the symbolic, which we will explore later, has implications for the experience of time. The symbolic represents the thought in the realm of language and culture, the act of Kantian *die Vernunft*, area of ideas, which introduces the subject to a particular temporal order. The imaginary, associated with perception and identifications, involves a subjective aspect of living temporality, involved as the definitive mind, *Das Verstand*. The real, beyond symbolisation, is timeless and outside the usual temporal constraints. The unfolding of the temporal continuum in Lacan's thought, therefore should be seen through the concept of desire, the

inherent intentional interest origins in compensating the lack between the Imaginary and the Symbolic. The lack gives rise to the tension that ultimately, now as the desire is attached to experience as a regulative idea. It seems to modulate the content of notion, *Das Begriff*, as the complex "retentive" scheme mixing different faculties of intellect that point to an alternative logic of subjective concept.

The concept of desire is closely linked to lack or incompleteness and the subject's consecutive attempts to fill this lack. They are intertwined with their temporal experience that follows impossibility. Therefore, time flows where desire is led. The perpetual movement of desire takes place in a temporal dimension of intentionality. Which recalls Friedrich Nietzsche's concept of the "eternal return". This idea suggests that certain patterns or events repeat themselves endlessly. Life is constantly repeating itself:

What if one day or night a demon were to sneak after you into your loneliest solitude and say to you: "This life, as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live again and again and again, and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and every sigh and everything unspeakably small or great in your life will have to come back to you, all in the same order and in the same sequence? Would you not fall to the ground, gnash your teeth and curse the demon who said such a thing? Or did you once have a great moment when you would have answered him: "You are a god, and I have never heard anything more divine" (Nietzsche, 2001: 273).

Lacan applied this concept to the return of the repressed, the repetition, in the psychoanalytic process to challenge conventional notions of time as a linear and unidirectional progression. This means that the unconscious operates in a timeless realm where past, present and future coexist. Desire embodies the temporal dimension. Its pursuit is an ongoing and dynamic process that extends into the future and influences the subject's temporal orientation.

In the context of the psychoanalytic session, Lacan emphasised the importance of "real-time" experience. This refers to the unpredictable and unscripted moments that occur during the therapeutic encounter. Lacan encouraged analysts to be attuned to the spontaneous and authentic aspects of the analytic process. He argued that the end of analysis is not merely the resolution of symptoms, but rather a transformative experience that reconfigures the subject's relationship to desire, the unconscious and itself as a transformative recursion or an updated phenomenological reduction.

The end of analysis represents a shift in the subject's reorientation within the symbolic order, thus reorganizing time. The analyzand becomes more aware of how temporal

and language structures of their subjectivity influences and bundle their desires, separates their will:

The end of analysis is for the subject to experience that his relationship to the phallus is an experience of lack. The subject must come to realise that his fundamental fantasy is just that - a fantasy, and that his desire is rooted in a fundamental lack (Lacan, 1998: 274).

The subject learns to navigate the inherent gap between desire and its object, gaining a more nuanced understanding of his or her own desires and drives. Lacan argued that true desire is only partially satisfied. Rather, it involves the recognition that desire is an ongoing and dynamic process that goes beyond the pursuit of immediate gratification. The subject learns to navigate desire without being consumed by it. The analyst plays a crucial role in facilitating it by the end of the analysis, his interpretations and interventions aim to guide the analyzand in confronting unconscious conflicts. The analyst helps the subject to gain insight into the symbolic structures that shape their desires, to master it in the time flow, direct manifestation. Which brings again ethical considerations of will into the psychoanalytic process, involving a subjective commitment to one's desires and the acceptance of the moral responsibility that comes with recognising their lack and arbitrariness. Lacan recognised that there is no universal path to the "end of analysis". Different people may reach this point in different ways, the timing and nature of the conclusion are individualised. The end of analysis is not predetermined but emerges through the unique dynamics of each analytic relationship.

What is to be faced when we consider the termination of analysis? A subject becomes responsible for balancing the drive. Returning to Freud we might also see its structure described in terms of the repetitive compulsion, the energy state in which individuals unconsciously repeat past traumas or unresolved conflicts. This compulsion strives for the release, and being not solved, it comes back as a naturalistic premise:

It would seem, then, that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the living being has been forced to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces; that is, a kind of organic elasticity, or, in other words, the expression of the inertia inherent in organic life. This view is supported by the fact that the universal striving of all living substance - namely, to return to the rest of the inorganic world - is clearly manifested (Freud, 2011: 36).

In this case, we consider certain rhythms of unconscious repetition, the example of a retention-protection hybrid, as it sets some triggers and solutions in the form of repetition. An essential part of the self, as in Søren Kierkegaard's repetition (Dolar, 2023). In this context, Freud's discovery was a Copernican revolution in that the centre was moved again, as it

correlates the self with the phantasmatic character of the object. Either I or Other, both unite embodied time as a psychotic and neurotic attribution on the perspective of existence.

The constitution of time for analysis is hardly related to the free energy of the unconscious and therefore also to the libido; if it were, then libidinal disturbances might lead to temporal disturbances, which instead lead to the aforementioned uninclusiveness in reality. Freud said: "The libido, which flows into the ego and serves it as a reservoir, undergoes many transformations and fixations over time, contributing to the complex structure of the adult psyche" (Freud, 2018: 41). The normal flow of psychic energy is crucial. Although it is symbolically structured, the libido can reconstitute the value of intentionality as it involves elements of transference. Dreams, for example, offer a glimpse of this non-chronological aspect of the psyche, it abreacts with its own logic. Here different temporal and signifying elements are condensed and linked within an imaginative aesthetic singularity.

Following Freud, Lacan reintroduced the idea that the symbolic process affects the subject's history retroactively. The way in which events are symbolised and integrated into the symbolic order can redefine their meaning and significance. This retroactive structuring of meaning is crucial to understanding how the past is continually reinterpreted in the light of present developments. The symbolic, thus, extends common notions in mind of lived experience, being enacted after in an active imagination of thought or a dream, on its way to pave the path of an unattainable.

If being influenceable is inherent to the thinking, does it manifest itself in alternative thoughtful forms, such as in dreams? Does it manifest itself through complexes that are partly conscious or paraphrased intentions? Or even as a dream while it incorporates sounds from the outside world, making them part of the dream, what is the faculty that is involved in that? Time errors in dreams, which may not correspond to time intervals, also indicate the temporal flexibility in regard to consciousness. A long dream can pass in a second, while a short dream can seem to last forever. What about the experience of the present moment and how are pathological states associated with it? For example, how does the synthesis of time occur in anticipation when a wish cannot be fulfilled? The experience of frustration and stop. How and to what do we deal with the fact that time is an indispensable feature of intelligible experience?

Psychoanalytic therapy involves a process of *working through* past experiences and conflicts. This process can take time, as a temporal dimension characterises the therapeutic relationship itself, since it takes time for the patient and the therapist to revisit past events

despite repression, and evaluate their emotional significance. The time of the unconscious is permeated by eternity. It permeates individual existence. The analytical space creates a unique temporal field to describe experience in which past, present and future interact in complex ways. Therefore, we should assume that the singularity of the psychic realm should never be limited in any way, as its phenomena might flow through many changeable patterns.

§1.2 The Singularity of the Mind as a Time Continuum

Recalling the ancient scientifically not pre-classified aesthetics, where the state of being, a miracle of the psyche, confused everyone as if they were seeing it for the first time. For all of them, the universe was a rational cosmos, the emanation driven by the *Anima Mundi*. As Anaxagoras said:

All other things share in a portion of everything, while nous is infinite and self-governing, and is not mixed with anything, but is alone, itself by itself. For if it were not by itself, but mixed with something else, it would partake of all things if it were mixed with anything; for in everything there is a portion of everything, as I have said in what has gone before, and the things mixed with it would hinder it, so that it would have power over nothing, as it now has, being alone by itself. For it is the thinnest and the purest, and it has all knowledge of all things and the greatest power; and nous has power over all things, both greater and lesser, that have a soul (Anaxagoras., 1981: F12).

We will find ourselves in a situation where, instead of constituting patterns of consciousness according to the fluidity of time, we should recognise its comprehensiveness and totality, not as its individual manifestations, but as witness to the temporal singularity, *Anima Temporis*. In essence, one's experience of time differs from what is generally experienced or conventionally agreed. In this case, it is due to specific subjective differences which are not exceptions to the rules, but individual implementations of other universal temporal principles, which would be consequently explored.

Husserl emphasises the universality of his definitions of time, which include concrete cases as peculiarities of individual phenomenal experience. Perhaps such personal meticulousness compelled him to ignore the concerns of psychology and historicity to remain within the horizon of abstract phenomenological inquiry. How can we be sure that this kind of abstract contemplation of time presented in phenomenology is the only legitimate one, despite the intention to gain universal knowledge? We should always remain critical at this point. Since simple ideas precede any perspective and have their roots in individual

experience at a certain point they become obvious and much more important. This is what happened to the late Husserl, who sought for the foundations in the surrounding world. The restoration of the living space, to the suppressed historicity of the non-scientific mind, *die Vernunft*. He said: "The "Lebenswelt" is the world of immediate experience, the world of common sense, in which we always already live and which provides the basis for all cognitive achievements and sciences" (Husserl, 2021: 123). This shift repeats Kant's appeal to the non-causal and determinative logic of freedom, in his *Critique of the Practical Reason*, which narrative dominance might be seen as well in Heidegger's phenomenological philosophy.

Therefore, the consideration of time arises from different aspects of the lived experience. For example, after listening to a certain composition, a relevant impression remains; after the act of perception held in retention, an act of evaluation and definition emerges. Being an intentional object means to be interpreted within different layers of thought. If we follow this logic after Ingarden we would agree at the point of various intentional object constitutions, being either a product of theoretical reflection on nature, or a matter of the aesthetical judgements as actual ideation of objects in regard to good, beautiful or sublime (Ingarden, 1973). Evaluation is known to be a subjective judgement as to follow some specific aim, personal taste, or inner causation. Therefore, what remains in the impression (e.g. affected projective intention) expresses not just pure remembrance, but also elements of the subjective judgement on something as making it subordinate to certain regulative ideas; as following expanding the inherent schema in notion of a certain object by not distinguishing *das Verstand* and *die Vernunft* as dynamical for its interpretive act. Thus, intentionality represents objects in a hybridized perspective for consciousness, fusing their implicit phenomenal content with their historical context and affect. This brings mixed phenomena of conscious experience along acts of perception within intentionality: the good, the beautiful, the sublime took place as well as guilt, disguise, the uncanny among others.

It might bring uncertainty into the field of humanities if not to distinguish this heterogeneous constitution of conscious experience and thought. In this way we approach understanding of time as an act of the personal emanation, which includes the enactment of personal judgements that contextualize the experience also in regard to the unconscious. Here, the external time ceases to be central, as a series of potential individualized substitutes emerge in mind. Finally, we are drawing the horizon of considering time as an absolute point of reference, an absolute point of reflection which represents human beings as actual entities,

that however, experience atomistically the nexus of events. As to define the flow of time-continuum for experience in comprehensible forms (Whitehead, 2010).

Maurice Merleau-Ponty, for example, also attempted to elaborate on this connection, but less comprehensively and atomically, which he introduced in terms of the active entanglement - the concept of chiasm (Merleau-Ponty, 2012). We will look at this in more detail in the following sections. To give an example of this time-continuum, he points to an exciting episode in Marcel Proust's novel in which one of the characters, Charles Swann, witnesses a musical concert performance of a particular melody associated with a particular story from his own life. This forced him to immerse himself in his memories and, at the same time, to experience a particular horror at the facts of his biography. Swann could no longer listen to the concert and had to leave, succumbing to the dramatic content of his memories. In the common psychological sense, this phenomenon might be called avoidant behaviour or an episode of panic disorder, as if Swann were controlled by a delusional mania. However, it aims to show the subjectivity as a multi-layered and diffused temporal singularity of meaning. Merleau-Ponty comments:

Thus the past appears to us as a structure of being, comparable to a landscape or a melody, or, to use a favourite example of Proust's, to "that novel of which we are sometimes tempted to think that its characters, though in different places, are involved in a simultaneous action" (Merleau-Ponty, 2001: 423).

Conversely, we can see that everything here is intertwined with time: the subject, the spontaneous object, and the modified memory are examples of the multi-level penetration of time in acts of consciousness. For this reason, time turns out to be a total characteristic of one's existence. Moments of consciousness become cyclical. In case of pathological consciousness, a maniacal subject becomes enraptured by an object in the course of time in horrific retention, he chases it within own projection (rejection, forclusion, etc), and often does not know what to do with it once he has caught it.

For such a subject, movement becomes a vital dopamine trigger. The chase, as a temporal realisation, might separate to a self-sufficient process that encycles itself enough to become a separate structure of the satisfaction, as a partially enacted intention with desire deformed by repression. Since the object of desire will most likely never consist of that which is sought in things, structured as thought though is good enough, but not too optimistic as to balance energy flow. Swanns' feeling of loss comes as a reactive despair, forthcoming with suffering. The imperative to non-arbitrary subdue a certain process becomes an act of ethical

completion. Therefore, it points out how time and being might unfold relatively to the trajectory of desire; although here it is not an absolute category of movement, but repetition. Being subjected to desire over self is rather immanent to non-transparency and congruency to the lack of self-reflection, that recalls to Johann Fichte's understanding of a subject as a conscious enactment:

Thinking itself is a moral act, an inescapable choice made in spite of the apparent need for its visibility. The self posits itself and its own activity as the fundamental principle of all reality. This act of self-positing expresses the moral law inherent in rational beings (Fichte, 2012: 45).

Thinking is a moral act and an inescapable choice that is made despite the visibility of its futility. If we look at it superficially, action through time represents the perspective of linear experience embedded in being a phenomenologist. Perception and thought processes are understood as diverse and individually articulated intentions. In psychoanalysis, however, time is turned backwards, as in the case of Emma, where we have a sequential regression in time to the primal scene (Lyotard, 1988). But would it be correct to say that psychoanalysis involves something retrospective instead of the phenomenological perspective, or that both are instead a reconstruction? The difference might be seen that psychoanalysis works inductively by observing events rather than at some point reductively interpreting them. Phenomenologist preserves reduction in his thought, in its purified form, as an optimistically non-deductive claim, along with its motto “*Zu den Sachen Selbst!*” that holds the intentional expectation of transparency that the thing should be directly seen as the thing, encrypted as the axiom for thought. Meanwhile, the multilayered history of things and its proper subjective regard brings thinking to a more complicated ontology.

So the direction of time is always the same, but the method of revealing it is not. Such an assertion is justified because if we understand the psychic complex as a sequential association of events organised around the primary, ultimately conscious event, we must see that psychoanalysis deals with nothing other than the deconstruction of complex retentions embedded as patterns in the subject's unconscious. Therefore, the reason for conditional confusion around the subject should be found in other errors of reasoning, namely, that each methodology implicitly uses or ignores the axiomatics of another. It implies the genesis of the act of consciousness, in this case as a relation to the type of temporality that is conceived. Thus, we assume phenomenological temporality, both as the Cogito or the Transcendental Ego as well as Dasein's, to unfold within the notion of potential infinity, making possible the premise for intentionality and a dedicating subject for the perspective of Being-in-the-World.

The psychoanalytic perspective, despite it also concerns Being-in-the-World, represents alternative logic of deconstruction of subjective experience as it investigates the repetition and thus reflects enclosed singularity, and thus, the logic of actual infinity. The topicality of an individual is enclosed in a singularity of repetition. That circle eclipses the object, that of classical consideration, of any phenomenal objectified representation, which ignores the subjective as a specific form of legitimacy of being alongside the things.

The consideration of time conditions *a priori* may influence the thought and build alternative subjective teleologies. Therefore, the reliance on potential infinity in philosophy leads to the reduction of subjectivity to be a project. Dasein or the Transcendental Ego hold some optimism to possess the world, while things might turn vice versa. When we place into mind, the two *topoi* of both infinities, atomic cross-flow, which combines heterogeneous aspects of temporal genesis into one common *continuum* of time consciousness (*noēton topon*), where the conscious and unconscious are associated as synthesis of potential and actual infinity. Which, after all, according to the logic of heterogeneous time genesis that we have outlined, shows the mental phenomena such as transference, sublimation, compulsion, etc. always to appear as part of an imaginary scheme, as the structured atoms of retention and protention, but in terms of actual infinity.

Here we encounter the first biased contradiction between phenomenology and psychoanalysis: if the unconscious is organised in a manner analogous to retention, how can phenomenology exclude psychological experience and insist on its uniqueness? The phenomenologist may indeed argue that complexes have a retentive structure in the psyche, as they do not represent universal laws of conscious acts, but empirical subjectivity. It is difficult to disagree with such a view, but at this point we can say that psychoanalysis also investigates the unconscious of an individual being, the another *a priori*. In this case, we can be fully confident that unconscious structures are realised on the invisible horizon of transcendental properties, and therefore have transcendental significance. An additional factor in this assumption would be the argument that unconscious data acquire to be seen as a structure after their own association as complex retentionalisation, *post factum*. However, they are more complicated than just retention and require a comprehensive concept to grasp.

Furthermore, if we continue with this logic, we must conclude that the transcendental, as a property of the psyche, was ignored by phenomenology. Phenomenology left aside the analysis of the transcendental foundations of the unconscious, even if we consider it a residue. Herbert Marcuse aptly remarked: "The problem of the transcendental method

excludes the understanding of social reality because it abstracts from the concrete historical conditions in which social relations are embedded and which shape the nature of human experience and consciousness" (Marcuse, 1960: 168). Transcendental concepts of time limit for an awareness of social existence, although they could approach it in a specific eidetic way. From this perspective, it becomes clear why psychoanalysis has been able to develop and grow; it allows one to reveal oneself in history, instead of the phenomenology, which limits itself by creating a unique, generalising thought. This made Heidegger, in terms of interpretation of *telos*, more relevant to psychoanalysis than to Husserl. If this is the case, how should thinking be structured so that it can remain philosophical and at the same time respond to the question of the meaning of thinking in order to think boldly?

The contradictions mentioned in the transcendental method and its self-limitation inevitably led to its resolution. They allowed the development of an alternative phenomenology, as in Heidegger's philosophy. This turning point in thought represents an alternative, especially in terms of time. For him:

The greatest and most difficult task of thinking concerns the forgetting of being, the forgetting of being that has become prevalent in the course of Western history. This forgetting of being is not a mere absence of memory, but an event that determines the essential history of the West (Heidegger, 2000: 40).

For Heidegger, the question of being should unfold under the motto "ontology is a hermeneutic phenomenology". He thus dispenses with the need to consider transcendental subjectivity in favour of concreteness and factuality. The familiar consciousness is transformed into *Da-sein* (being-in-here). The etymology of the word refers to being of real presence, the attitude of *Dasein* towards Being as existence, which is related to a sustained questioning of the meaning of this witnessing. This is different from what we know as ontic or essential: "Being, as care, is essentially ahead of itself in its being alongside the entities encountered in the world" (Heidegger, 2008: §32). This way of thinking aims to inquire about being and implies alternative questions, namely whether it is possible to reveal the being while excluding the *essential* from it.

A human being, by its own definition, cannot fully characterise itself as it happens in scientific discourse, the Aristotelian four causes or even in his ten categories. Heidegger proposes that human beings should be explicitly defined by "existential" categories, analogous but contrast to Aristotle's. These categories describe temporality, how the constitution of human existence is expressed through intense points of presence, the

phenomenons: Being-in-the-World, Care, Decisiveness, etc. This points to the explicit fundamental dimensions and modalities of presence. Temporality is thus transformed into historicity. By unfolding through the dimensions of human existence, it can be affirmed that in this existential philosophical anthropology, patterns of consciousness correspond not only to thinking and knowing, but also to the implementation of will as destiny in the world, as categorical action. Such a new approach truly revives the essence of phenomenological thought by adding the perspective of self-awareness in its own concreteness.

Perhaps one of the most original features of Heidegger's concept of time is his emphasis on the priority of the future. He assigns the importance of the future to "happen" or "occur" in the sense of the actual fulfilment of historical events or history in the process. The historicity of human existence lies primarily in individual fate, or "destiny". By anticipating its final "collapse" or death, human being is thrown back into his facticity, which is given to his former self, existential repetition or "being". By accepting this inherited possibility of his "abandonment", *Geworfenheit*, he becomes capable of acquiring a moment, *Augenblicklich*, of the present. However, lately, Heidegger had a critical attitude towards the language he used for *Being and Time*, considering it too attached to the European metaphysical tradition. Consequently, the project was only partially successful. The philosopher said:

The thinking that tries to advance in Being and Time is still burdened by the language of metaphysics and thus remains largely under the dominance of the tradition of Western thought. But I have never spoken of a turning point in my thinking. This misunderstanding was caused by the awkwardness of printing my essay "On the Nature of Truth", which was presented in lectures from 1930 onwards. What is needed is a transformation of thinking, not a turnaround (Heidegger, 1998: 230).

He therefore shifted his attention to explore the language. Moreover, its inherent reasoning lends itself to ways of expressing being, i.e. to the establishment of a specific ontological self-consciousness. This consciousness must emerge from the way language is used, so that poetics takes precedence over the demands of the scientific formulation of truth. We have already discussed the faculty of the mind in relation to the distribution of ideas and the logic of spontaneous causality, *die Vernunft*. The appeal to poetic language gives the impression that the late Heidegger, like Kant in his transition to the *Critique of Judgment*, also shifted in his thinking. In doing so, he touched upon the limits of individual aesthetic expression and its peculiarity to the limits of the inexpressible. The possibility of multiple diversifications of Dasein, adheres to the expressive modality of language, which prepares the foundational concepts and expands existentials to many more phenomena, for example, it can

be used to interpret tolerance or mindfulness as phenomena of empathic co-existence and conscious presence. Therefore, language is *the house of Being*. It enables the world picture to be represented as such.

Psychoanalysts argue that its knowledge is also a form of intellectual discourse and self-awareness, rather than a specific therapy, engaging in which, with its characteristic reductiveness (to psychic a priori and unconscious structures), also inevitably leads to a particular world view. On the one hand psychoanalysis appeals to the fluidity of language in the unconscious; on the other limits itself with its own approach. As Guattari noted: "Psychoanalysis is a bourgeois fiction: it deals with a very specific population, with children of a certain age, with people of the educated bourgeoisie" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1997). Much like the self-limiting thinking of phenomenology, psychoanalysis can not end the acceptance of the aesthetics of psychoanalytic discourse and mythology: here the myth of unconscious seems to lurk behind every act, where content highly likely to be deconstructed in such a way that there is no final defining interpretation, but rather the awakening of the analytic function in reflection.

It gives the impression that due to its naturalisation, psychoanalysis is incapable of understanding fate and Being, although it were Guattari and others at this radicalised thinking that led to this opinion. Therefore, we pass by the perspectives of objective and subjective time *a priori*, and look at it as the social time or the time of completion in the surrounding world. Transcendental phenomenology cannot answer questions about social time, although no one asks it to. Human beings, unlike animals, have become capable of living in time, of living in history. The creation of temporal objects such as calendars, clocks, or even some other objects is used to predict the course of history. This, in time, is linked to the historical, contemporary environment, faded protentions and internal transferences onto the clock. Therefore, hermeneutic phenomenology and psychoanalysis agree in their ability to deal and understand social beings. Since either existential or unconscious processes express the essence of a person's social existence, and although they are involved in specific a priori structures, they can only be discovered through investigation on the interaction with others. Not surprisingly, this later made it possible to develop into Binswanger's existential therapy.

No matter how illogical, the unconscious is subject to deconstruction. Based on the laws of logic, the reconstruction of events corresponds to the structure of passive retention. It concerns associations and binding subjectivity. Existentialism, on the other hand, expresses the phenomena of human participation in events and inclusion in the world. Existentials,

modes of being, are characterised by their temporality: decisiveness does not exist without the moment in which it must manifest. Being-in-the-World requires awareness of co-presence, etc. Moreover, Heidegger's phenomenology points to structures that are different from the unconscious. Here, social time is constituted at the intersection of objective and subjective time. Such dynamics indicate a position of the golden mean between solipsism and physicalism, the horizon of phenomenal experience where the conscious and the objective alternately manifest in turn. Consciousness is therefore something concrete.

These crucial points for the manifestation of Dasein require one to be present as a form of personal responsibility. To face something that is to be realised through existential "world disclosure" or "resolve". This here-and-now presence, *hit et nunc*, is expressed via the term "Kairos" (Ramalho, 2021), which is defined as follows: "Only in resolute openness to the call of conscience do we experience the moment of vision, which is the authentic present, the now of resolute existence" (Heidegger, 2008: 387). The decisive moment of the high time to be present. Thus, it is necessary to distinguish *kairos* from *chronos*, the usual flow of time, to foresee the premise for a different ontology. This intention coincides with the end of the analysis, where the characteristic features of recovery are the ability to lead an everyday life, to make decisions, to be present among others. There are two types of consciousness: the first is switched on in perception and constitution, the other is one that has to develop. So we could assume that time in the hermeneutic version of phenomenology and time as the ability to be *alive* after analysis are ways of regaining one's *time*, recapturing from the past or finding time again. Temporality, then, is the way of uncovering oneself. Both phenomenology and psychoanalysis repeat but this the ancient principle of education mentioned in Plato's Sophist - *Elenchos*: "The practice of elenchus, the cross-examination of opinions, both one's own and those of others, serves to purify the mind of false beliefs and to prepare the way for true knowledge" (Plato, 2015: 230b-c), i.e. to test a person's opinions about himself and to cleanse him of false beliefs - "the greatest purification". Therefore, we can see how their line of thought emerges; we could define them as a traditions that lead to self-questioning as part of European reflective anthropology.

Before the Kantian definition of time as the transcendental, there were centuries of philosophical reflection: ancient conceptions of time should not be simplified because of their mythologised form, as the time they picture was symbolised by the images of the god Chronos turning the wheel or the god Kairos demonstrating his forelock of hair (Boschung, 2013: 34). The Greeks and their intuitions about time established paradigms of thought and

understanding. Parmenides, whose problem we touched on in the introduction, is an incredible example of the effort to reveal the nature of being through his successor Zeno by questioning the nature of change. That feature of it that it never ends and repeats itself. The primordial experience of time is formed by the natural change that follows the experience of day and night - the visible movement of the heavenly bodies and the distribution of light, theistic harmony. What is important, however, is that philosophers seek to establish the basis of this movement. What if we look at the movement of the planets in the same way as we look at the aporia of Achilles? If Achilles has to go a certain distance to catch the tortoise, and he is always one step behind, while the tortoise is also moving forward. Then within this temporality the planets should stop and we should not see any more days or nights. The chase presented in the aporia shows us an imperfect modality of movement in which the actors are not synchronised, as in the real world. Thus, Achilles will always reach the tortoise. Therefore, through this paradoxical modality of space, we might have noticed that Zeno gave this example for a purpose: to show, through the metonymy of time in Achilles' equation, the intuition of the principle of Being hidden in motion.

So movement is not being; rather, together with rest, it represents some of the higher categories of thought, together with identity and difference. The problem of representation, then, is one of entering into a problematic description. If, according to Parmenides:

Coming into being and passing away, being and not being, change of place and alteration of bright colour. Where, then, it has its farthest boundary, it is complete on every side, equally poised from the centre in every direction, like the mass of a rounded sphere; for it cannot be greater or for it cannot be greater or smaller in one place than in another (Parmenides, 2017: 40).

Then, an eternal being cannot be grasped and expressed as permanent because of cosmic change. It is something in nature that is accessible through transcendence to the unchangeable sphere of never ending being, the principles of nature. The perpetual presence of the world in comparison to which there is nothing else but imagination, the world of opinion, the reality or truth, thus, is only one of possible worlds. The beauty of dialectical Platonic reasoning has brought us to the limits of thinking and shows that even in terms of the highest categories, Being is hardly comprehensible and therefore something transcendent to our logical grasp, so that perhaps the only being we could think of is the one reachable by contemplation. This, together with other implications of the concept, lead to the creation of the first system of ancient cosmogony and ontology, demonstrating a considerable depth of thought about time and being.

It is not obvious, but another important theme in the revelation of this ontological consciousness as temporality is the issue of partial being or non-truth. This theme was first developed in Plato's dialogue "Sophist". Here he radicalises the need to speak the truth in the world in order to show what is false does not exist at all. The figure of the Sophist in ancient Greece embodies the character of a charlatan: "The sophist claims to know everything, but in reality his knowledge is superficial and deceptive" (Plato, 2015: 233c). This personality does not adhere to any criteria of devotion to the truth and instead acts manipulatively for selfish purposes. Sometimes the activities of these individuals, together with their talents, reached a high degree of sophistication and refinement in their art.

The Sophist is the one to be questioned about the possibility of lying. Through the mouths of the Eleatic Stranger and Theaetetus, Plato tries to discover how falsehood is possible, because if we follow the logic of the Eleatics, falsehood is non-being, and if so, how can something be said about it if it is non-being? To assert the being of non-being creates contradictions. So the subject of falsehood and ontology brings us back to the so-called argument about being. Therefore they have begun to investigate what a sophist is. The first questions on his nature do not lead to the conclusion, as he also gets his knowledge from nature: "The sophist is an illusionist who creates images and appearances that seem real but have no true substance" (Plato, 2015: 234c). With this art, he perceived nature as something tautological and imitated it every thought. In this case, the sophist cannot be caught because he is talking indefinitely about nature. Most of the time he changes the argument and it is impossible to catch him.

Finally, the philosophical discussion moves on to an eidetic examination of falsehood, questioning its relevance to being and non-being in terms of higher categories. The first step in this thinking is the question of whether the negation of non-being is possible, since it seems absurd, the assertion of non-being, and how one can deny or even say something that does not exist. However, it turns out that we can express it through the concept of difference. They finally conclude: "Non-being is not the opposite of being, but rather a different kind of being, something that is not the same as being, but different from it" (Plato, 2015: 258e). Pointing to what is or is not the truth, is considering a particular quality, projecting in mind the otherness of being. This makes modalities possible: why the lies of the sophist are different from the truth, but still exist and fit to understanding.

This is no longer a relevant ontological problem, as we can partially assert non-being in the dynamics of thinking as distinction within the higher categories defined as Being, Rest,

Motion, Identity and Difference. For Plato, these concepts cannot be derived from each other and nor are they identical. The collision of these concepts might lead to paradoxes because they are ideal and abstract. Thus, non-being is partially expressed in thought, but not in the world; there is no non-being in the world, but the resemblance of Being. However, it denotes a diverse conscious multiverse, that associates elements of experience into a one conscious sequence which is irrelevant to truthfulness, therefore separates any even pathological consciousness as a unique phenomenon. Therefore, falsehood or partial non-being only appears because of the ability to perceive and constitute the difference, which, therefore, enables all possible thoughts to appear as reflection of Being.

Alexius Meinong, known for his contributions to ontology and epistemology, recalls the image of Sophist. He argued that not all objects need to have actual existence. He proposed an alternative way of understanding intentionality, the relationship between mental acts and their objects. He argued that intentionality does not necessarily require the existence of the object, mental acts can be directed at non-existent objects: "There are objects that actually do not exist" (Meinong, 2013). Thus, we have an example of non-existent objects that can be the subject of meaningful discourse. At issue here are philosophical positions that take existence as a necessary condition for being an object of thought. Meinong distinguishes between different types of objects, including objects that exist, "existent objects", and those that do not exist. According to him, these non-existent objects have a mode of being called "subsistence". For example, a golden mountain subsists in thought even though it does not exist in reality. Eventually, for this Meinong's ontology argument gets a huge criticism because it contains assumptions for many objects, including impossible or contradictory ones. Bertrand Russell calls it Meinong's Jungle, a fictional world inhabited with non-existent objects (Russell, 2005). At certain points it's important not to ontologize, but accept the difference in mind as Plato did.

The conclusions proposed by Plato later in his thought are impressive in their boldness and completeness. In particular, they show that consciousness is at the centre of a rupture that disrupts the logic of being. The immediate logic of the world is linear and predictable. For human thought, however, the act of difference opens up the creative potential of the mind for expression. The sophist's deception should be understood as a purposeful activity aimed at a predictable outcome. In other words, we can now assume that through this trope we have reached the eidetic imagination of otherness and explicit act of diverse retention through higher categories of being. Imagination and retention, thus, create the

projection of human subjectivity into the world. It is therefore interesting to assume that the diversity of the content of the unconscious corresponds to a sufficient degree to the criteria of being and partial non-being; it exists as the false belief. This matter argues about a priori and allows for the diversity of psychological and social phenomena within perception, desires, which constitute also a possible diversity of atypical psychological experience in being.

Thus, in phenomenological terms, the unconscious is assumed to have a transcendental nature based on difference and temporality. As with diverse conscious experiences, this highlights the complexity of the role of time in human consciousness. It also shows how different philosophical and psychoanalytical traditions have grappled with its nature and implications. By constituting this difference, might we not also assume that the fundamental difference of the manifestations of so-called atypical consciousness somehow inherits its own difference and temporality? Most of the mental disorders considered in ICD-11 are related to time, e.g. aetiology, duration, recession, acute state, etc. (ICD-11, 2019). Could we not admit that the unconscious can serve as a horizon for the formation and constitution of a subject? The ground for reflexive and pre-phenomenal constitution. The study that analysis deals with, and has been dealing with since its first discoveries: dream, trauma, fixation, repetition and transference.

So we have to talk about human cognition in a reduced sense. Still, about cognition in general, without any existential relation, either to the empirical self or to the real world. Phenomenology does not claim to be anything other than a doctrine of entities within pure intuition. On the exemplary data of transcendental consciousness, the phenomenologist realises that intentionalism is regarded as the essential descriptive property of mental phenomena. All this leads to the method of a descriptive doctrine of consciousness, both transcendently philosophical and, of course, psychological. Second, the phenomena of transcendental phenomenology might be characterised as partially non-existent therefore fluid for definition. Before us, first of all, as an all-pervasive, passively flowing synthesis in the form of a continuous inner awareness of time:

Every perception of a physical thing has its horizon of indeterminate actuality. Every perception, as a perception of this one and the same thing, has an internal horizon in which the continuity of this perception itself is constituted as a unity of synthesis (Husserl, 2012: 99).

Every experience has its own temporality as the premise. Suppose it is an experience of consciousness in which some object of the world becomes the *cogitatum*. In this case we can avoid distinguishing between the objective and internal temporality of the phenomenon.

Its unity is the unity of synthesis - in general, a continuous coherence of cogitations, which, in its essence, is the method itself. This gradual formation is preserved in the developed ego as a stable system of forms of apperception and thus pre-forms of constituted subjects. Among which are the substances of the objective universe of a stable ontological structure; this preservation itself is only a form of genesis. The following logic would be explored in the III Chapter. Mind constitutes temporalities due its own design and has as a consequence the complex manifold of conscious experience. However, the specific subject of descriptive psychology is precisely that which is proper to personality as such, as subjects in themselves of an exclusively intentional life, which, in the case of the individual soul, must be regarded as its own purely intentional relation.

§1.3 Fundamental Ontology and Traumatic Experience

Here, we will discuss some methodological problems that arise on the horizon of intellectual inquiry. They arise in questions of understanding the way of philosophical reflection on the prospects of traumatic experience and its formation in consciousness. Moreover, when we begin to think philosophically, we turn to certain tropes of thought and use the specific methodology. In phenomenology, for example, it would be difficult to imagine such thinking because, guided by universality and apodicticity, it would be challenging to reduce the experience of the pathological to a universal root. How can trauma be described phenomenologically?

If we turn to a discipline related to the study of pathological conditions, such as psychoanalysis, its inherent thinking does not allow us to achieve the same desired universality as in phenomenology. This excludes any possibility of its confident and authentic expression. Standing between two poles of radical difference in approach and description of states of consciousness, we may begin to shrug our shoulders and wonder how we can include such experiences with philosophical certainty and remain completely satisfied. We also wonder whether psychoanalysis, with its focus on trauma and healing, could add keys to philosophy. Therefore, we would like to address the following questions and bring this discussion to the ontological issues. Since philosophical reflection inevitably leads to the revelation of the problems of being, so we must inevitably come to this question.

First, we must point out that Western thought continuously reflects, recategorizes and divides itself. As a result, it finds itself in an increasingly confusing situation, even though it

aims for clarity. Somehow "normality" and "being mentally healthy" have eclipsed all alternatives, crowding out all attempts to comprehend the fullness. The very method of rationality excludes such explorations because, in its view, they do not lead to constructive conclusions. Moreover, the culture of thought suppresses the recognition of atypical consciousness for philosophical attention. The ancient ideal of the Supreme Good still compels thinking to be cruel in its reflections, cancelling out everything irrational and disordered in favour of the spontaneous and contingent. A morbid pattern thus guides the subject, in order to lead him into the ideal/ethical or extraterrestrial realm, despite the need to remember the facts of the concrete presence. As in Nietzsche's criticism of Socrates: "I found no substantial change in the character of Socrates compared with that of the other Greeks. He understood all their instincts, but he overestimated reason; he turned against the instincts" (Nietzsche, 1997: 476).

There is an epistemological impossibility of combining phenomenology and psychoanalysis because of a fundamental difference in the orientation of thought. Husserlian contemplation is guided by the ideal of the omnipotent *Cogito*, which allows for the consistent and prolonged reflection on consciousness. In contrast, psychoanalysis is implemented as a kind of two-body psychology. Two-body psychology means that the crucial interpretation needs the other to be guessed at. The archaeology of subjectivity thus shows a different dynamic to that of the *Cogito*. Freud noted: "Internal perceptions of emotional and intellectual processes can be projected outward in the same way as sense perceptions; they are thus used to construct the external world" (Freud, 1990: 81).

What emerges between the analyst and the analyzand is that the truth of the subject is quite different from what we can obtain through general logical analysis or reasoning. For the phenomenologist, the world is transparent and accessible, and under certain ideal conditions it can reveal its transcendental foundations or the correct view of things. For psychoanalysis, the subject, with its inherent resistance to self-disclosure, falls from the ranks of omnipotence and becomes dependent on the psychoanalytic method. Thus, epistemologically different approaches can end in the impossibility of finding a common root. How can we not simplify the situation in which we wish to combine our knowledge in order to gain insights into pathological modulation, and reconstruct everything in a more coherent philosophical picture? It is therefore natural to say that such an approach is doomed to failure, for how can something contingent become a coherent concept? Moreover, how can subjectivity be introduced into this subject in order to reveal a specific inherent dependence? So, if this

impossibility is due to an epistemological difference, could we not reformulate the question and pose it in a more updated form and in a way that would somehow obtain a correct generalisation for our understanding?

Suppose we begin by considering the phenomena of consciousness from an ontological point of view, namely: perception, apperception, dreaming and imagination. Their only inherent and unifying common feature would be their immanent intelligible and logical character. In this case, we will not encounter any contradictions along the way. Whether it is phenomenological reflection, psychopathological reaction, or other manifestations within the conscious experience, in any case it could ultimately be bound to the eidetic contemplation or *res cogitans*. The thought, however, seems to be connected to sensible stimulation and emotional reaction, while they are united at its arousal. In this way of argument, it does not matter whether we observe atypical or typical, healthy/unhealthy, etc. states of consciousness, they are ontologically equal at this point. However, in any case, we must note their quantitative difference as intensified and mainly deformed in pathological intelligible phenomena of conscious experience mentioned: thinking, imagination, memory, and other. Such the structure of self-presentation repeats the struggle to reveal mechanisms of mind, but ignores the human being as such. Since Husserl's phenomenology largely limits his ontologizing within strict rationality, we propose to turn to Heidegger's phenomenological philosophy, which provides an ontological extension of phenomenology, and try to answer the questions from an alternative region of the ontological perspective.

At first sight, however, more than this may be necessary, for if we ask ourselves how we can introduce a whole group of phenomena that manifest themselves in the horizon of psychoanalytic experience. Such phenomena related to trauma and healing are not regular elements of the consistent dynamics of the mind. Their nature is entirely spontaneous and unpredictable in future. However, if we consider both subjects to be about conscious experiences, we can at this point unite them as parts of general conscious experience. Which makes it possible to think philosophically about matters of psychology. Furthermore, the traumatic experience is mainly extended in the ethical dimension and often requires an ethical interpretation. It is thus subjected to transcendental questioning and non-causal logic. Since a trauma becomes part of existence and self-constitution, we suppose this might be elaborated within specific terms of the Heideggerian philosophy. This paper seeks an adequate ontological category for traumatic experience, the phenomena of rupture.

As in the case of the concepts of *Das Man* and *Dasein*, which are placed ontologically and in a way that corresponds to a particular philosophical position. This paper proposes an ontologically consistent reinterpretation of *Dasein* by extending it to include the category: *Schattendasein*. This aims to follow another consideration: what exactly from psychoanalytic experience should we include in this concept? And what exactly should we think about when we integrate this category into our ontology? To do this, we propose to stay on the horizon of phenomenological ontology and move along the vector outlined by Heidegger. It is to give an explicit explanation of how we should think about the categories of human existence in order to expand the ontological horizon.

To begin with, Heidegger's definition of *Das Man* and *Dasein* is a clear mode of questioning on the authenticity of one's own existence; in the first case, the subject avoids questioning his own life and death and blinds himself in social existence. As he defines it, *Das Man* is "such a preoccupation with the present that it turns human life into an "anxious chore" in the mundane routine of everyday life" (Heidegger, 2008: 128). Its main characteristic is the uncare, its main focus on existing things and changing the world, replacing the self into exteriority. It renders the subject anonymous and impersonal, immersing the person in the world. This impersonality forces one to give up own freedom and stop being oneself. This way of being dissolves subjectivity in the other: "We enjoy and play as one enjoys; we move away from the crowd, and as one moves away, we find outrageous what one is outraged by" (Heidegger, 2008: §27).

In a way, we see the perspective of *das Man* emerging before us as something socially acceptable, mediocre and familiar. Interestingly, we suggest this situation coincides with the Lacanian understanding of language and its impact on the constitution of the subject. Especially when it comes to culturally-linguistic structures that shape the world and create subjects that are dependent on meanings and values given by the environment, fueling disrupted or externalized subjectivity. Indeed, the symbolic and culture are prerequisites for creating the subjective, for teaching how to live and desire. What, then, is interpreted as the balance for the rupture in subjectivity when we consider that to be historically contingent? The subject, vulnerable and dependent on the other, is forced to enter the symbolic horizon in order to establish a connection with existence, and only with its help can it become human. The symbolic, as he defines it: "It is the world of words that creates the world of things, which without language would remain a chaotic mass. The symbolic gives structure and meaning to human experience" (Lacan, 2002: 65). Therefore, structure and a set of values

come to a person with its family and country; they lay the foundations for coexistence. We are, thus, faced with the image of falsely interested subjectivity that goes with the flow and avoids self-awareness. One that pursues a policy of normality and familiarity, the case of the *Natural Attitude*. When it comes to Dasein, it is the opposite intention:

Dasein is that being which, in its very being, is concerned about its being. This is a constitutive feature of the ontological structure of Dasein. Dasein always understands itself in terms of its being - in terms of a possibility of itself: to be itself or not to be itself (Heidegger, 2008: §47).

A state of the subject in which he questions principles of its own authenticity. But in such a way, it begins to feel responsible for its choices and its situation in life. When the subject confronts with the experience of the death of others he begins to think about his own. His own death levels reveal the initial dependence on the way the world is lived. Although, in this case, the *Natural Attitude* is specifically reduced not by a phenomenological reduction, but by an ontological or existential reduction. Dasein is ultimately to be understood as a reorganised concept corresponding to a *living* intentionality. Therefore, in this research we want to reinterpret Dasein in order to extend the ontological consideration of the human being.

In psychoanalysis, something similar happens in reflection of potential patients at a certain point. In order to understand their lives and overcome themselves, while they are not satisfied with their existence, they experience passions of their own neurotic structures, due to which they try to escape from their routine repetition in order to gain, if not integrity, at least some meaning and liberation. It is the destiny of subjectivity to face the need for meaning and to search for it. For without it, conscious could not be consciousness. Although, there is a methodological distinction here in regard to philosophy. The person who positions as Dasein begins to question his own life, almost as an analyzand. However, this ontology weakly includes situations that are intertwined with the experience of trauma and ways of dealing with it psychologically. Thus, we come to the opposition between a person in search of meaning and someone who is not fully able to have it. Is the category of Dasein sufficient to describe this situation of authentic subjective existence, or can we go further beyond the Dasein? It should ultimately be understood as a reorganised concept corresponding to an understanding of intentionality, especially when considering the issue of traumatic experience. This view seems ultimately inadequate to address the issue of trauma because it does not include the Other and the specificity of the psychic archaeology represented in non-causal logic of individual existence. Therefore, in order to develop this logic, it is

proposed to expand the categories of human self-understanding using the logic of Hegel's triad, namely the Universal, the Individual, and the Particular, which are put on the table together with other categories. As in quoted Hegel's piece before:

The concept as such contains the moments of universality. (as the free sameness with itself in its determinacy), particularity (the determinacy in which the universal remains the same as itself, unalloyed), and individuality (as the reflection-in-itself of the determinacies of universality and particularity, the negative unity with itself that is the determinate in and of itself and at the same time identical with itself or universal). (Hegel, 2010:§163)

We expand the ontological consideration of the self-reflection with following logic of questioning:

Hegel	the Universal	the Individual	the Particular
Heidegger	Das Man	Dasein	Schattendasein
Lacan	Symbolic *S	Analysand	Passent

Figure S: Schattendasein

The Universal is the starting point of the development of subjectivity, where Das Man coincides with the dependent subjectivity. Heidegger defines it as: "Everyone is the other, and no one is himself. The Das Man that provides the answer to the question of the 'who' of everyday being is the 'nobody' to whom every being has already surrendered in the process of being together"(Heidegger, 2008: 165). Symbolic forms of a contemporaneity shape the state of consciousness, the initial matrix of an individual to comprehend and live the world. Some of these are primordial and universal value conditions. When we consider the particular, we mean the courage and determination to search for meaning and to confront subjectivity with reality and the truth of one's existence. Courage is akin to the first initiation of the analyzand. At this point, however, this approach still has an implicit Cogito-wised methodology. This condition excludes attention to more general conditions of psyche development that are overlooked by philosophy and found in the strategy of two-body psychology. What if alternative methods, especially psychoanalytic experience, could open up even more to the archaeology of the subject, exploring levels of biography and ideology and how we can elaborate on this ontologically, especially in relation to trauma?

Thus, we should pursue a particular deepening of the definition of Dasein. Assuming revelation on the individual more and more, so that at this point we are looking at it as a more

concrete entity, the appearance of the Individual. Within this, we find the actuality of individual unconscious existence, the totality of its factors. In order to define this as the ontological term, we propose the above-mentioned term *Schattendasein*. In this category it expresses the sphere of hardly accessible pieces that constitute the invisible parts of self-experience, its original elements. The pieces have to be found against resistance and non-evidence as a form of the art of self-discovery. The understanding that comes after the initial challenge of *Dasein*, which accompanies the state of *Passent*. This is usually defined as the process of transmission and psychoanalytic knowledge and definition of one's symptoms. This is to ensure that the analyst's position is validated by the testimony from their analytic experience. This kind of testimony creates a logic of self-knowledge and confession. As the analysis is completed, the *passent* is recognised as being able to give his own testimony - to tell the story of his own analysis (Laurent, 1992).

Therefore the one who finishes his analysis and knows his shadow-side. The shadow side is something that needs time and light to be seen. Human beings consist of different temporalities in a mindset that makes them non-transparent. The repetitive actual infinity in the constitution of the unconscious complexes the investigation of conscious acts. Thus making assumptions on the subjective as of hybrid temporality, where specific temporality is built in experience by relevant associationism in mind. Just as it takes time to be healed, as in psychotherapy, it takes time to learn about philosophy and the self. The category is proposed to define conditions of self-reflection that follow the state of reflection after defining symptoms and deep self meditations, and is about what comes after human self-discovery in analysis. The new problem of self-subjective reflection comes with the problem of new definitions. After such a self-investigation, as we would see the subject gets into a state of suspension facing contingency of the Self and installs the subject into a state of uncertain freedom. Since specific pieces of experience are not disintegratable, they are forced to exist along as one's own shadow, which induce a state of uncertain confusion in the notion of the anthropological project. Memories, habits and traumas are chiasmatic parts of subjectivity, enclosed in the cyclical time - existence along with them is inevitable. For Lacan's critique, the truth seemed to be self-surrender. The final truth is impossible, but could only exist as evolving self-knowledge. This condition provokes a new state of being as placed in ethical uncertainty. We therefore use the ontological terms to describe the mentioned situation of human self-reflection.

In this case, we could recall the shift in approach of existential psychotherapists such

as Binswanger. They developed ideas on how to conduct therapy within an existentialist framework. This involved paying attention to the patient's participation in the treatment and rethinking it phenomenologically. The aim was to help patients search for the meaning of their life. However, as mentioned earlier, they were driven by the original intuition of truth, *aletheia*, the inherent openness which is irrelevant to the updated view of subjectivity. Truth is something that does not apply to life because it's broader and much more complex. A human being is no longer just a *telos*, but enclosed in a repetition of symbolic. Lacan ironically says:

I told him right away: you do not marry the truth, you do not sign a marriage contract with it, and you certainly do not have an extramarital affair with it. It tolerates nothing of the kind. Truth is above all a temptation; it is meant to deceive. In order not to be caught by its hook, one must be strong (Lacan, 2023: 20)

A truth is always something that does not fit into life itself, but limits it. Nevertheless, at this point of the *knowledge*, the situation of the *Schattendasein* requires the enactment of phenomenological reduction, as of being in a state of self-knowledge should follow the state of suspension, as a consequent habit of thought. This dark side is never transparent, and each of its elements has its own degree of complication. Although, due to the universal nature of the intelligible nature of consciousness, we might admit the congruence of experience with people having severe mental disorders. However, the exact fact of radical otherness and partial inaccessibility due to the impossibility of communicating the state of affairs with specifically disintegrated individuals hardly complicates the curation in contrast of the philosophical reasoning as the pure reflection on the *a priori*. Nevertheless, it still points to the possibilities for thought of building bridges of meaning in the search for logic of its distribution. Whether it is an ordinary neurosis, a Lacanian psychosis or a Heideggerian hermeneutic quest, a traumatic experience in most cases means a lack of interpretation. Thus, if it is possible, the communication as the act of healing is still valid, until we face not severe cases that are still curable. This makes the philosophical and therapeutic acts synonymous while clarifying events and teaching one to mastery one's existence. In the case of mentioned people, the degree of subjective disruption points to different degrees of freedom of the shadow existence to our cognition. Therefore, epistemologically, a certain degree of this Other will forever remain invisible and incomprehensible. Ontologically, however, we can maintain our empathy for these people by observing their world and reconstructing it *from the shadows*, partially, contingently and fragmentarily.

Schattendasein can become a fruitful category and close the ontological syllogism of self-reflection with *Dasein* and *Das Man*, making it possible to combine phenomenological, psychoanalytic and psychopathological thinking. In this way we can emphasise the psycho-oriented and historically grounded factors that influence the activity of the mind. They may reveal the subject in a more dynamic perspective, avoiding the limitations and demands of normality. Which might also be productive in understanding the inherent repetitiveness and destructiveness of the human, as it becomes when considering phenomena called as the death drive or the *jouissance*.

From a theoretical point of view, it is also important to outline some perspectives on the application of this concept. Firstly, as mentioned above, it constitutes a set of factors that determine the human experience, regardless of how ordinary, abnormal or pathological consciousness people encounter, even with subsequent intervention. To give an idea of a situation of philosophical thinking where thinkers have to deal with their encoded shadow rather than follow a certain logic. This is not only because in this way one can better see the essence of being. The destiny of human subjectivity, whether healthy or suffering from specific mental difficulties, is to deal with meaning and finally to become a *passent*. The someone who has reached the fullness and maturity of his or her existence, as happens when one completes one's analysis. Secondly, psychoanalytic exploration of temporality reveals specific implicit understanding of a human being as a non-project. From the point of psychoanalytic interpretation, the *perspective* becomes a choice, as the symbolic order should lead to the limits of the constitution. As if we applied two patterns of infinities to express the subject in preserved qualities of the *project* as potential infinity, which however are limited by the repetitive actual infinity of the *particular unconscious*, we consider it though as a hybrid temporal entity. From this point, the vision of existence ceases just to unfold itself, holding oneself as the confusion of meanings that are already given and the question is only their order.

In this regard, we should ask whether there is a possibility of expanding the concept of existence by unfolding the dimension of *Schattendasein* more deeply emphasizing dimensions for psychically oriented factors of intelligence in regard to people with severe mental difficulties. They are thrown into the path of *Schattendasein*, as of being non-transparent, not fully communicable to others and consequently exist within an alternate intersubjective setting. Being dismissed because of the impossibility of communication shows another side of the issue of being enrooted into the language. Thus, ontological

self-reflection is only possible within conditions of proper ability and thinking convey the meaning, e.g. choice understanding, otherwise any treatment is impossible. It makes clear at these radical points the phenomenological requirement of normality and degrees of impossible. Nevertheless, as we consider in this research psychoanalytic thinking helps to build a diverse and expanded perspective on the mind.

Chapter II. The Logic of Phenomenology and the Logic of the Unconscious

*Yo que senti el horror de los espejos
No solo ante el cristal impenetrable
Donde acaba y empieza, inhabitable,
Un imposible espacio de reflejos*

*Sino ante el agua espejular que imita
El otro azul en su profundo cielo³*

In the previous section we considered temporality as a critical feature to explore phenomenological and psychoanalytic interpretations of consciousness. We found that when we compare these perspectives, at first sight we see that the time of the unconscious is different from that of the conscious, as the perspective is different from the retrospective. However, the universal philosophical constitutions of time are not contradictory but complementary, they represent heterogeneous genesis. While the perspective of time is interesting for explorations of consciousness, we need to do more than just talk about time, but go on to see how it works while thinking about essences. In what relationship does meaning regain its value in consciousness? The flow of time only shows us the emergence of essential logic, but not its inner connections. Since the phenomenological project was originally created to justify a universal logic of knowledge, we will also turn to the premise of the subjective logic that originates from the unconscious. We want to consider this logic as it might show its effects on thinking.

§2.1 Reversed Givenness

Here we begin to consider the mental action. In general, we have many names and diverse descriptions for this phenomenon, such as stream of consciousness, active imagination, etc., and is also known as intersubjectively communicative phenomena. This mental action represents certain logic of the mind, something most proper, accessible and inaccessible at the same time, since it is part of us together and is as well unknown as abstract. The same with the innate awareness of the phenomenal matter of human consciousness as naturally proper to human beings as logic, but not as obvious as fact. The

³I have been horrified before all mirrors, not just before the impenetrable glass, the end and the beginning of that space, inhabited by nothing but reflections, but faced with specular water, mirroring the other blue within its bottomless sky (Borges, 1999).

rational logic matters but differs to one in psychology, therefore some may underestimate its implicit cognitive nature, as a part of the mental action.

The study of the intentionality of consciousness is the culmination of logical inquiry on subjectivity and mental action, as Husserl believed: "Phenomenology is the descriptive analysis of consciousness in its intentionality, in which the aim is to uncover the essential structures that make experience possible" (Husserl, 2001: 152). This was the central point of his phenomenological argument. Husserl adopted the concept of the directionality of consciousness: "The concept of intentionality involves the directedness of consciousness towards an object, which can be anything the mind can think about or perceive" (Husserl, 2001: 121). Thus, it is only with Husserl that the term 'intentional' takes on the meaning of the directedness of consciousness towards an object as well as its imposed intrinsic genesis. He wrote: "Every intentional experience has its intentional object, which correlates with the act of consciousness. This object is not part of the real world, but is constituted by the intentional acts of consciousness" (Husserl, 2001: 30). Accordingly, the terms 'intentional' and 'intentionality' have since acquired their meaning as the correlates of consciousness. This refers to the relational property of being the intention's content.

(1) Intentionality "objectifies": This means that it links the data that are integral parts of the stream of consciousness, or *reell* with "intentional objects". These intentional objects are usually given only by this data, more often characterised as sensual, *feelings*, or later so-called hyletic data. The function of intentions is to "interpret" these data, i.e. to relate them to objects that are not part of such acts, but are "transcendent" to them. The identity of this object is compatible with different modes of relating to it - such as perception, thought, or doubt. The idea of intentional consciousness as the objectification of source material also presupposes such a theory of perception, as well as an explanation of other acts that are by no means undeniable. Husserl mainly studied a class of phenomena called "acts", which are determined by their characteristic presence in the mind.

The intention is initially associated with the hyletic data: "The sensory data, to which we can always direct our attention as to the abstract layer of the concrete, are also already the product of a constitutive synthesis" (Husserl, 1981: §16). Only as a neutral stream of experience not yet attributed to ourselves. Moreover, the thesis states that we are immediately inclined to attribute these experiences to objects rather than ourselves, since we assume that the world simply exists and is experienced in the mode of the *Natural Attitude*. According to

this view, the self and reality are discovered only through a process of reductive differentiation that takes place in a neutral primary stream.

(2) Unifying intentions: The next step in the objectifying function of intentions is that they allow us to successfully attribute different data to the same referents or "poles" of meaning. Without such unifying functions we would have only a stream of perceptions, similar but never identical. Intention provides a synthetic function by which the different aspects, perspectives and stages of an object are focused and integrated into identical *nuclei* of meaning. For example, the frontal aspect of the cube refers to the lateral aspect (profile) and, less clearly, to the backside. This shows some expectations about our future experience, which may or may not come true in the future, but these predictions of what may happen are clearly labelled in the present. Here it becomes necessary to make a division of intentional acts, which Husserl has to express sufficiently clearly: a division between acts of pure intentionality and acts of intuitive fulfilment. The first group includes all those acts which blindly refer to intentional objects when we are only thinking about them and do not yet have a clear idea. The second group includes acts that fill the empty form of such intentions with intuitive content, as in perception or imagination. There are many transitions between these opposites, for example between the idea of a proper icosahedron and its intuitive filling. The first group of purely "sign" or "symbolic" intentions always call for such acts of intuitive filling as their true "meaning" or purpose. When Husserl calls the former "intention" and the latter as "filling", we can assume that specific intuitive filling of an intentional act is also made by the passive structures of the unconscious and might appear at this level of constitution. Thus two kinds of intention in its constitution are equivalent: intentions of objective or symbolic demand, which are intuitively empty, and the content of filling, which brings intuitive, ideatic and imaginary content. The two are inextricably linked. The former need the latter as their complement.

(3) Intentions constitute: Husserl went so far as to ascribe to intentions the function of actually constituting intentional objects. This becomes the "fulfilment" or "achievement" of intentional acts. Consequently, the intentional object no longer appears as a pre-existing referent to which the intentional act points as something inherently given; but generated in the act itself. At this point the genesis of the conscious repeats the unconscious and remains non-transparent, and analytic. This constitutive function of the intentional act can only be discovered by expanding the method that Husserl calls intentional analysis.

For our discussion, the evaluation of this subject's intentionality aims to sum Husserl's explanation of "intention" by describing it also as a property of every unconscious act and ensures that it does not only point to objects, but is at its constitution. The given matter in such a way that the object appears in our consciousness as a whole. The establishment of identity between the referents of several intentional acts, the linking of the various phases of their intuitive content, along with its constitution (Husserl, 2001: 234).

The intentional functions presented by Husserl - namely those of objectification, unification, and constitution - ultimately give rise to the object in consciousness. This involves a process of passive synthesis. The peculiarity of Husserl's interpretation of the active synthesis of empirical data lies within the framework of a priori forms imposed on the material provided by passive synthesis. While this part is considered to be pre-logical, Husserl wrote: "The passive synthesis constitutes the horizon of potential experiences and shapes the way objects are perceived and interpreted even before active consciousness engages with them" (Husserl, 2013: §19). In this way, before conscious acts occur, they are forced to experience passively pre-organised perceptions that provide thinking with an image of self-sufficient perception. After this, we can assume the way in which tokens of the unconscious manifest itself via passive synthesis to be the same as the primal constitution. Husserl's definition of active synthesis requires the active participation of the ego, which directs attention and intention to the data of experience (Husserl, 2013: §62).

Active synthesis means the process of logical thinking as it takes place in the logic of syllogism. At the same time, the phenomena are represented in consciousness as meaningful, developed representations of reality. Passive synthesis, on the other hand, is considered to be a mental process that does not involve any awareness of the mental track. Passive synthesis is defined to explain the origin of those constitutive aspects of consciousness that are provided with ready-made, pre-formed meanings. Suppose that the observation of the tree appears to us as a whole perception before anyone analyses or measures any of its properties. This wholeness of being in perception is provided by passive synthesis.

Modern French philosophy, in particular Julien La Mettrie, offered us several mechanistic conceptions that describe man as an automaton or machine. With this conception, he opposed the cartesian priority of the Cogito and created a perspective on self-sufficient non-transparent mind: 'Man is a machine so complex that it is impossible to have a clear idea of the machine beforehand, and therefore impossible to define it' (La Mettrie, 2012). Such views sometimes bordered on naivety and a belief in the omnipotence of

the human mind, a belief to recreate himself as a golem, Frankenstein, for example. However, these points follow to certain mechanistically interpretable possibilities for the mind as a specific passive synthesis of the different kinds. Therefore, the mind considered as the engine produces certain objects within a relevant region of meaning, which enables for much complex object modification in mind. In this way we can assume the method to understand the moment of a particular genesis of the things. It is possible, following Husserl, to consider these as the modes of appearance, *Erscheinungsweisen*:

To every object there corresponds an ideally closed system of truths that are true of it and, on the other hand, an ideal system of possible cognitive processes by virtue of which the object and the truths about it would be given to any cognitive subject (Husserl, 1981).

While we look at it, let us ask whether we can study the unconscious as a specific mode of appearance. Husserl wrote: "Thus, we see only one side of the house, but we understand this as one side of the whole house, which itself is given by a synthesis of these appearances" (Husserl, 2013: §15). This is the premise to assume the unconscious being attached to our perception, as pre-statement of the desire. In a way, we perceive greater complexity in the formation of the *Natural Attitude*. Which afterwards becomes a part of intentionality, the *other side* of the object that does not even have a coherent, but spontaneous intuitive content; that can only be implied by creative imagination.

We should distinguish between the clarity and indeterminacy of these modes of appearance. The phenomenological reduction is constantly repeated in order to disregard the naïve impression of the immediate nature of reality, as experienced in the Natural Attitude. However, the modes of appearance are so closely related that, just as touching a mirror reveals an optical illusion, we can anticipate them from different positions as we move around the object (Spiegelberg, 1994). If we think of the unconscious as a kind of passive synthesis, however, being passive means being unconscious; thus, there is no contradiction and there is room for more to be in the passive genesis. To illustrate this concept, we can refer to René Magritte's painting *The Key to Dreams*. In this painting, six images are arranged in sequence: an egg, a shoe, a hat, a candle, a glass and a hammer. Underneath each image is a caption: acacia, moon, snow, ceiling, storm and desert. These captions obviously do not match the images. Magritte's painting illustrates how shifts in the meaning of things can occur when forces of repression are involved, deforming the usual referential relationship between image and concept. However, this deformation is inherent in the associative connection of things and meanings in a dream, aiming at a non-causal constitution. Similarly,

we can assume a modulation of the noema to happen via unconscious aspects, which simultaneously deforms the constitution of the object. This may be the main criterion that distinguishes phenomenology from psychoanalysis to make the archeology of conscious acts. However, we have no right to demand therapeutic effects from phenomenology, because it points rather to reflect on the nature of cognitive constitution. At the outset, it is important to point out those common motifs of phenomenology and psychoanalysis that are irrelevant to classical logic, which is taken to be the apophatic consciousness, limited with rationality.

As a starting point, we will consider the topic of intentional correlates, distinguishing primacy on the intentional act as noesis and noema; similarly, we can distinguish by analogy the regions of deployment of mental acts into those bound to cognitive experience itself, or the noetic region, e.g. to include retentive elements: desire, neurosis, defence mechanisms, etc, and the noematic region, linked to the real objects of the external world in transference and acknowledgement.

The constitutive function of the intentional act can only be revealed by the method that Husserl calls intentional analysis. He uses the critical distinction: "noesis" and "noema". Noesis refers to the subjective, intentional and active aspects of consciousness. It is the act of consciousness, the way in which the mind engages with or directs itself towards an object. Noesis is the cognitive or experiential activity by which consciousness grasps, thinks about or perceives something. For example, if thinking about a tree, the act of thinking about the tree is noesis. Noema, on the other hand, refers to the intended object as the noesis. It is the meaning or a content that is given in the act of intentionality. In the example of thinking about a tree, the tree itself is represented in the perception as intuition of a tree or in an imagination as a memory. Noema is not the physical object, but the intentional content or the way the object appears in consciousness or its *mode of appearance*. At the same time, when we are talking about the unconscious, why not consider it as a specific mode of appearance, but in terms of the noetic correlate. The genesis of this noetic correlation relies on Natural Attitude, might include the desire, which dynamics unfolds in terms of actual infinity, repeatedly recreating certain logic's content. This trope follows Husserl's idea, the noetic-noematic structure reveals the essential connection between the act of consciousness and its object, highlighting how intentionality constitutes the meaning of objects as they appear to us (Husserl, 2012). Noematic disrupture in constitution, or hallucinatory appearance in consciousness could also be regarded as a case of pathological genesis of intentionality.

Next, we assume that the unconscious being formative for a Natural Attitude is included in experience as an entanglement with numerous passive syntheses. First, they give a noetic-noematic unity to the individual cogitations "as concrete, synthetic wholes" and their relations to others. It is only by clarifying the peculiar passive genesis of the manifold apperceptions can a specific understanding be possible. Since structural forms are stable in their habitual orientations, they appear to the central self as formed predestinations. What if we think of noetic structures as implicitly carrying the possibility of neurosis and psychosis.

This is already evident from the fact that everything that qualifies as the ego and is perceived objectively, as a *substratum* of verifiable predicates, appears to be a possible target for various possibilities of explication. One might think of the subject as a permanent possession, as something repeatedly available. Either as it is given in representation, "Vorstellung," something presented in mind, or as in judgment, something is affirmed or denied, in the desire, something as desired, etc. This intentional existence is peculiar to exclusively phenomenal acts, and does not make sufficiently clear the distinction between acts of pure intentionality and acts of intuitive passive fulfillment (Husserl, 2001). It includes all those acts that blindly refer to intentional objects and acts that fill the empty intentions with unconscious content, as in perception or imagination. From this point of view, both faculties might be constituted with the unconscious as the whole of singular acts.

Husserl, with his characteristic enthusiasm and self-confidence rejected any connection with potential psychologism in the pursuit of his grand goal. And that is probably why he wanted to think less about such things. Of course, the nature of psychic experience is not constant. If it is not logically continuous, then it is not universal, thus contrary to the idea of 'rigorous science.' However, as we can see from the point of view of psychoanalysis, the situation is quite the opposite: mental structures passively form intentionality with no less efficiency, and their connection with thinking is much more profound.

It comes with an aftermath that shapes the perception of a thing, synthesizing itself as a logical and affective experience. Sometimes radically intensified in thought. Freud wrote: "The effects of the scene were delayed, but... had the same effect as if it had been a recent experience" (Freud, 1991: 276-277). The subjective experience is more about being performed than about being barely received. The identification process involves non-linear tools for appropriating the meaning. These tools are rooted in linguistic engagements and logic of substitutions, a part of the noetic-noematic correlation. The punctuation pattern, however, is not an index, but a signifier: "The signifier represents a subject for another

signifier" (Lacan, 1998: 207). There is, therefore, an ambiguous link between pathological phenomena and consciousness.

§2.2 Reversed Logic

Before we begin considering the logic of the unconscious within classic psychoanalytic ideas, we should pay attention to the theory of the neuro-affective connection between the brain and consciousness. This is necessary in order to see the possibility for the theory of affect and its logic as a case of passive synthesis. As mentioned earlier, logic and affectivity are distinctive parts of the human being that complement our consideration. Why does an ethical representation of an event have an effect on the analyzand as its derivative? How should therapeutic reinterpretation and *catharsis* make someone feel better and change their feelings into something else? So, we should assume that some psychic matters are not purely transcendental or affective, but hybrid. Psychoanalysis aims to investigate this unconscious logic of the psyche and, as a result, to invent a therapy of the repetitive logic of the subject. Thus this logic of the unconscious should unfold also in terms of actual infinity. Although, the traditional logic to represent the world as to be a fittable project of knowledge, therefore represents potential infinity as its premise.

This reflection attempts a philosophical interpretation of psychoanalysis and neuropsychanalysis in order to extend the discourse of subjective logic in phenomenology. When it comes to the structure of the human psyche, the mind is constantly reeling and shifting. This is because, unlike the phenomena of the physical world, the phenomena of conscious experience are transient, changeable, and difficult to hold. As philosophy points out, there is always a fundamental difference between the beholder and the seen. The visible is more congruent and uniform to perception. At the same time, the beholder is rarely conscious of being the beholder, let alone conscious of the fact of seeing. Phenomenology offers something similar: it distinguishes the field of physical phenomena from the natural attitude and gives particular archaeology of the subject. It distinguishes and emphasizes these differences in order to think and set mental processes from their content. In this way, the general features of thought and consciousness can be revealed.

Let us consider how the affect might influence the subjectivity in a predictable way. Damasio, famous for his criticism of Descartes, emphasized the error of the French philosopher in distinguishing affect from consciousness and associating it with the body. In

his research, Damasio asserts that: "The body, the emotions, and the mind are connected in ways that few have suspected, let alone acknowledged" (Damasio, 2005: 4). He sees the affect as an embodied companion to cognition that helps to explore the world, writing: "At the heart of consciousness is subjectivity, this sense of having a self that is observing its own organism and the world around that organism. This is really the heart of consciousness" (Damasio, 2010: 21). Affect is deeply connected to the drive, but there seemed to be different levels of drive setting, one biological, another symbolic. For Lacan, the drive is always psychological and repetitive: "That is, it may have its source in the biological dynamism of the organism, it is lived by the subject in its own symbolic terms" (Lacan, 1998). The drive is considered to be hybrid in nature; on the one hand, affection is connected to the free energy principle; on the other hand, it is shaped by the Symbolic.

The free energy principle follows to balance homeostasis, Freud said: "The quantitative factor in the instinctual impulse, which we call the amount of excitation or psychic energy, is subject to the principle of constancy, which aims at keeping the amount of excitation as low and constant as possible" (Freud, 2010: 568). So, we see that drive in both cases is about releasing energy from the psyche in its terms and possibly modifying the intentional act. More recently, this concept has been updated by Friston and his research on the brain, where he explained the principle: "The free energy principle states that any self-organizing system in equilibrium with its environment must minimize its free energy" (Friston, 2010). This principle became crucial to understanding the dynamic process of the psyche, however under different understandings of the drive.

Neuropsychanalytic research changes approach to the two basic drives: libido and mortido. One is said to be directed toward well-being, Eros, and the other towards a destructive pattern, urge to die, Tanatos or *jouissance*. Libido is defined as: "is now used in psychoanalysis to denote the energy, regarded as a quantitative quantity... of those instincts which have to do with everything that can be included under the word 'love'" (Freud and Strachey, 2024). Mortido, on the contrary, is a very questionable concept, as at one point nothing in the biology of the brain shows its presence, but it exists as a repetitive maladaptive pattern of the normal drive with its specific logic. Also, recent neuro-psychoanalytic research claims that there are not two drives but seven which are linked to particular emotions and brain regions (Solms, 2021). In this way, Solms extends Panksepp's research and points to basic drives that shape our mental actions. It is therefore suggested that their example be used to show how they influence the formation of thoughts and how they somehow interfere with

our thinking and perception.

According to Panksepp and Solms, there are seven basic emotional centres in the brain that regulate how the mind assimilates the environment and appear as drives that modulate state: sexual attraction, search, anger, fear, panic-grief, care and play. Therefore, we could hypothesise that it is the affective variable of these seven drives that emerges from the energy principle and are linked to libido and the symbolic. This changes the focus of reflection in drive theory and also criticises the death drive, which they consider to be an incorrect assumption for a naturalist perspective. 'There is no death drive at work in the mind. On a mechanistic level, this means that all drives are homeostatic and anti-entropic' (Solms, 2021). From a neuroscientific point of view, perhaps the death drive is absent because it does not manifest in the brain. However, might this not be confirmation of the social nature of the death drive and its structure? Thus, the death drive is a more specific case of the symbolic and jouissance, which will be considered later.

In this study, we consider this obstacle to be useful for developing a theory of passive synthesis of affective mental structures. These instincts modulate states of consciousness, acting as drives and shaping the emotional content of thoughts and intentions. We propose that they should be considered atypical instances of logic in passive synthesis. These elements are denoted as $A = \{d_1, d_2, d_3, d_4, d_5, d_6, d_7\}$, with each d_i representing a different drive. In this case, it is assumed that affect and sense interfere with the subject's perception and consciousness.

This unconscious logic should be defined in terms of passive synthesis. We will call this the sense function of the affect. This function is denoted using the operator D , and P is defined as a value denoting an ideal state of pure consciousness that is free from affect and has a vacant space for information. The letter D also denotes the set of conscious affects that reflect an intelligible update of reality. Thus, we obtain the sense operator D .

$$D: A \rightarrow P$$

Example 1. Let us consider the statement, de-subjectified declaration, in a state P :

"This house is high".

The meaning should change with the modulation of the affect because the imagination keeps showing up alongside a drive. This immerses the subjective self in the genesis of perception, as with affective correlation. For example, it creates a logical connection with the fear drive (d4), which will involuntarily alter the statement:

"You can fall off this house and die".

As a logical sub-operation with action:

D: A4 $\rightarrow$ P

The newly formed statement is certainly full of true. However, it points to the influence of the unconscious on the conscious, the logical conjunction of subjective. It represents the metonymy of the change in perception, and the consequences in the form of the transcendental premise. Similar things could happen in connection with any of the drives, so the representation genesis of the external world could be connected to d1, d2, d3, etc. Later we will move on to a fuller review of the processes involved in passive synthesis. Meanwhile, this case is intended to shed some light on the subject of passive synthesis. At this point, a specific synthesis of meaning occurs as a unifying intentionality that combines different perceptions and affects. This gives us the *reverted givenness* and consequently the *reversed logic* as the object that passes by through the trajectory of consequent affectation, reflecting the particular subjective and making the purified state for consideration as not legit. At the end of the next chapters we will look at this in regard to the phenomena of interpretation and transference.

At first look, pure or transcendental phenomenology is justified not as a science of facts, but as a science of essence, or an "eidetic" science, which intends to establish exclusively "cognitions of essence" - not "facts" at all. The corresponding reduction - the reduction of psychological phenomena to pure "essence", or in judgmental thought, the reduction of factual "empirical" generality to the abstract "essence" - are eidetic. Although, in case we use data from other sciences, and if this means the same as systematic disclosure of constitutive intentionality, why limit ourselves? Merleau-Ponty, in his *Phenomenology of Perception*, also uses extended scientific data on embodiment and perception, which constitute the point of his philosophy. Phenomenology itself proves for the expansion of its

regions beyond any idealism or rationality. Initially, Husserl's philosophy was opposed to psychologism, naturalism and other positivistic theories. The matters of logic seemed to him to be unchangeable, an ideal that should have nothing in common with the affections of psychic life, but of whose nature is concluded from the human mind, the strict *a priori*. This gives the impression that phenomenology is the opposite of psychology. Adding neuroscience to the theory of passive synthesis might look contradictory, because it is an inductive science, which is the opposite of the phenomenological method. Assuming that Husserl, in his dedication to philosophy, was looking for the supreme good of being universal, it may take more than that to reassume that with inductive sciences might be done more for the sake of phenomenology and the study of consciousness in particular.

§2.3 Unconscious Object Constitution

When we experience other people we could much easily see the unconscious mechanisms involved, then we can suspect them while they are enacted in ourselves. Therefore it is fully legit and may be the only way to elaborate more on this occasion is in terms of passive synthesis. Therefore in this paper, we use it as a leading concept to fulfill horizons of phenomenological thought based on methodological pluralism, common sense and the evidentiality of intuition. In this way, all methodological arguments would be left behind to make room for more philosophical considerations. As Husserl saw it, phenomenological psychology was intended to provide the essential insight necessary to give meaning and to direct the investigations of empirical psychology with the "preconscious", namely that part of mental life which, under certain conditions, can be fully realised.

The proposition for phenomenological psychology is to answer reciprocally. For that, it seems worth noting Max Scheler as one of the first thinkers to affirm the phenomenology of living subjectivity, that he updated phenomenology by abandoning its "untrue aspirations" for "science" and "research". Scheler described specifically the phenomenon of the intentionality as constituting itself via the affect, the inherent emotional qualities for making fundamental shifts in consciousness. He gives an interesting example that investigated intentionality as derivative, deformation of resentment, the feeling of injustice that causes de-evaluation of the world and its ironic and untrue vision. Scheler wrote: "Ressentiment is a self-poisoning of the mind which has very definite causes and consequences. It is a persistent mental attitude caused by the systematic repression of certain emotions and affects which, as

such, are normal components of human nature" (Scheler, 1972: 45). The episodes of resentment shows how initially free imagination of subjectivity subdues to set of specific rules of *unhappy* or *false* consciousness so afterwards confuses the own will in regard to one's authenticity. Another example of endeavour to consider pathological phenomenologically, therefore, at some point, coincide and emphasise the objectives of this research.

Scheler believed in reality, where the human being is one of the resistance. But resistance to what? According to Scheler, it is not the intellect that experiences it, but the initial intuition of value. Consciousness as unfolding of primary emotional setting. Rather, resistance against reality as the spontaneous "pre-givenness", active, volitional life that holds the value. Thus, "reality itself" or "embodiment" are lived not only in perception, but in the practical attitude. Therefore, for Scheler, reality is relative to practical interests and is, in a sense, a pragmatic question. Human beings are moral not due to obligation, but specific moral intuition. This makes Scheler's ethics as opposed to Kant's, which makes the will to subdue the supreme value as ground of all practical activity. In another respect, Scheler's approach denies that laws and imperatives are significant for moral consciousness. Against this view, Scheler asserts the importance of the phenomena of values formed on an alternative basis of intentionality as its proper intuition. For him, their existence is grown on the act of love (Scheler, 1992). This shows us again the attempt to expand understanding of intentionality as a complex phenomenal manifold. Sartre got it somewhat radically: "Since we cannot change the world with our actions, we change it with our emotions, subjectively, magically" (Sartre, 2013). This perspective at this point is more relevant to psychoanalytic investigation than a line of thought of transcendental phenomenology.

This could even further justify the hybrid consideration of this research. Thus, the maxim *to the things themselves*, stated as a principle of phenomenology, could be repeated once again. Here it applies the origin to all mental acts and their correlates. Value has no temporal position, but a constitution in mind. A temporal object may be beautiful, pleasant, useful at a particular time. But beauty, goodness, etc., have no position in nature and time. They do not appear in acts of present representation or reproduction, they are *seen anew* with intuition. For this reason, it forces us to assume its relation to the eidetic level of thought and distinguishes it from the factual level as multidimensional transcendental of values. Husserl writes: "By means of eidetic reduction we pass from the individual empirical

intuition to the general essence. The focus is not on the factual content of the experience, but on the essential characteristics that universally define the experience" (Husserl, 2012: 68).

This is similar, at some point, to Hegel's idealism insofar as the creation of a rigorous philosophy of science is concerned. The facts of the world of life are a diverse and hierarchically different series of things - the optics of sensual, vital, spiritual and sacred values. When we consider their nature in the mental context, they should be perceived as eidetic constructions. Therefore, in principle, the general replaces the particular. The possession of essence, and thus of an *eidos* is the subject to pure understanding, is inseparable from the meaning of all that is contingent, and is now found among the essential truths of various degrees of universality. Thus, everything that follows makes use of intuiting entities or "ideation". At all times, every value should go through the process of transcendental emergence. So when we talk phenomenologically about values, we should bear this in mind. One might ask whether this operation represents a return to the origins, if we do not allow this phenomenologically, to be far obvious.

Time expresses the order of logic; the logic, however, is not always adequate to reality, is subjective and contingent. This makes it possible to be false, however it preserves the structure. The logic of time was considered in the previous section, here we would consider the logic of subjectivity expressed as the logic of unconscious object constitution. The surplus value of the object. While in phenomenology it reflects the logic of cognition, in psychoanalysis it shows the logic of the accompanying co-intentional process. By deconstructing the unconscious, the analyst gradually reveals parts of a particular whole, concrete *retention*. In its cyclical dynamics, however, the unconscious can be expressed as complex retentions. This means that mental formations are potentially formed in synthesis from retentive patterns. Therefore, the transition from such retentions to protentions in the unconscious should be an inherent unconscious structure of thought, or a kind of passive synthesis. This is another *modus operandi* for asking about the possibilities of psychoanalytic practices to reveal the apodictic in the unconscious. Here we are dealing with memory and language, with the staging of our imagination. The free association process which assumes the unconscious to speak we suggest to be a part of more general transcendental structure. This structure, however, borders on two aspects of subjective consideration. Firstly, as we have already discuss the ethical disposition within consciousness we assume the unconscious object constitution to be connected with value distribution or *ethical judgement*. Second, the way unconscious expresses itself, in particular as the aesthetic faculty to make a judgement,

Kantian *Urteilkraft*. Indeed, how not to consider the imaginary representation of the unconscious expressed in a dream via subjective images if this is clear evidence of the creative and transformative logic that changes the latent meaning into the appropriate one. In this way, let's say as in Fromm's case with a woman dreaming of being chased by the dark cloud, we might assume that transcendental imagination condensed the particular fear into the image of cloud (Fromm, 2013). This imaginary process that happens in an unexpected way should be connected to a more general aesthetic function of mind, the *judgement of taste*. Which might let us assume after that the discursive process has different and harder resistance than within the imaginary realm. An imagined desire has less resistance or dreaming does not face that much repression, while it's harder to emerge along with resistance in imagination, although the structure of narrative should look the opposite, language viciously confusing the tropes for association shows more inherent repression.

Therefore, the logic of the unconscious and its disclosure are essential for psychoanalysis and are realised through time. Memory is directly linked to resistance and repression, and the less accessible a particular memory is, the more valuable it is for research as connected to mechanisms of repression and therefore to unconscious object constitution. Moreover, the process of analysis is long and its logic is based on duration, whereas the unconscious is characterised by non-permanent structures that can be stretched over time. The unconscious logic makes the entanglement of the subjective within the object by means of aesthetic function or the *euphemism*. This non-linearity of unconscious processes might inevitably lead to dissatisfaction with its low permeability compared to the clarity and transparency of the rational method. Therefore, in order to begin to consider psychoanalytic cases as examples of the logic of the unconscious, we must establish it within the "noesis" as an accompanying concept for understanding unconscious logic.

The given phenomena of psychic experience must be seen also as correlates of intentionality, based on passive synthesis. This two-fold synthesis is more closely resembling the Natural Attitude. Which Husserl defines as follows:

In the natural attitude, we are involved in the world, we live our experiences in an unquestioning way, we accept the existence of the world and its objects as simply given: "I am completely given over to the object poles, completely bound by interests and tasks which are exclusively directed towards them" (Husserl, 2021: 205).

Therefore, after asserting passive synthesis as a prerequisite for the perception of single objects, we can also assert it as a premise for various variations of a Natural Attitude. However, these *judgements* might not happen if we consider William James' notion of fringe

or edge-conscious experiences. These are experiences that lack specific sensory qualities. Examples include the 'tip of the tongue' state (the intention to recall a word), feelings of knowledge and familiarity, intuitive judgements, intentions to act, expectations, grammatical and logical reasoning, abstract meanings and emotional connotations. These experiences can be reported with high uncertainty (Baars, 2009). This case describes the interesting state of affairs when intentionality is just about to happen, the particular dysfunction of passive synthesis, the phenomenal exception. In this case, however, we could argue that much of our mental life is occupied by 'fringe' events that are experienced as fuzzy or vague, but with properties that suggest that something precise is happening, as cases of the uncertain and incomplete phenomena.

Husserl also notes the existence of non-intentional experiences. These are lived experiences that are accessible to consciousness but specific: embodiment, mood, or affect. He claimed: "All validities and realities, whether thought or existing, are constituted in experiences" (Husserl, 2012: §41). Such pre-intensional formations might fit with considerations of psychoanalytic experience. A pre-reflective "unity of consciousness, in which all experiences are integrated, underlies all intentional activity" (Husserl, 2012: §84). This coincides with our research focus as we consider the unconscious as integrated into thinking. This parallelism forms the basis for correlative research, in which aspects of phenomena are studied and described as a unity. Considering one without the other would lead to an artificial abstraction that may have some application, but which ultimately requires reintegration into the context of the concrete experience from which that application was isolated. Continuing in this way, the terminology of phenomenology is used to describe the processes of signification and symbolization in the psyche, the *unconscious judgement*. In this way, the psychoanalytic reflection should first be expressed in more philosophical terms and given in a more structured appearance. The logic of the unconscious should be considered as a repetitive group of intentional correlates. However, in the situation of psychoanalysis, due to the aforementioned fact that it is a two-body psychology, a different perspective arises: the set of intentional correlates represented in the dialogue requires, first of all, the necessity of the analyst's interpretation to give away the analyzand's inherent resistance, to follow his *unconscious judgement*.

The traditional phenomenological image strives for empathy, the experience in which the other person is constituted from one to other ego and vice versa, the ground on which the *other* can be understood. Despite its constitutional claim, it is difficult to fit into this

perspective because the constitution of the other described, implies the legitimization of the other by the concept of the Transcendental Ego. It also emphasises the legitimization of intersubjectively communicative experience: the ability to measure experience with the other. In the phenomenological perspective, several linear relations are always preserved. Such an archaeology would not consider acknowledgement and communicative structure to be more productive as from psychoanalysis. We must therefore consider the psyche as a variable condition for the dynamics of consciousness *per se* that hardly remain transparent in philosophical thought. Dividing the psyche into two or even three layers of different kinds might lead to complications rather than intellectual clarity, so they should appear in thought as a functional idea. It is necessary to recall the Lacanian assumption:

The existence in him [man] of a certain biological rupture, which I am trying to define by speaking of the mirror stage... Man develops a special relationship with his image - a relationship of rupture and alienated tension (Lacan, 1988: 72).

Human beings are thus perceived as limited by their existence and need symbolic means to mediate the world. The image is not reflective enough and gives a vague picture of the world, which shatters the subject to *je* and *moi*, one is imagined and another is thought. The unconscious appears here. The symbolic is never identical to the natural, creates its inauthenticity, an absurd and lack in human existence. The Lacanian interpretations are somewhat better than the Freudian in understanding the unconscious because it has more elaborate explanations and patterns. This is the internal recommendation of this research for a better practical understanding. The structuralist division of the psyche into the real, the imaginary and the symbolic gives a picture of how conflict occurs in the mind.

The *imaginary* is the realm of images, imagination and deception. The main illusions of this order are synthesis, autonomy and similarity. The imaginary corresponds to perceptual consciousness; it creates an initial image of things. But there is also an initial contradiction to this, implied by the very distinction between the imaginary and the symbolic. The imaginary is the realm of visible phenomena that function as an uncertain illusion. The symbolic is the realm of structures that cannot be seen but deduced; phenomena are interpreted psychoanalytically using the order of the symbolic. The analyst seeks to transform images into words, as in the interpretation of dreams, to define the inherent constitution of the unconscious. Its architecture of statement follows modulation that consists of repression, denial or rejection. The symbolic comes as a gateway to the imaginary with a reciprocal connection of unifying function of the intentionality. This imagination constitutes the level of

the desirable and should therefore not be understood just as a field of active and creative imagination, but as faculty incrustated in the noetic structure of the personality. This is the dimension of conscious deception that needs to be deciphered. When Lacan wrote: "The unconscious is structured like a language", he implied meaning that grammatical modulation is the state of the unconscious, the variable of euphemism. Only when we recognise that the symbolic, the imaginary and the real are realms structured by language can we understand the unconscious (Lacan, 2013: 119).

At the intersection of all three the subject's conscious experience emerges. Perception, law and intersubjectivity – its three main pillars. The conflict though is caused by the mirror stage. It is in the stage of primary identification, the subject identifies with its own image. Subject enters into a conflict due the imaginary figure that appears before his eyes as a *whole* is not identical to the figure that is expressed in symbolic, verbal terms. This creates the above-mentioned gap in the personal grasp, and the encounter with the real always reveals it. Man is a deficiency and an incompleteness that needs to be filled.

The imaginary is always intertwined with the symbolic in the mind. Its non-correspondence creates gaps, which are formed by means of a discursive order or the dominant power structure. The people with whom the subject encounters after its birth instill in the person a language, an axiomatic consciousness of power, permissions and rules. This meaning-dictating rule is often called the Name-of-the-Father, the Superego, or the Moral Constitution. It teaches how to act and what not to do, and determines the trajectory of the subject's intentionality emergence. Although it declares superiority, it also hides the desire behind the meaning in forms of repression. The search of psychoanalysis is to find it missing. As Lacan wrote: "But what Freud showed us... was that nothing can be grasped, destroyed or burned, except symbolically, as they say, in effigy, *in absentia*" (Lacan, 1998: 75). The *unconscious judgement* which is considered to be ethical content subdue aesthetic transformation as reaction to the repressive in Law, a modulated statement of repressed. These orientations tell the subject how to desire and what to refuse. They provide him with a primary matrix of desires.

The Big Other substitutes the cognition with acknowledgement. The object is interpreted as an act of mutual recognition through communication with the Other. Ultimate meaning is therefore realised through the power of the Other. Its social determination makes it purely contingent and historical. Its structure is represented as the interaction of a certain group as actors of mutual recognition. We could use *Scheme L*, as an example to show how

the structure modifies the essence and constitution of the object in comparison to pure perception.




Figure 1: Scheme L

"Scheme L" or "Diagram L" is a complex diagram illustrating how the unconscious desires of the subject are structured and communicated through language (Lacan, 1998). Thus, we have an object representing itself within the relation between actors and ego. The object of the subject's desire is often associated with the Big Other (A), representing a symbolic system and social norms. An alternative or reflection on intentionality shows the object as the dependence of personal unconsciousness on Big Other (s), as reflected in other subject's recognition (a) to form the active installment for the Ego of the specific value. Here we have a case where the identifications of the world that appear to consciousness are understood as the result of interaction and *ensurement*. As if someone told you reading Kant is worth spending time on. The other assigns meaning to the subject, which is projected through the unconscious onto something else. In this way, content of intentionality finds its constitution in intersubjective consciousness.

In phenomenology, "noema" and "noesis" are also a signifier and a signified. Noesis refers to the subjective, intentional and active aspects of consciousness. Noesis is the cognitive or experiential activity by which consciousness apprehends, thinks about, or perceives something. Thus, in the case of psychoanalysis, we see the dependence of the emergent symbolic as a noetic correlate. The object that at some point appeared as the image of subjectivity, its double, that nevertheless retains a certain constancy of appearance in time, which, however, given the transience of all things, cannot last indefinitely.

That part of human experience which is actually the knowledge of the subject, the part through which the subject exists, is on the level of the emergence of the symbol. The essence of the objective split separates the object of unconscious as an intelligible entity. Its meaning repeats the idea in the initial division of the *primary object*, in the image of the two aspects of the mother-feeder, her two orientations into good and evil. For Melanie Klein, the mother's ambiguous perception of a child could divide the world into 'good' and 'bad'. The good represents the idealised, nurturing aspect of the mother. In contrast, the bad embodies the frustrating and withholding aspects. From the most primitive, it builds primary structures of opposing meanings on the object, pathologizing its neutrality, that is rather about the constitutive repetition of value relationships and transference. This creates an initial binary disposition of the subject comprehension of the object, initial deformation within intentionality (Klein, 2018). Thus, we might assume that noetic correlates seem to vary in numerous forms as they show multiple premises of the development.

We can connect it after Husserl with the notion of *manifestation*, a function that is different from being practical and expressive for linguistic semantics; it represents the individuality of appearance. Manifestation at this point is independent of the will of the speaker, and its understanding is a matter of the interpretation as the sign of the external receiver. However, the peculiarity of Husserl's individual self-determination and functional understanding of language for consciousness bypasses the themes of intersubjective recognition and an alternate meaning formation it shows the possibility of partial object constitution (Husserl, 2013).

Consciousness genesis posits the unity of "being-for-self" and "being-for-another"; the absolute antithesis is posited as a self-identical essence. At first sight, this seems to concern only the form of the moments in a reciprocal relation, but "being-for-self" and "being-for-another" are also the contents of themselves, since the antithesis in its truth can have no other nature than that which is produced in the result, namely that the content taken as true in perception actually belongs only to the form in whose unity it is dissolved (Hegel, 2018: §134). Such a specific meaning begins to dominate and prevail over the classical subject. In this mutual recognition, a particular linguistic element stands out as significant and begins to mark the subject's symptom as a sign or *unconscious judgement*. To do this, Lacan uses Saussure's terminology. According to it, the signified is the conceptual element of the sign. It is not the actual object designated by the sign or the "referent", but the psychological entity corresponding to that object: "The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a

concept and a sound image" (Saussure, 2013: 66). For Saussure, the signified has the same status as the signifier; both constitute equivalent aspects of the sign.

In contrast to Saussure, Lacan assumes the superiority of the signifier and argues that the signified is merely a consequence of the play of signification, as a result of which the original connection with desire also is lost. Despite being displaced (repressed, denied, rejected), the desire to express via the unconscious judgement that is subject to the laws of displacement, e.g. metaphor and metonymy, distorted image of its proper elocutive trajectory. In other words, the signified is not given, but produced. Lacan's ideas, thus, oppose the conception of language according to which concepts exist in some pre-word states before finding their material expression in language. In opposing such a conception, Lacan asserts the priority of the material element of language. He reverses Saussure's scheme of emphasising the importance of the signifier over the signified, suggesting a more unstable relationship between the two. In Lacan's version, referred to as "S/s", the signifier (S) is given priority and the signified (s) is located under a bar that separates them, symbolising the resistance and lack of direct correspondence between the two:

$$\frac{S}{s}$$

Figure 2: The Saussurean algorithm

Therefore, the analysis aims to find *signs* characteristic to the subject and their further interpretation. However, the Lacanian adaptation brings significant changes to this model. Subjectivity is subordinated to the sign. This "algorithm" reflects Lacan's broader psychoanalytic theory in which the unconscious is structured by signifiers. The bar represents the inherent instability and fluidity of meaning, the view that language and unconscious processes are inherently elusive and multifaceted. The dominance of *sign* creates an explicit axiomatic consciousness. From this perspective, meaning is indicated by the symbol of the law that unfolds in the mind: "It is in the name of the father that we must recognise the support of the symbolic function which, from the beginning of history, has identified his person with the figure of the law" (Lacan, 2002: 67). Meaning, thus, is generated by the interaction of these signifiers through the architecture of power rather than through any inherent relationship with the signified.

$$f\left(\frac{S'}{S}\right) S \equiv S (+) s$$

Figure 3: Function of the signifier

This formula represents the repressive function and can be read as follows. On the left side of the equation, behind the brackets, Lacan places $f(S)$, the function of the signifier or, in other words, the effect of signification or repression. In the brackets, he places S'/S , which represents the substitution of one signifier with another. This is an important point for clarification of unconscious logic. On the right side of the equation is the signifier S and the signified s . A third symbol between these two symbols represents the intersection of the following Sassurian algorithm. The statement: “I want to do k ”, due to repression changes into more adaptive “I want to do m ”. Another signifier substitutes a significant object because it is completely congruent with the Law (Lacan, 2020). The whole formula reads as follows: the signifying function of substituting one signifier for another is congruent with the intersection of the trait. Here we see the dynamics of the discourse of power: *father's discourse* forms a value paradigm, which subsequently creates a system of behaviour and interactions. This value paradigm also creates the first difficulties for the subject, since neurosis and psychosis appear here to be factors that mark the indicated gap between the biological and the symbolic subject. In this way, it creates a gravitational field of resistance, since the subject, now placed under the figure of the law, is forced to obey, to deny or to reject it. In this way, the rupture in the subject continues where the symbolic element brings it into a specific structure. This reminds Heidegger's *thrownness*, but where the subject is re-estimated in a more structuralist ontology.

This structure creates a contradiction for intentionality. If desire contradicts intention, intentionality will be distorted by the gravity of the law. Thought will move away from its object, since the latter will not be able to appear in consciousness in its expected form. Therefore, in most cases, the objects of the unconscious will appear to consciousness through the inverted intentionality via other signifiers through the structure of metaphor and metonymy. In this way we can perceive the totality of the unconscious as a paraphrase of the other spoken as the Natural Attitude. As a result, the reflexive content of consciousness will appear in complex metaphors. Their reduction is only partially accessible because the

palimpsest of the symbolic does not imply direct access to the cause, forcing the analyst, therefore, to *work through*.

In this form, the logic of the unconscious is expressed as negativity, but it is hopefully historically mutable. The first symbolic structure that builds up this negativity is the repetition of the paternal Oedipus complex, or as in the case of the Name-of-the-Father. Freud wrote:

In my experience, which is already extensive, the main role in the mental life of all children who later become psychoneurotics is played by their parents. To be in love with one parent and to hate the other forms part of the essential content of the unconscious wishes revealed by psychoneurotic analysis. As we have seen, this is a quite universal phenomenon (Freud, 2010: 278).

By forming the first prohibition, this primordial Oedipal complex also creates the singularity of the personal enactment. This individuality conceals the first repression and sets the initial vectors for the symbolic unfolding in consciousness. We are thus faced with a Lacanian perspective on the object modification. It is not identical with itself, but gathered within *intersubjective* intentionality. It is constantly *unattainable* and expresses the concept of the "objet petit a". The invisible cause to focus on the axiomatic consciousness:

Lacan's objet petit a, the cause of desire, is an expression of the lack inherent in the human being, whose incompleteness and early helplessness generate a search for fulfilment beyond the satisfaction of physical needs. The central dynamic of desire is the search for objects to which it can be attached within the logic of the pleasure principle (Kirshner, 2005: 3).

The *objet petit a* is the cause of desire, the little piece that fills the "gap" in the real, and is distributed by the other through language. This abstract object denotes the share of desire attached to objects, their value. When in communication, the addressee sends his message to the other and to himself, he shares the *objet petit a*: "In human speech, the sender is always already the receiver" (Lacan, 2013: 24). Putting these two points together, we can say that in addressing the analyst, the analysand also addresses himself, albeit unconsciously, in an inverted way, holding the unconscious judgement behind. The analyst's task is to allow the analysand to hear the message, thereby revealing the *objet petit a*. By interpreting the analysand's words, the analyst returns to him the true, unconscious meaning of his own message. Human existence unfolds in intersubjectivity and in language, thus, tends towards the two Others. The first is the other of recognition and the second is the other as signifier. The *objet petit a* stands for lack in signified. The incomprehensible gap between the imaginary and the symbolic, which unites the subjectivity in both. However, eventually, the

fulfillment can not be achieved as the final expectation does not fully correspond to the object, so comes back as repetition.

When it comes to neurosis, it often means maximum devotion to the law. Although it is more of an impulse to violate it, the law creates a demand. The degree of desire and repression in neurosis is always equal to the degree of devotion to the law. This creates a conflict when any desire to disobey confronts it. The neurotic cannot define his identification and legitimacy for something and therefore needs clarification. Thus the conscious become entangled in a knot of neurosis. A neurosis is "a question put to the subject". The content of this question determines the particular form of the neurosis. The hysteric's question, "Am I right or wrong?" concerns implicit uncertainty, and the compulsive neurotic's question, "To be or not to be?" concerns the fragility of his or her existence. These are the two "big questions without resolution in the signifier... what determines the existential meaning of the neurotic" (Lacan, 2002: 168). Desire is the relationship of being to scarcity - existence as the prospect of maternal deficiency and lingual compensation. Self-understanding and self-perception are blurred. This logic forms a paradigm of the Natural attitude.

In order to study a case of neurosis in detail within the framework established by Jacques Lacan, we can look at his reinterpretation of Freud's case of the "Rat Man". Which he revisited to illustrate especially concerning the symbolic order and its implications for obsessional neurosis. The patient, known as the Rat Man, was plagued by obsessive thoughts and fears, particularly around the theme of punishment involving a torture by rats. He was persecuted out of pure fear, so that the imagination saw a normal situation as pathological. Freud's analysis focused on the patient's unconscious conflicts, especially those related to authority figures and deferred obedience, in the patient's dream:

At the same stop I sat down between two officers, one of whom, a captain with a Czech name, was to become a significant figure for me. I felt a certain fear of this man, for he obviously took pleasure in cruelty (Freud, 2018: 191).

This young man was suffering from a conflict of desires. He admitted that he is about to be punished, if he had the desire to see women naked, which he believed would lead to the death of his father. In this dream we see the repressive metaphor that aesthetically changes the content of the message but preserves the sign of execution by substitution of the signifier. This instance indicated a deep conflict between a desire and his guilt, the *objet petit a* and the law. He mistakenly associated one with the other, in the unconscious object constitution. This caused specific confusion in his Natural attitude and therefore led to a disruption within the

psychology of the proper well-being. Ultimately this created many contradictions in him and led to obsessive-compulsive disorder, that needed for clarification. Eventually, Freud considered the treatment a success, noting that the patient was able to resume his work and social life without the paralysing influence of his previous symptoms.

Once again, let's pay attention to the substitution of the image of a punishment figure. In one case it is rats; in another, police officers; and so on. We can see how the unconscious expresses the fear of punishment through aesthetic sensuality in various forms. Moreover, we can assume that, in this case, we are dealing with the transcendental aesthetic faculties to constitute the beauty and the sublime, in the unconscious object constitution via imagination of the subject. The unconscious here expresses a certain value by representing a certain expediency or *Zweckmässigkeit*. This is evident in dreams where a particular event might be magnified, such as an overwhelming fear of rats or the imposing presence of a police officer. This magnification in aesthetic terms follows the logic of the aesthetics of the sublime. For example, in William Turner's painting *A Ship against the Mewstone*, we see the image of a storm and people on a ship that expresses the aesthetic correlation of a person recognising their own insignificance in the face of prevailing natural forces. Similarly, in an unconscious judgement, such as in a dream, the horror that accompanies the image of punishment could be expressed aesthetically in the form of a chasing rat or a punishing policeman. However, when there is no excessive affectation around the main object in a dream, we can also assume that the logic of imaginary embodiment follows the aesthetic logic of beauty. The dream that represents a certain value of possession. The expression at this level is tautological, but modified in repression via metaphor or metonymy. The particular desire or dissociation can give another meaning to Gregor Samsa's imagination to become an insect associated with dreaming (Kafka, 2022). The ability to perceive and express beauty in judgement corresponds to the capacity to contemplate a goal without a purpose, such as the comprehension of the concept of moral virtue embodied in the image of a flower (Kant, 2008). The ability of aesthetic judgement enables various unconscious experiences for the expression.

Neurotic statements express the forbidden desire in its repressive logic, but there are statements of a different kind. Pervert's statement expresses accommodation of the desire and the law, visible reconciliation of their goals in imagination. Here the desire gets its rational justification, e.g. overeating might come with the false purpose to be stronger. Pervert does not repress or substitute the desire within given order, but search for the alternative premise of its realisation. The perfect example of justified evil made for the sake of the certain kind of

the supreme good. The ultimate justified pleasure of concentration camps and genocides. Degree of the perverted judgement varies, but always keeps the image of unrestricted liberty.

If we consider psychotic statements, we face a situation of a gap in unconscious synthesis and the significant *signifier* falls out of the discourse. Certain piece of subjectivity that begins to exist as a separate entity, and threatens the subject by its presence in psychic repetition. Classical psychoanalysis avoids treating psychotic subjects as not being able to communicate and fix symbolic order. At this point the unconscious becomes critically autonomous and less connected with consciousness, therefore modulates states pathological experience within more complicated unconscious logic of hallucinations, ideas-fix, false identifications. Psychotic scenarios in imagination might be seen connected to both aesthetic feelings, although rather should be seen as much more entangled with the feeling of the sublime that constitutes the shattered subject in disproportion with Others, e.g. paranoid schizophrenia shows sublime position of the Big Other, transformations of presence in the psychotic forclusion. Therefore, the psychotic statement falls out of general logic of the primal scene and is hardly traceable. Wherein, its unconscious constitution is totally contingent and distorted.

Lacan discussed how the Rat Man's obsessions could be seen as a manifestation of a symbolic debt he felt he owed to his authority figures. He linked the Rat Man's problems to the concept of the Name-of-the-Father, which he argued was crucial in structuring the patient's psychic reality. The failure of this function brought a false order that led to neurotic symptoms, emphasising the symbolic dimensions of the Rat Man's obsessions and anxieties. For him, obsessional neurosis was about repressed desire in conflict, the individual's position that is defined in contrast to social and family relationships.

It illustrates how neurosis can be understood as a disordered synthesis within intentionality. The individual becomes trapped in rigid, repetitive symbolic rituals and constraints. The reason for the formation of all psychopathological structures is precisely the non-acceptance of a *castration*. This castration means any restriction on action in one of many ways. For well-being it is impossible to avoid castration altogether, since no limits mean no order. So neurosis is normal. A completely "normal" state remains unattainable. The neurotic structure is most common, because the subject here is able to protect himself by repressively filling the lack imposed by the law. This prevents the neurotic from fully accepting his desire, which ensures the balance between consciousness and *jouissance*.

A more radical defence against castration is the denial of the underlying perverted structures. These are associated with a total denial of the Law, so these people go along with every possible willing act and do. Therefore, the unconscious logic of the pervert would instead go wherever it leads, for there is no limit. Consequently, we see how the construction of ethical dimensions dedicates the unconscious logic to constitute the intentionality in a negative but reconciled way.

When it comes to psychosis, its statement becomes even more radical: "The psychotic resorts to an even more radical remedy: he rejects castration altogether, as if it had never happened" (Lacan, 1988: 53). The result of this rejection is the mentioned return of castration in the real, manifesting itself as signified in hallucinations of dismemberment, as in the case of the Wolf Man. Making psychotic expression of inherent logic connected as we have seen with aesthetic faculty of judgement. Although here it is the metonymy of the real, that came back in the dream with the image of wolves.

To understand reversed intentionality as a connection with the unconscious logic, namely as the definitions of analytic interpretations, we see that its inherent logic develops as metaphor and metonymy:

$$\frac{S}{S'} \cdot \frac{S'}{x} \rightarrow S \left(\frac{1}{s} \right)$$

Figure 4: Metaphor

Lacan explains this formula: (S..S') capital letters are signifiers, x is an unknown signifier, and s is a signified caused by a metaphor that substitutes S for S in the chain relation of signifiers. The omission of 'S', represented here by its crossing line, is the prerequisite for the success of the metaphor. In this way, the execution becomes a metaphor for Rat Man, replacing the original impression with imaginary substitution.

$$f(S \dots S') S \equiv S (-) s$$

Figure 5: Metonymy

This is the formula of metonymy, which is about the opposite process of signification. The subject always remains behind knowledge and desire, always preserved in a message projected by the unconscious. Metaphor corresponds to the Saussurean paradigmatic relation,

held in absentia, and metonymy to the syntagmatic relation, *held in praesentia*. The desire to have a lot of money metaphorically might come back in imagination as possession of the expensive car, held in absence, or as one's contemplation to inhabit the bank, held in presence. In the case with the Wolf Man's dream we see the connection to the primal scene. His parents were symbolised through the image of the wolves, so that the absence of the parents was associated with the presence of the wolves. The wolves were interpreted as representations of the parents and metonymized due to the fear of castration (Lacan, 2013: 78). In this way, the logic of the unconscious transforms objects according to a spontaneous rule of aesthetic association driven by negativity of repression and obedience to the law.

This makes us consider what happens in dreams in the context of transcendental analysis. Specific logical and aesthetic enactment unconsciously coincide with the logic of the metaphor and the metonymy. The act of dreaming as thinking without resistance preserves a crucial message, but also subdues unconscious object constitution. It is more difficult to hide the logic that reveals itself imaginatively in the unconscious. So let us assume that metaphor and metonymy are cases of unconscious logic in the imagination and the discourse. It represents the transcendental paraphrasing function of the unconscious. Thus, the "objet petit a", here represents crucial information about subjectivity, is encoded in metaphor and metonymy. Although its value is historical and contingent, due to the gravity of the law dynamics and corresponding to human culture, this effect on intentionality reverses it. Unconsciousness seems irrational, but at its core it has logic, the case of passive synthesis. The psychoanalytic approach goes backwards, as providing subject with retentive archaeology that goes deep into enclosedness of the Natural Attitude, the premise of the repression.

Communicating meaning to a 'sick' person heals them insofar as it creates conviction in them. The patient must recognise the message as their own, inscribe it in their biography, and reintegrate it into their imaginary continuum, or sense of self — a sequence of meanings that they did not have before. However, there are cases in which it is impossible to deliver a message to the addressee. As previously noted, it is as difficult for psychotics to accept that new words have been invented. Lacan identified the cause of these disorders as a lack of 'points de capiton'. This means that the psychotic experience is characterised by a constant slipping of the signified under the signifier, which is catastrophic for the signified because there is no continuous reality check. The issue lies in unifying intention. Since this creates a

gap between the law and the *objet petit a*, the subject is unable to establish a connection with the world, resulting in a pathological logic of subjectivity.

The concept of foreclosure refers to the Name-of-the-Father as a gap in the symbolic order that can never be filled. The subject may then exhibit psychotic tendencies, even if they do not display any of the classic signs of psychosis. Sooner or later, when the foreclosed Name-of-the-Father reappears in reality, the subject is unable to assimilate it. The result of this 'collision with the unassimilable signifier' is 'entry into psychosis', which is typically characterised by hallucinations and delusions (Lacan, 2013). This deforms intentionality into a defragmented temporal sequence of experience, showing malfunctional possibilities for building separate conscious regions. At this point, the subject neither represses nor denies the law. Rather, it is that the subject experiences instances of pathological autonomous constitution within his or her mind. At this stage, the psychotic constitution exerts such a strong pull that it attracts all the psychic energy required for its emergence resembling by this centration, if we just could use this term, as a case of phenomenal cancer in the mind.

The case of Aimée sheds light on the development of psychoanalytic theories, particularly those concerning paranoia and psychosis. The case is described in detail in Lacan's doctoral thesis (Cox-Cameron, 2000). 'Aimée' is a pseudonym for Marguerite Pantaine, a woman who attempted to stab a famous actress. According to Lacan, this act was a manifestation of her psychotic paranoia, "to be understood as an increasingly centrifugal displacement of a hatred whose direct object she wished to misunderstand" (Lacan, 2013). Lacan explored the link between Aimée's paranoia and her feelings of persecution and self-punishment. He suggested that her delusional system was a defensive strategy to cope with her fragmented self-image. He observed that her delusions were closely connected to her relationships and sense of identity, particularly her unfulfilled aspirations to become a renowned author. In this case, Lacan examined the failure of the symbolic order to fully integrate the subject of this structure. He proposed that Aimée's psychosis was partly the result of her alienation from societal norms, leading to aggressive behaviour. This caused her to externalise her guilt and project it onto a random actress. By attacking the actress, the patient wanted to take revenge on herself. Psychotic cases appear as a kind of pathological passive synthesis, in which a certain logic of interpretation as metaphorization remains intact. However, these cases are so pathological that they indicate a trace of logical connections, showing that a certain element of thinking cannot find its way out, instead realising itself in something else and transforming into a paradoxical, self-existent entity.

This region - in the measure of consciousness, when we speak of it in terms of logic - is represented by the conceptual noetic composition. Each noesis corresponds, as far as its essence is concerned, to a perfectly closed group of possible noemes, possessing its unity through the capacity of synthetic unification. In this case, the group is also visibly fulfilled by means of an identifying superimposition. In the case of appearance, it is seen as the fullness of its sensible power. Other Egos and their empirical constitution is subject to various transcendental functions. However, the familiar basic premise exists as logic to the view of these logical entities, as a hybrid of ideation and power identifications that originate in subjectivity. Nevertheless, the process of "constituting" universals in subjective consciousness is based on the individual's perceptual experience. Husserl defines three stages of perception: simple apprehension; explicative contemplation and explicative synthesis, which give rise to the first categories of description. It apprehends horizons and their relations to other objects. We can assume that these stages involve a complex interplay between the activity and passivity of perception. This suggests that the boundary of the domain of these phenomena requires a different status, the phenomenological residue of reduction, which he calls the region of absolute, apodictic or pure consciousness. Phenomenologically this is obvious, but it looks interesting that association is not just a connection but a term for highly voluminous phenomena of mind constitution. That appears everywhere so without this intentional essential regularity of the concrete constitution, for the sphere of the *innate a priori*, the ego as such is unthinkable.

Every denoted being is always equal to itself. A phenomenon is what is in consciousness; not the object itself, but the way it is perceived. This is to be understood as reconstituted subjectivity. Psychoanalysis identifies fruitful acts of repetition that emphasise their role in the constant reworking of the subject's relationship with desire and the symbolic order (Lacan, 2013: 131). This brings us to the conclusion that the same dream or phantasm reproduces identical signifiers within its own noetic parameters. In his '*Studies on Hysteria*', Freud stated that even well-organised unconscious pathogenic material could only be gradually overcome. He likened the process to a narrow gorge through which only one pathogenic memory can pass at a time (Freud and Breuer, 2000). This process is crucial to the unfolding of consciousness. The peculiarity of the passive state lies in its importance.

Subsequently, phenomenology demonstrates the 'primordial constitution' of passive elements of phenomena and develops a cognitive 'teleology' of consciousness. Unsurprisingly, the term used in the psychoanalytic process to describe overcoming desire is

'withdrawal', which not only denotes negation, but also a difference from preservation. This repeats the initial stages of phenomenological reduction. The path paved by the phenomenological motto '*To the things themselves*' reveals the constitution of phenomena and their true fulfilment. Thus, the initial state of the Natural Attitude should be bracketed. But what if, instead of moving towards it, we take a step back to discover the Natural Attitude itself and find out what contingent cognitive experience philosophers might have avoided? This approach has already been applied in considering the mind as a manifestation of temporalities based on the premise of potential and actual infinity, or in using neuroscientific material to understand affect as a spontaneous mental act of repetitive modulation. Despite any possible confusion that might arise from the combination of phenomenology and psychoanalysis, methodological pluralism and double consideration can be employed to avoid it (Kant, 1998).

For the mind to think, it often means as being within the split between eidetic and affective matters. This classical notion is suspended and reconsidered. Since in psychoanalysis the conversation plays a fundamental role, as a talking cure, it is dedicated for discovering a person's inner setting. But what happens in therapy, when repressed feelings, emotions and memories somehow come to the surface through tears and pain? Perhaps psychoanalysis has its own kind of hybrid reduction. Unlike the Husserlian reduction, the simulativeness indicates the need to progress to the next level of reduction, which Richir will eventually term 'hyperbolic' (Richir, 2004). Suppose the goal of the Husserlian reduction was to identify the intentional structure of consciousness as the primary means of forming and fixing meaning. In this case, the aim of the new reduction would be to identify structures generated by the environment. 'Meaning as becoming' takes the place in the world of the ready-made sense, mainly comprehended passively by the eidetic structures of consciousness.

§2.4 Continuation on the Consideration of the Passive Synthesis

It is interesting to assume that some collective unconscious, formed in both the language of culture and structural interaction influences intentional experience. These unconscious judgements include the distribution of power structures, networks of *objet petit a*, various trajectories of metaphor and metonymy. Similarly, when considering passive synthesis, let us assume that unconscious synthesis is an alternative case of repetitive passive

constitution. Let us denote the set of cultural contents by the Symbolic (S) and the action operator (I) for the act of the interpretation:

$$I: S \rightarrow P$$

In particular, statement "This house is tall" can be modulated into the statement:

"This house is tall; maybe I can make a tower out of it - the tallest tower in my town".

$$I: S1 \rightarrow P$$

Therefore that we can observe how the values of the phenomenon are modified from the point of view of unattainability. The statement expresses curiosity of the specific subjective desire. At the same time we consider the modification of the object in imagination. This modification appears as retentive repetition of the unconscious in presence.

Also while considering the split between affective and ideational, it is important to consider another separate hybridized type of the unconscious passive synthesis. Its appearance is considered in terms of transference and as a type based on intersubjective association. Transference involves the projection of past emotions, attitudes and experiences onto the therapist or others. This dynamic highlights how the past is continually re-enacted and experienced in the therapeutic relationship, demonstrating the non-linear nature of temporality in psychoanalytic treatment. The logic corresponds to the same logic of unconscious, but as a separate kind of synthesis of ideational and affective perspectives. This is crucial because, in going through the manifestations of resistance and transference, the therapist is confronted with the pulsation of the past and the curvature of the present. Transference is a modification of the complex retention. In order to describe the trajectory of meaning as a function for passive synthesis to understand intersubjective phenomena, we should reintegrate transference into the logic of the unconscious. The basis of influences will be based on affective drive and *objet petit a*, since transference in the sense of complex intersubjective relation shaped by the personal unconscious as ($U = A + S$). Let us denote it by the operator T.

$$T: U \rightarrow P$$

Thus, the statement "There is a guy at the house." can be modulated to

"The guy at the house resembles my neighbour, I guess he's a nice buddy!".

$$T: U1 \rightarrow P$$

Individual experience forms the matrix of the subject's unconscious content. Thus, it separates the operator of intersubjective reciprocal identification. This hybridised the subjective imaginary and the objective culture depended on individual affectiveness. Thus, we add intersubjectivity as the premise of unconscious logic to be oriented among each Other.

Moreover, the passive synthesis considered here differs slightly from the synthesis shown by Husserl. Whereas Husserl points to the constitutive formation of perception and thought, we assume that to be the integration of the specific trace of unconscious in the intentional correlates. Thus, we can distinguish three basic operators: affect, cultural identification and transference signified as [D, I, T] for the passive synthesis for unconscious sense function. These operators should adequately describe how the influence of the unconscious occurs in ordinary conscious life.

Since three operators have already been singled out, to complete them together, we would call each one a sense function and denote it by the Greek letter Ω . Thus we generalise the assumption for the function that influence of unconscious content; in other words, the passive synthesis function as a variety of sense modulations such as:

$$\Omega(p) = [D, I, T].$$

Since the state of pure consciousness is impossible, then it is always predetermined by $\Omega(p)$ and its modulation [D, I, T]. Here the affect appears as reactive fulfillment, the cultural identification as spontaneous fulfillment, transference though as hybrid of two. This fulfillment as we noted before happens as repetitive response of the unconscious as modulation of intentionality:

$$\Omega: [D, I, T] \rightarrow P$$

The above statement suggests that the relationship between phenomenological and psychoanalytic thinking can be unified. This formalisation is also expected to shed light on some problems of the genealogy of Natural Attitudes, or how any state of affairs has to

happen. It is prepared in advance and encrusted within the perception. It is linked to a particular interpretation of the object, so this consideration also appears as a formalisation for the understanding of mental disorder - namely, how an unhealthy perception is produced by the psyche that inherently provides someone with a distorted representation of the world.

Interestingly to recall what was happening in Swann's mind: a particular obsession was displacing his attendance at the concert, generating a series of memories and associations that trapped him in a specific internal dialogue, a vortex somewhat similar to Zeno's paradox - the actual infinity of unconscious until he could not break free from the vicious repetition and sufficiently distracted as received the mental discharge. Interestingly, if Swann found himself in a similar situation again, would he not repeat the same pattern? Would he rush out again and experience his intrusive state again? In this case, can we not say that there is a trigger that activates a particular internal sequence of experiences, thoughts and states at a specific time? Can we assume that the time of the world is linked to the time of internal unconscious logic as active non-obvious emergence? Following Merleau-Ponty's thinking, there is no separation in the world. For him, separation is an act of thinking; everything appears as the product of an individual, microcosmic time singularity.

Chapter III. Language and the Other

Dos cuerpos frente a frente

son a veces dos olas

y la noche es océano⁴

This chapter is also devoted to the study of logic, but logic of a different kind. Phenomenology gives its perspective as the Cogito not distinguished from the intersubjective constitution: the particular logic for singular acts of perception and singular acts of interpretation. The attitude that shifts within some adherent reasoning that follows the passive synthesis changes the definition of predicative acts. In order to consider a more broader picture, we should turn to more general premises of communication and interpretation.

The development of the subject from the first days and the encounter with the world require a fundamental mediation that takes place through linguistic structures. It does not matter what becomes a sign: a mother's smile, a baby's word or a mirror image is fully structured in terms of association of imaginary and symbolic. Žižek claims that for Lacan:

There is no great Other, which means not only that the great Other is virtual, without a substantial reality of its own, but that it is in itself inconsistent/incomplete, perforated by gaps. These gaps are filled by another version of the Big Other: a fantasmatic appearance of the Big Other as a real thing in the guise of the so-called Id-machine, a mechanism that directly materialises our unacknowledged fantasies (Žižek, 2022).

The Big Other is the site of speech. It is constituted as a signifier. From the simple to the complex, events begin to be reflected in more sophisticated ideas and narratives. In this case, consciousness appears in more complex forms of reflection. These forms, as complex ideas, project networks of meaning. To ask how individual consciousness achieves its own reflection, we must consider the tools of its interpretation. Therefore, the first thing that comes after the acts of personal perception through the act of language. Thus, we can consider the broader question of the Big Other and consciousness. We would also use this concept to describe consciousness as emanations of the objective mind, that are subject to power structures, and the law:

⁴Two bodies face to face, are at times two waves, and night is an ocean (Paz, 2018).

All knowledge, once applied in the real world, has effects and, at least in this sense, "becomes true". Knowledge, once used to regulate the behaviour of others, implies constraint, regulation and the disciplining of practice. Thus there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not simultaneously presuppose and constitute power relations (Foucault, 1977: 27).

It is part of human destiny to be part of the symbolic order and to be defined by language structures. Ernst Cassirer, at this point, provided an extensive definition of man as a symbolic entity:

Therefore, instead of defining man as an animal rationale, we should define him as an animal symbolicum. In this way, we can designate his specific difference, and we can understand the new way open to man - the way to civilisation (Cassirer, 2021: 44).

Another important point to consider is the impact of the Big Other on the imagination. It portrays consciousness as a reflective mirror, constrained by the boundaries of language, the conflation of fantasy and memory beyond linear organisation. At this point, the natural does not coincide with consciousness and is mediated by an inherent temporal sequence that intervenes with the presence of sign. The sequences of the unconscious as repetition and the conscious as perception collide, producing atypical or irregular states of consciousness.

The formation of a self-image, or 'I', during the 'mirror stage' is an example of the development of complicated ideas that disrupts consciousness for the first time. This results from the contradiction between the image of the body (je) reflected in the mirror and the expectation of the self (moi). According to Lacan (2002: 166), "in the discourse of the other, the 'I' (je) creates itself as the ego (moi) in order to understand itself as both subject and object of its own desire". For us, the formation of this (moi) as a pattern of consciousness is essential. It belongs to communication and recognition. The imaginative ego (je) is substituted by the moi due to the circumstances of its priority. This gives rise to the idea of the ego as transitive, emerging arbitrarily from the communicative logic of the Other. This presupposes a communicative strategy for the value structure. This strategy is based on mutual recognition. For example, we might recall even the absurd episode of Don Quixote recognising Sancho Panza as his squire and Sancho Panza recognising Don Quixote as his leader and an exceptional knight (Cervantes, 2015). We can observe in this, or any other, dialectic of the lord and the bondsman to represent different forms in the history of thought; here, the subject appears as an element of a mutually definitive structural discourse. Reflection itself necessarily requires the Other in order to take place at all. Hegel writes:

We have now to see how the process of this pure Notion of recognition, of the duplicating of ofself-consciousness in itsness, appears to self-consciousness. At first, it will exhibit the side of the inequality of the two, or the splitting-up of the middle term into the extremes which, as extremes, are opposed to one another, one being only recognized, the other only recognizing (Hegel, 2018: §185).

Moreover, this effect does not indicate an inability to recognise oneself, but rather a need for others to confirm one's identity. As Hegel wrote, "Self-consciousness exists in and for itself when and through the fact that it exists in this way for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged" (Hegel, 2018: §178). In this case, consciousness demands recognition from others; here the status of the subject's autonomy changes. Recalling Kant's well-known categorical imperative, "Act only according to that maxim which you can at the same time will to become a universal law" (Kant, 2012: 30). Which also contains an expectation of mutual acknowledgement for this implementation. However, the Kantian perspective presupposes the autonomy of the subject, its adulthood, responsibility, and so on. The ethical condition here does not call for its representation as the structural epiphenomenon. The development of the Hegelian conception involves shifting the emphasis from the autonomous self to the principle of reciprocity, thereby changing the mechanisms of thought and history from those centred on the Cogito at the level of intersubjectivity. One form of such presuppositions is the subject's involvement in the metabolism of discourse.

§3.1 Discourse

Appearing as an act of communication, consciousness is condemned to unfold in discourse alongside others. Its destiny is to be born in history: "Discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of domination, but is the thing for which and through which there is a struggle, discourse is the power to be seized" (Foucault, 1981: 52).

Therefore, let us consider the aspects of the unconscious' internal communicative strategy within psychoanalytic discourse. If we consider the act of utterance itself to be an atomic act and attempt to interpret it, it will undoubtedly manifest in terms of predicate logic. Conversely, the logic of discourse is concerned with the exchange of predicates. Approaching the discourse according to Lacan allows us to derive as many structural figures as possible from the positional combinatorics of values. However, four of these aim to represent the logic

of the unconscious. What, then, should the figures of discourse be? We refer to the communicative strategy as the order of addressing among the actors within a discourse:




Figure 6: Structure of discourse

The process captured by a figure of speech is analogous to the trajectory of communication. The addressee is in the position of the agent and the unconscious constituent aspect of truth. The person to whom the message is addressed occupies the position of 'the other'. What is expected as a response in the position of the product? (Lacan, 2023). This therefore provides a way of seeing how discourse constitutes experience. Discourse is the invisible element conveyed to the subject through language. Language is the medium through which various aspects of the lifeworlds are formed. However, as discourse, it is not just a set of meanings, but also the implicit dynamics of the Big Other to which one must be obedient. Subjects act according to the requirements of discourse. It positions itself within the structure of questioning. Thus, the subject unfolds in the social world as the discourse of the master, the discourse of the university, the discourse of the hysteric, and the discourse of the analyst. Each creates a specific trajectory of thought and therefore imposes inherent power structures. When it comes to truth, it may be worth daring to think impersonally. Discourse is characterised by incompleteness; the link at the bottom of the structure expresses the loss of connection between the two lower addressees. This connection occurs through the intersubjective mediation of the figure of discourse; in this way, the unconscious manifests itself in language.

The discussion focuses on individual acts of interpretation based on the general logic of *linguisterie*, which is defined as the expectation of mutual recognition. It therefore elaborates on the dynamics of power structures in order to present communicative strategies and ideological situations as necessary conditions for subjectivity.




Figure 7: Four discourses

The discourse of the Master (dM) encompasses the meaning and the signified. The symbolic master represents the dominant narrative. In the university discourse, knowledge is produced under the constraints of censorship. In the discourse of the hysteric, the legitimacy of the master is questioned, as are the nature and manner of its authority. In the analyst's discourse, one is asked about the unconscious and hidden desires. These discourses describe the trajectory of power imposed on society. In the discourse of the hysteric and the analyst, however, there is a search for the *objet petit a*, the missing piece of the discourse. Power figures repress it through their authority and knowledge. The institutions behind the elements indicated by the figures cause several metamorphoses of information. These institutions realise the structures of meaning by defining their position within the discourse. It is important to note that the figures of discourse express the metabolism of information, i.e. how consciousness is patterned as a communicative agent of history. This is compelled by an inherent ethical orientation. After all, if a communication strategy aims to fulfil certain criteria, it necessarily involves power. The role played by the unconscious guidelines of the discourse of the Other is no coincidence, but rather reflects Lacan's preconceived interest in Hegelian and Kojèvean philosophy. According to this logic, history itself must be explained through the figures of discourse. For example, the figure of hysteria (dH) represents an extra-historical structure posed against the authoritarian discourse (dM) that is embedded in thought, causing modification or revolution.

According to this logic, consciousness itself cannot be explained only by the description of direct acts of cognition or judgement. In this case, these acts are influenced by an external order. This order determines the subjective order and guides cognition, ethics, and self-knowledge. Another fundamental feature of the approach of revealing the social through figures of discourse is that, unlike most social and historical theories, it incorporates desire into its framework. In doing so, it establishes new norms and an alternative anthropology. When desire is factored into the consideration of such issues, the dynamic changes: the social universe itself loses its mechanical features and comes to life when the subject is characterised not only by abstract self-consciousness, but also by structural homeostasis — when its corporeality is inscribed in its existence. Although this vitality is challenging to detect in discourse, it is nevertheless closely intertwined with the structures of desire — even more so with regard to the principles of pleasure and reality.

It is important to note that the discourse first carries out the fundamental markup of the world: the *point de capiton*. This is a French term which translates as "stitching point" or "anchoring point". Literally, it refers to a button used in upholstery. These points function as a web of points at which signifier and signified are bound together. The *point de capiton* lies in the diachronic dimension of consciousness, maintaining the processes of interpretation and repetition. The bridge between objects is an associative point made by elements illustrated by the graph of desire. The essence of repetition is that communication follows from a retroactive consequence of *punctuation*. The meaning of words is only established after the end of a sentence — a system of retroactively reflected statement of the desire:




Figure 8: Graph of desire

The element of desire is formed along the trajectory of its specification; thus, the fractured subject undergoes individualisation through desire, formed through a series of Others (A),

each playing a special role. Initially, a kind of empty form or lack is fulfilled through the *voice* of the Other. Then, a certain meaning passes through the points of *punishment* and *pleasure*, where the element acquires a distinction of value between what is possible and what is forbidden to desire. After that, it can be modified further through the layering of signifiers. For example, the desire to have a pet is met with the *restriction* of responsibility and all the additional activities associated with it, as well as the *pleasure* that comes from communicating with the animal. This desire may result in the substitution of an alternative: for example, a neurotic person with strong repressive tendencies may choose a fish or a houseplant as a way to reduce symbolic punishment. Although, the trajectory would be different for a perverse type of psyche, in which the subject might choose any animal, even a wild one.

Since the disruption between imaginary and symbolic creates a gap in subjectivity: the voice is symbolic but its sound gives an impression of presence and thus makes the illusion of the symbolic to be real. The activity of the subject though is a strive to fulfill this gap with desire. The unconscious, as such, seeks to be expressed in metaphor - the case where the sequence of unconscious messages finds its resolution in a metaphorical expression. On the unconscious side there is no resistance but the urge to repeat oneself over and over again. For example, the fear of contamination by touching objects touched by others would provide a kind of obesity for cleanliness. This fulfillment is never finishable and enclosed in repetition.

The transgression of the usual within new experience the subject shows how the restriction activates the opposite movement towards *jouissance*, to cross over the law. Jouissance is a destructive fulfillment of the gap, disbalance aimed to transcend prohibition and indulge desire with dangerous force. For example, in the case of anorexia, a person becomes preoccupied with their appearance and restricts their food intake, thereby harming their health. The transgression of what is permissible due to the immense *object a* can take destructive and perverse forms. Žižek defines it: "Jouissance is not the satisfaction of a need, but a surplus pleasure beyond the satisfaction of needs" (Žižek, 2019: 131). Therefore, the principles of pleasure and reality could be attributed to this as another part of the consideration to a greater extent, as they reveal the energetic principles underlying behaviour. These principles are also directly related to subsequent desire dynamics and link them with self-fulfilment. Holding energy requires additional expenditure, so homeostasis is the process by which it is expressed according to a particular mental pattern. Therefore, it is not surprising that, for Lacan, repetition corresponds to pleasure, enclosing desire within the

actual infinity of moral identification. The pleasure principle must be overcome and therefore inevitably satisfy social and rational criteria, and such an act would be directly associated with a particular urge. For instance, overeating is related to the urgent and persistent satisfaction of hunger, typically involving inferior carbohydrates, which can eventually result in obesity. Sudden and necessary decisions made under the influence of the pleasure principle mainly indicate underdeveloped defence mechanisms and banal psychophysical reactions, requiring the development of alternative modes of behaviour. Therefore, guided by the reality principle, a person who prefers cooked food will later be able to satisfy their hunger with better quality food and preserve one's health.

In regard to mastering the desire, the subject transformed by the analysis is mainly guided by the principle of the reality in life. He tries to align priorities and behavioural strategies with the norms of the social world and the self, extending the discursiveness of speech and achieving goals according to specific criteria. The discourse and thinking that emerge after analysis expect the analysand to be able to reproduce the discourse of the analyst and to ask itself the same questions. Thus, it is not the language itself but the mastery of the discourse through the language that allows the individual to mature by introjecting the analytic function of the analyst. It places his unconscious reflexes in the position of meta-discourse of desire. Which is demanded in the subject's discourse and could not be expressed before, it becomes possible thanks to new orders of language and new figures for unconscious' reflection. This shift makes the incorporation of discursive practices necessary for consciousness and self-knowledge in general.

It underlies modern psychology, which attempts to explain human behaviour by appealing to ethological categories such as instinct and adaptation. Lacan is critical of attempts to explain the phenomena of human behaviour in naturalistic terms. He argues that such attempts are based on a failure to recognise the importance of a symbolic order that radically alienates the interruption of the signifier. The neurotic structure is the inability to live adequately with the real and to find a compromise between the symbolic and the imaginary. The psychotic structure is quite different; in this case there is no real in this context; here being is not unified, but subjected to obeying the repetition of disruption at the edge of the imaginary and the symbolic.

What philosophical implications does this have for the definition of consciousness? Suppose that the order of discourse affects the order of phenomenal experience. In this case, this logic could be attributed to the genesis of axiological consciousness and its

contradictions. Above all, it is necessary to determine why discourse, despite being such an all-encompassing phenomenon, still requires improvement - a problem if it is viewed as merely a perfectionist's demand. Kurt Gödel addresses this issue in his incompleteness theorem:

Any effectively generated theory capable of expressing elementary arithmetic cannot be consistent and complete. In particular, for every consistent, effectively generated formal theory that proves certain basic arithmetical truths, there is an arithmetical statement that is true but not provable in the theory (Gödel, 1992: 4).

One begins to accept, albeit involuntarily, that totalities are likely to be incomplete systems. Therefore, we must adopt the primary hypothesis of logical incompleteness in our theoretical and methodological reasoning. Although discourse may seem inaccurate in describing reality and is not strictly defined, it fits these criteria of meta-reasoning. This is because we have the idea of a system's lack of completeness. Each of the assumptions can be extended to another meta-level or updated to cover the previous one. If we consider discourse to be a formal representation of the interaction between communicative agents, it will obviously not be the final stage, but rather a trope of the subject's contextual and communicative expansion. This determines the fate of its mental acts, and thus of its consciousness. This argument does not imply the complete loss of the subject's sovereignty, however, it does highlight the structures of culture, which incorporate the communicative achievements of many generations into an individual's existence, thereby facilitating their life. A person necessarily enters the world through culture. This does not mean the end of the subject, but it can open up ways to a more formal understanding of reality, as shown in structuralism.

Of course, the phenomenological perception of language does not attempt to identify structures in the same way as structuralism does. The very nature of phenomenological methodology and its inherent reduction would exclude such a possibility. For a phenomenologist, venturing into the realm of the unconscious would be an uncertain endeavour, and uncovering hidden structures would contradict the criterion of evidence. Therefore, phenomenology is characterised by describing what is directly manifest in language through lived perception. Thus, language will first and foremost appear as a structural element of cognition through which knowledge is organised — how else could a person be incorporated into the world at this point? Thus, Heidegger's phenomenology is closer to that proposed by Lacan. Even before he begins to develop the theme of the language

of the *house of being* in his later work, Heidegger establishes the central theme of his method as hermeneutics to explore the concrete historical subjectivity and its fate. Moreover, for Heidegger, ontology is possible as hermeneutic phenomenology. He asserts:

Only as phenomenology is ontology possible. In the phenomenological conception of "phenomenon", what one has in mind as that which "shows itself" is the being of entities, their meaning, their modifications and derivatives. And this showing itself is not just any showing itself, nor is it something like appearing. Least of all can the being of entities ever be something like the appearance of entities (Heidegger, 2008: 60).

This characteristic of Heidegger's thinking marks a transition to an axiological pattern of subjectivity. This narrative or ideology emerges in consciousness through the process of self-dedication. Subjectivity tends to enclose itself within narratives of desire. In a sense, consciousness is subject to ideology and may eventually constitute itself in the Hegelian sense by explicitly considering the stages of the evolving mind. This is how self-identification and the resolution of contradictions with others occur. This is why psychoanalysis is not a science, but rather a 'practice' with a 'scientific vocation': it is a quest for ultimate interpretation (Lacan, 2002: 863).

Psychoanalysis is not a science. The distinction between didactic and therapeutic analysis, as established by institutions, was one of Lacan's main objects of criticism. While he agreed with the IPA's view that prospective analysts must undergo psychoanalytic treatment, he opposed the artificial distinction between therapeutic and training analysis. According to Lacan, there is only one form of analytic therapy, regardless of why the analyzand is undergoing treatment, and the treatment's goal is not to eliminate the symptom, but to transform the analyzand into the analyst through discursive processes. Understanding the process of developed autonomy of the symbolic reflective function of analyzand is essential to avoid the disastrous unconscious reflection in the error that arises despite the evidence of the direct facts. Exploring the truth of the subject can transform one's perspective.

To address this issue phenomenologically, and to put that in the framework of the more general scope we might also recall Merleau-Ponty's interest in the pre-linguistic and pre-reflective aspects of perception. He argued that our experiences are not initially formed as thoughts or concepts, but rather are rooted in an immediate engagement with the world that precedes language. Language then becomes a tool for expressing and communicating these experiences. Moreover, in Merleau-Ponty's concept of *corporeal intentionality* he suggests

that our bodily movements and gestures are as well important receptive and expressive acts that convey meaning. Language, as a form of expression, is intertwined with this corporeal intentionality. As he explains: 'Expression is the establishment of a relationship between a sentient subject and a significant world by means of language' (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 203). The focus is not just on conveying information, but on expressing the lived meaning of our experiences. Merleau-Ponty recognised the social dimension of language and communication. Language is a tool for expressing individual experiences, as well as for engaging in dialogue to achieve shared understanding. To unite this all sets of actors of perception Merleau-Ponty introduces the notion of *chiasm* and refers to the intertwining of the perceiver and the perceived. In the context of language, this entanglement suggests that language is not merely a transparent medium that reflects pre-existing thoughts. Rather, it actively shapes, embodies, influences and builds a more complex constitution of the world.

In this way, we arrive at a set of 'Others' that constitute our experience. The Other is a symbolic dominance of discourse and an agent of recognition, as well as a substitute for the signifier. However, isn't subjectivity depersonalised by these Others, except insofar as it differs as a personal set of signifiers? The problem first arises in the a priori form of self-explanation, in which the existence of the Other is given as the initial premise that renders subjectivity fluid and dependent. Husserl wrote:

The objective world as an idea - the ideal correlate of an intersubjective (intersubjectively communalised) experience, which ideally can be and is carried on as constantly harmonious - is essentially related to intersubjectivity (itself constituted as the ideality of infinite openness), whose constituent particular subjects are equipped with mutually corresponding and harmonious systems. Consequently, the constitution of the world essentially involves a "harmony" of monads (Husserl, 2013: §49).

The other person is therefore always part of the interaction and environment. It is a specific region for the constitution of consciousness, since it involves self-identification with inaccessible spheres of another ego. However, constituting this other through signifiers ultimately leads back to the initial setting. This is similar to Melanie Klein's observations, which show how pre- and post-verbal links are formed in a child's perception. The mother's feeding behaviour, as well as her absence, creates an initial distinction between good and evil. This is described as follows:

The good breast: "The infant's first object, the mother's breast, is of central importance for its later development. Suppose it is experienced as pleasurable and life-sustaining. In that case, it becomes the prototype of the 'good' object and lays the foundation for a sense of security and trust";

The bad breast: "Conversely, the breast that frustrates the infant's needs is perceived as a 'bad' object, associated with feelings of anger, frustration and fear. These early experiences of the 'bad' breast contribute to the development of the infant's aggressive impulses" (Klein, 1932: 219-220).

They create an imaginary, precognitive setting in which the castration complex is the trigger for subsequent traumatic experiences. In this example, we can see how the primary scene is interpreted: the agency of the Other forms the primary intuitions for distinguishing phenomena as opposites. In the future, the symbolic order will further complicate these notions before they can be united into an idea that encompasses both as originating from the same source, albeit within different perceptual frames. Levinas questions the Other in a strange way:

The ego loses its sovereign coincidence with itself, its identification, in which consciousness triumphantly returned to itself and rested on itself. Faced with the need of the other, the ego is banished from this rest and is not the consciousness of this exile, already glorious. Any complacency would destroy the uprightness of the ethical movement (Levinas, 1963).

Thus, a certain optimism of completion can be attributed to the Other. This emphasises the interconnected nature of consciousness and the paradox that the Big Other defines the Other, yet both are ultimately infinite and therefore indefinite:

Subjectivity is not for itself; it is, again, initially for the Other... In principle, the I does not pull itself out of its "first person"; it supports the world. It constitutes itself in the various movements in which responsibility for the Other is transferred to it (Levinas, 1958: 99-100).

The Other establishes itself everywhere. This Other fulfills the unconscious. No matter how wide the scope of our consideration — whether symbolic, anti-Oedipal, grammatological, or otherwise — each approach can be reduced endlessly as an element of a larger system, thus facing Gödel's demand. Thus, the notion of the Other shows the entanglement of dependent predication as the chiasm of experience. The intersubjective consciousness pattern that emerges at this point is therefore an opaque, historically defined entity for reflection.

§3.2 Meta-Hypothesis

Understanding something philosophically means understanding the logic of a phenomenon, its 'logos'. Depression, for instance, involves an emotional state that slows the

flow of a person's activities and makes their life less consistent and productive. However, it is not just an affect; it also affects the mind and logic. The affective nature makes the logic of the unconscious hidden and obscure. The body functions like a machine – fear, anger and other psychic responses are as natural as breathing. According to Panksepp, the depressive reaction is a consequence of the panic-grief system (d5) in the human body. This system is closely linked to human social interactions, particularly paternal contact. A lack of caregiver activates a bodily response, thus modulating a state of anguish. The unconscious feeling of loss or separation may recur, influencing mood and thoughts, or even becoming a sad symbol of life. Certain parts of the brain may cease to function normally, leaving the individual unable to understand what is happening or to take action. This condition is often triggered by a traumatic event that disrupts the body's internal chemistry, causing a partial shutdown of mental functions. Depression stops the seeking system (d2), meaning a loss of interest or motivation. It makes one freeze or play dead. Therefore, specific embodied systems modulate subjective states.

Considering the affective passive synthesis in a more sophisticated way, we can introduce it as a contradiction in vectorial form. According to Greek tradition, there are two fundamental characteristics of affect: the stenic ($\sigma\theta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma$, meaning 'strength') and the asthenic ($\acute{\alpha}\sigma\theta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\iota\alpha$, meaning 'impotence'). Some encourage action, while others inhibit it. Based on this, let us consider another hypothetical gradation of the properties of the unconscious. We denote those that give impulse or acceleration to mental life with the letter " σ ". The letter ' $\acute{\alpha}$ ' denotes those that have a negative effect, such as defence mechanisms that are more or less effective. Consequently, according to the previously established correspondence with Janksepp and their inherent vectorial influence, we have two sets of drives:

$$\sigma = [d_1, d_2, d_3, d_6, d_7] \text{ — acting as an acceleration vector}$$

$$\acute{\alpha} = [d_4, d_5] \text{ — acting as a deceleration vector (negative)}$$

The confusive affective state as depression in this case would represent the relation:

$$D: A5 \rightarrow P$$

$$P \rightarrow -A2$$

Both are special cases of affective passive synthesis. What if we could describe the potential modality of a consistent argument in this way? The change of mood or value at the

heart of it all is an inherently intelligible, isogenic feature: the relationship between affects and their expression in language. Passive synthesis is the specific design of the 'point de capiton', the signifiers-stimuli. Everything else could be seen as the delusion, manifested in reality as insights that interpret it. Thus, unconscious state modulations of mind would be denoted by the symbol ($v, N, - \nu\tilde{o}\tilde{\nu}\zeta$), using "t" to represent specific act in time. Some complex states or affective confusion of consciousness can therefore be represented by the vector sum of effects:

$$(\sigma t + \sigma t + \dot{\alpha} t \dots) \rightarrow v_t (D), \text{ or}$$

The result of the vector addition of affects (D) and their action if we consider an ideal state of consciousness, P, or:

$$N_t(D) = (\sigma t + \sigma t + \dot{\alpha} t + \dots) \rightarrow P$$

At this point, we could also consider how this logic is integrated into cultural interpretation, focusing on a specific interpretative process. This would entail engaging consciousness with opposing value figures of modulation in the unconscious. This would describe the collision of desire and law in terms of repressive, deniable, or rejective statements of metaphor and metonymy. The resulting confusion would express disruptions in symbolic order:

$$N_t(I) = (i_1 t + i_2 t + i_3 t + \dots) \rightarrow P$$

Similar vector reasoning should also apply to the transference 'T', representing a complex and intuitive modulation of affect and identification following interaction with others, as well as other states associated with *mixed* feelings.

$$N_t(T) = (u_1 t + u_2 t + u_3 t + \dots) \rightarrow P$$

Thus, by adding the aforementioned operators, we can formally understand each state of atypical consciousness to be influenced by tripartite passive synthesis:

$$v_t = (D_t) + (I_t) + (T_t) \rightarrow P, \text{ or}$$

$$N(P) = D + I + T$$

The above statements have some other interesting consequences. In his methodology for studying states of consciousness, Husserl excluded cases of mental disorder. For his research, therefore, the subject must be mentally healthy and have consistent logical thinking. This requirement limits the phenomenological method. Using logic operators based on investigation of the psychic life, such as affect, prejudice and transference, we can broaden the scope of phenomenological inquiry and overcome some of the limitations of Husserl's rigorous thinking and rational loyalty to logic. Psychoanalysis enables us to introduce new tools to phenomenology, thereby expanding our understanding of subjective temporalities and the Natural Attitude. We therefore assume that it enables the creation of an alternative phenomenology of psychopathological states.

The same logic applies to the organic, nervous system-based description of consciousness; despite the determinism inherent in this way of thinking, it seems possible to demonstrate intellectually that psychopathological and mental states are the consequence of various forms of passive synthesis. This accompanies the human being as a cumulative complex of affect, transference and culture. In this case, we can also explore the organic defect in terms of pathological passive synthesis to further deconstruct the genesis of a particular consciousness, allowing it to be considered without any specific requirements.

However, when we consider the logical and phenomenal modulation presented in these various forms of passive synthesis, the definition of time synthesis also requires updating. When we consider the genesis of time, we can refer to the distinction between McTaggart's A and B series (McTaggart, 1908). In each series, the thinker distinguishes a specific methodology for considering events in terms of time. The first methodology corresponds to Heraclitus's changing universe, the unique moment of being and all things. This unites the entire universe at a single point of unique moment. The second methodology corresponds to Parmenides' One, pursuing the givenness of time as a closed continuum. Phenomenology corresponds to the former, and its series A reflects the experience of the world, here and now. Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, refers to the closed singularity of the unconsciously repeated. We can assume that the experience of consciousness, with its implicit confusion and vagueness, is related to a heterogeneous temporal genesis. As previously mentioned, the subject can synthesise the infinite number of variations of the world in the experience as a perspective. This is possible because of the inherent openness of the course of thought in perception (series A). When we speak of the contingent, repetitive unconscious, we perceive it as the endless reproduction of the same as the actual selection of

elements (series B). The incorporation of such heterogeneity of streams of experience into the mind (AB series) causes deformations of primary intuition and thus mental disorder.

The discrepancy between the real as perspective and the symbolic as repetition is a defining characteristic of incomplete experience. Nevertheless, under normal conditions, the human mind usually demonstrates balance and success with this ontology of mental acts. The conditions of the occurrence of conscious and unconscious acts can be described as specific givenness, a layering of the logic of potential and actual infinities in temporal genesis:




Figure 9: Metaphor of the infinities

The large infinity sign reflects Being-in-the-World. The characteristic intertwining of the subjective and the Other through language, the prospect of perception. The small infinity reflects the individual unconscious, which is the genesis of repetitive acts of subjective experience. Dreaming is a good example of repetitive genesis: as it is outside of immediate perception, the content of the mind returns to itself. It is also repeatable through *jouissance*, or the pleasure experienced, in Freudian case, by a boy playing the game Fort-Da! — throwing a toy out of his crib and saying "Fort!" (meaning 'gone' in German) when the toy disappeared, and "Da!" (meaning 'here!') when it reappeared (Buchanan, 2010).

Instead, consider this repetition in terms of Platonic reminiscence, where unconscious repetition might be understood as a form of retention that returns (Dolar, 2023). Here, it is proposed that this should not be considered as a form of remembering, as with voluntary recollection. But, as it is an autonomous activity similar to the dream emergence, which is considered to be a part of two heterogeneous flows of temporal genesis: one with the active involvement of the mind and the other with the passive emanation of the unconscious. This allows us to move beyond Platonic idealistic anamnesis and consider conscious genesis following the Aristotelian ideas on Zeno's paradox. In both cases, whether Achilles reaches the tortoise or not, we see an example of two different intelligible currents within imaginary synthesis. Thus, we assume them to be autonomous, thereby changing the phenomenological understanding of time from the linear perspective of Husserl to a modified stream of heterogeneous temporalities in terms of actual and potential infinity. At this point, the images

of Achilles and the tortoise represent opposite temporal premises in comparison to infinities. The impossibility and eternal division of space, which Aristotle considered to be an error in applying potential infinity, represents the repetition itself — the genesis of actual infinity in the mind. On the contrary, the actual infinity image, in the case of Achilles successfully chasing the tortoise, comes from potential infinity rooted in concrete, unfolding perception and consists of a completed, correct image of Being in the mind. This is how we might initially find it confusing to consider these infinities and their generic fusion in consciousness.

The implicit, which is not obvious, occurs at the points of temporal entanglement, or the temporal *point de capiton*, as in the situation of the Schattendasein. It is at these points that intentionality is logically modified and the unconscious is united with lived experience. This implies both an inherent ignorance (constant repression of one stream by another) and that atypical states of the psyche originate at these points. The following image can be used to illustrate the interweaving and collision as aspects of temporally heterogeneous experience:



Figure 10: Collision in the temporal genesis

Self-knowledge, emerging from a non-obvious chiasmatic entanglement of the unconscious in acts of experience, renders final transparency impossible. Conversely, it provides specific certainty of the subjective, as well as discrepancy with reality, making accessibility of the present moment difficult and unobvious due to temporal clash. At the points of entanglement — desire and law; affect and transference; and structures of passive synthesis — these meet against the backdrop of consciousness's active involvement in perception. Due to temporal imbalances and the opacity of experience horizons, disturbances occur in the functioning of consciousness. Psychoanalysis shows that, in some cases, the subject's integration with the world can be restored by clarifying symptoms inherent in passive genesis. This highlights the mind's complex chiasmatic relationship with the world and its reliance on interpretation and ideation. Despite this incomplete transparency, the

subject's ability to question the world and itself is not diminished, although it is limited. This situation will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter of the thesis.

However, for the purposes of argument, the hypothesis remains unchanged. The heterogeneity of aspects of experience involves mechanisms in the formation of intentionality that are not always sufficiently transparent. These processes occur through various manifestations of passive synthesis, including affects and the unconscious. Experience thus emerges as the complex genesis of acts of consciousness and being in the world within the paradox of immediate givenness and temporality. Hypothetically, balanced consciousness would be deployed in a spiral constitution, incorporating both aspects of genesis in hypothetical mindfulness. Thus, conflicts in consciousness arise as a result of the complex preconditions of synthesis, non-obviousness and self-ignorance within the framework of contradictory modern values and the inherent, paradoxical transcendental limitations of the freedom of consciousness formed at the crossroads of infinities.

Chapter IV. The Body and Consciousness

*Man has no Body distinct from his Soul
for that called Body is a portion of Soul
discerned by the five Senses
the chief inlets of Soul in this age
(Blake, 1972).*

Wilhelm Wundt's establishment of experimental psychology paved the way for a new form of self-awareness. It marked the beginning of a new scientific era in which *sinful* physicality, having been pushed out of the limelight, returned to the forefront of contemporary thought in anatomical theatres. Initially regarded as a vessel for the soul, and later subjected to intense scrutiny as part of the study of the blood supply or nervous system, the body began to acquire a more complex scientific understanding of itself as an *embodied pattern for consciousness* connected to naturalistic update of transcendental pattern, which at some point follows asloso the relational pattern. Meanwhile, the use of introspection as a method of investigating the human condition began to fade with each subsequent experiment. This led to significant changes in medicine and biology, ultimately resulting in the emergence of various life sciences. The body's inherent ability to be studied as an autonomous physical environment — including homeostasis, cyclical processes, cellular specialisation and hormonal regulation — led to the transformation of the human sciences, sidelining historical and social existence.

The adventure of experimental psychology in discovering new aspects of corporeality continues to amaze us today, from the initial measurement of heart rate, pupil width and blood pressure, to the more advanced methods of brain research made possible by MRI and EEG technology. This demonstrates that the numerical component of experience is rooted in the properties of bodily experience rather than in the realm of pure reason. Despite its scientific nature, experimental psychology is also involved in a certain internal contradiction. Behaviourism studies behavioural components and offers a system of operant conditioning, whereby certain behaviours are instilled in a person through positive and negative stimuli. Cognitive science, on the other hand, seeks to study brain structures and their role in shaping subjective experience that overcomes the naturalistic setting of behaviourism. Indeed, both disciplines are effective in studying human beings to reveal important insights despite their distinctive approaches. For our study, it is important to note that behaviourism highlights the

significance of repetition in reinforcing positive habits or eliminating negative ones. According to this theory, a conditioned reflex causes a habit that becomes part of experience, as demonstrated in Pavlov's famous experiment. The body's inherent susceptibility to habit proves the existence of mental repetition in both the symbolic and the corporeal. Behaviourism relies on incentives and penalties, ignoring the symbolic logic demonstrated by Lacan, particularly the concept of the *objet petit a*, which transcends any deterministic view. By demanding the pursuit of the unattainable, the *objet petit a* outlines a perspective that follows the pathological logic of negating law.

Such a manifestation of reason in the social field contradicts the aforementioned method of 'carrots and sticks', since, according to this logic, the law could have been enforced much more effectively. However, we should also recognise the fundamental nature of these studies. In Watson's case study of Little Albert, for example, we can see how an 11-month-old child was artificially made afraid of a white rat, whose appearance was associated with noise. Finally, we agree after these statements the presence of repetition in the body-psychic plateau (Davey, 2019). However, cognitive science has sought to redress the balance in self-reflection by reviving interest in the integral internal experience and by returning to the study of the foundations of phenomenal experience, which behaviourism had dismissed. This has also given impetus to the search for new discoveries in the field of consciousness, particularly with regard to its architecture. Perhaps Solms' quest was partly based on a similar expansion to his mixed research, but in fact it was to add the scientific basis of neuroscience to psychoanalysis. Although his theory and science still have to face the challenge of numerous verifications in the future, we will turn to them to reveal important aspects that will help to clarify the bodily preconditions of conscious experience from a philosophical perspective.

§4.1 Atypical Consciousness and the Body

In this chapter we will thematically consider some crucial features of embodiment as essential aspects of experiencing through which we will elaborate on consciousness. The philosophy of the embodiment is a branch that explores the nature, meaning and relationship of the body to the self as consciousness. Merleau-Ponty defined it:

I am conscious of my body through the world, and if my body is the unperceived term at the centre of the world to which every object turns its face, then for the same reason my body is the pivot of the world (Merleau-Ponty, 2012: 84).

Interpretations of the body encompass different perspectives and themes, ranging from metaphysical considerations of the body's natural existence and purpose to rigorous and precise scientific investigations. Recently, especially along the course of embodied cognition the perspective of the subject has changed. It is claimed that the mind is inherently embodied and thought is largely unconscious. Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical. In a sense, they make the body irreducible regarding cognition, it defines dependence:

Many features of cognition are deeply dependent on features of an agent's physical body, such that the agent's beyond-the-brain body plays a significant causal or physically constitutive role in the agent's cognitive processing (Wilson and Foglia, 2021).

Thus, the deep connection between body, emotion and thought has been recognised. Although emotions are not always present in acts of consciousness, they constitute the process of cognition itself. Thus, showing us contemporary thought constantly trying to construct a specific picture of consciousness in which dependencies between the functions of brain regions and constitutive aspects of conscious experience are to be found (Farina, 2021). The theory of embodied cognition that arose in the neurophenomenology of Fransisco Varela (Varela, Thompson, Rosch, 2017). It tries to define cognition by corporeality and to identify the main perspectives of the constitution of phenomenal experience: reciprocal integration of neural systems into emerging perceptual awareness. It unites all levels of perception in dependance with environment, fulfilling the explanatory gap between *perception consciousness* and *subjective experience* within present conscious accomplishment along with reality (Lanfranco et al., 2023). The physical qualities establish connections between things, such as the position of the eyes and their binocular vision, or hearing such as taste or smell. For example, sound underwater will be different from sound outside. Therefore, the influence of both by the perceptive environment is a crucial factor.

This approach provides an interesting perspective on how cognition can occur in the body and brain in particular. However, this approach also needs to address the experience of consciousness and, in particular, the historicity of the subject. The same can be said of neuropsychanalysis: as an empirical science, how can it be expected to provide explanations beyond what is possible? After all, the task of describing complex psychoanalytic phenomena in the optics of the brain energy flow, as well as impact of the impairments tends to multiple

methodological sophisticated considerations. Affective theory, discussed in chapter two, is an example of such thinking. It gives a picture of the affective on consciousness. Since it had so much work involved in these attempts to reconcile psychoanalytic theory and neuroscience it seemed to have more to say than just on the brain functions.

Solms suggests that repression, a defence mechanism defined by Freud, may be linked to specific brain mechanisms. Repression involves the unconscious exclusion of distressing thoughts, memories or impulses from conscious awareness, and he proposes that this process is mediated by brain systems involved in emotion regulation, memory and conscious awareness, in particular the limbic system, in particular, the amygdala, and the prefrontal cortex. Solms argues that repression may involve the amygdala interacting with higher cortical areas, such as the prefrontal cortex, to suppress or inhibit the conscious retrieval of emotionally charged memories (Solms, 2013). He suggests that the prefrontal cortex may actively inhibit the retrieval of certain memories or impulses to protect the individual from psychological distress, consistent with the concept of repression. Repression, in this view, is a dynamic process in which unconscious mechanisms prevent certain content from reaching consciousness.

Although, at first sight, this approach does not allow for a deep study of consciousness in the phenomenological sense. This thinking is based on different intentions, a distinctive approach that was initially criticized by Husserl, as it is built on naturalistic generalisations. Nevertheless, such a consideration would be important for our study, because it adds exciting developments in ideas to the picture of consciousness genesis. When philosophers discuss corporeality, they consider it primarily in terms of existence. Embodied cognition pursues an epistemological orientation of thought, so it is not surprising that its objectives are different. The human body is an unsurpassed wonder of nature.

For this study, the investigations of the above approaches would be partially relevant, because no matter how they study, they rarely misconnect the experience of consciousness with what is learned. For example, in the sleep study, the activation of the REM stage of sleep pointed to the physical process of rapid eye movement as the equivalent of dreaming. Here is the interest in sleep as an experience of embodiment, but not in dreams. Moreover, such disciplines generally avoid considering aspects studied under the name of the unconscious content as non-accessible. For this purpose, we will mainly use neuroscientific ideas that might focus on the connections between the experience of consciousness in regard to the atypical consciousness. For example, Jan Panksepp's *Affective Science* and Solms' work on

neuropsychanalysis are sources of interesting thought and data that change the perception of consciousness logic. Again, as mentioned earlier, this study is interested in the direct experience of consciousness as a connection with the unconscious in the subjective expression. To do so, we should then keep in mind some hybrid considerations, so the focus of the research is shifted as related to the main methodology. As in the case described by Jung, various synchronicities connect mind, body, and world. Definition of his synchronicity could be applied also for the embodiment:

Synchronicity takes the coincidence of events in space and time to mean something more than mere chance, namely a peculiar interdependence of objective events among themselves and with the subjective states of the observer(s) (Jung, 1997: 25).

In a sense, body and mind already correspond to the principles similar to the wave-corpuscular dualism. While you consider the body, consciousness is indefinable, as such vice versa. Thus, cognitive science generalises certain patterns as thinking aspects of brain activity and creates a naturalised epistemology of the human mind. Such epistemologies are interesting to think about, as they represent contemporary attempts to reformulate transcendental patterns of consciousness in terms of embodiment. They inevitably face troubles with a deeper study of the nature and quality of consciousness, by building more complex theories of corporeality in an attempt to push consciousness into the Procrustean bed of their science. For philosophy, as criticised by Husserl, such a naturalisation of consciousness would not meet its criteria of apodicticity and *a priori*, pointing to single contingent fluctuations inherent in the brain matter. However, its importance for understanding the aspects of embodiment and how consciousness manifests through the body could not be diminished, therefore must be considered. Which we will use in a slightly different way for the research.

First of all, corporeality has been a categorically shifted concept since the time of the mind-body dualism proposed by Descartes. At that time, the body and the mind were separated as distinct substances interacting in an undisclosed synchrony. More materialistic thinkers argued that consciousness was just a material substance, while others sought evidence for its distinctive *ideal* nature. Thus, in contrast to dualism, materialism and physicalism argue that the mind is not a separate substance but a product of physical processes in the body, particularly the brain. No matter yet, how far philosophers explored how consciousness and subjective experience arise from physical phenomena, they eventually stuck in the hard problem of consciousness.

On the one hand, it is obvious that the brain determines consciousness. However, as noted above, it is hardly necessary to reduce consciousness to a unique sum of perceptions. After all, to say that without the body there would be no perceptions is the same as saying that without the sun there would be no light, so such a deontology of consciousness seems useless. One may wonder why this philosophy is so surprised by the place of the embodiment as a modulation of experience, as if it wanted to say something fundamentally new, not much different in principle from the English empiricists of the 17th century. The integration of the body with cognition set the tone for methodology then. Indeed, the experience of embodiment is enough to recall Berkeley's doctrine of vision. The body, like the eye, is an integral part of the experience. Concerns about the *nature* of consciousness, thus, are crucially legitimate for philosophy.

This study evaluates them as a contribution to theories of perception by discovering specific data that strengthen thinking from empirical knowledge. But how can we place consciousness and lived experience in this knowledge if we limit ourselves to specific inductive methods? Psychoanalysis, in particular, has been based on empirical data as essential, however it presents an alternative vision of inner subjectivity. The givenness of consciousness is a broader problem; it includes perception as well as reasoning and imagination. Moreover, the intellectual character of the facts of consciousness loses its significance for philosophical thought after excessive attention to bodily implementation.

Phenomenology seeks to describe the foundations of experience, but in no way considers cases of inadequate or abnormal experience. Practice shows, however, that most of these are not possible either. Therefore, any attempt to interpret the consciousness of the other is only partially possible. In this respect, some of the considerations presented here are made in spite of the methodological limitation, since the registers of analysis are only accessible through language. In schizophrenia, for example, the orders of the symbolic are separated from the orders of the imaginary, so the psyche begins to constitute incongruent parallel reality. Nevertheless, it ceases just to be seen in its own symbolic hermeneutic singularity of interpretation, stuck in a pre-closure, dependent on renewed interpretation it strives to transcend it back to reality, what might be tracked in conversation. The subject begins to exist without smoothly coinciding with the world and, finally, remains within its specific image. The schizophrenic disruption in the brain represents itself in language, so we could assume that it preserves the trace of dissolution as part of the abnormal world picture, therefore to false perceptive and subjective synthesis. To understand the role of the body in thinking, we

could use the metaphor of "automatons" - since the body acts at most autonomously the description of man as a machine (La Mettrie, 1996), a set of possibly predictive functions and actions that follow the passive synthesis. So let us keep all the considerations together.

Recalling Damasio's approach of thinking about the mind as also a hybrid form of affect and logic. He proves mind and body, reason and emotion, as aspects of a single being (Damasio, 2005). He goes so far as to intertwine corporeality with the structure of the world, and his argument confirms the deep embodied determinacy in synthesis of acts of existence. In this case, the mind cannot exist without emotions, it has no power, energy or influence. In the same regard, the more complex psychoanalytically updated idea of affective regulation for cognition aims to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the mind. To do so, Solms uses Panksepp's ideas to draw a bigger picture of what kind of interaction affective memory systems as well as its multi facial modulation of natural drive in experience.

What is most interesting about neuropsychanalytic study is that Solms decided to repeat a hybridized perspective and to see generic acts by comparing injured brain regions with areas of the psyche in order to find imposed psychic patterns in physiology. Although this idea might be met with a dubious smile, he has managed to elicit fragments of conscious experience from clinical trials by interviewing patients after brain surgery. To follow this we will then consider some of the clinical cases.

The first exciting example is the case of Dr. Z., a neuroscientist who experienced a rare condition called *Capgras delusion* following a head injury. He began to believe that an impostor had replaced his wife. Although he recognised her, he could not feel an emotional connection to this person. Solms explains that the Capgras delusion results from a disconnect between the brain's facial recognition system and the emotional centres, particularly the amygdala. Dr. Z.'s case showed that visual recognition was fine, but the emotional response that typically accompanies such recognition was missing. Solms wrote: "Dr. Z. could see his wife and know it was her, but she seemed like a stranger without an emotional response", to illustrate how consciousness integrates sensory input and emotional meaning and how it might be disintegrated forming pathological experience. This leads to the following conclusion: "Our conscious experience of the world is not just about recognising objects and people, but about feeling their meaning to us" (Solms, 2021: 86). Patient knew that the person in front of him was his wife, but his emotional mind could not accept this, resulting in alienation. Such a psychopathological disorder can indeed occur as a result of such injuries. The psychosis that seems to manifest itself in the usual way and gets a new aspect of

understanding. Neuropsychologists would say that in this case we see the crucial role of emotions for a fulfilled experience and need of bundle thought-emotion. From a Lacanian point of view, however, we see a solid example of psychic disorder that can indeed occur as a result of a break between imaginary and symbolic. However, here we can see that the function of rejection is preserved, as is the specific significance of the spouse disarranged by false perception. The psychosis, however, under different explanations.

Another case represents Mr. V., who suffered a brain aneurysm at the age of 13 which required surgery. In such cases, as is often, the blood damaged and poisoned other parts of the brain during the operation. This led to an infection, which required more surgeries, and so on, until the prefrontal cortex was completely destroyed. This led to the cognitive impairment that Solms found in interview:

- *Are you aware of what is happening?*

- *Yes, of course I am.*

- *To confirm this, I am going to ask you a question that will force you to visualise the picture in your mind and consciously solve the problem.*

- *OK.*

- *Imagine that you have two dogs and a chicken.*

- *OK.*

- *Are you sure you can visualise that?*

- *Yes, I can.*

- *How many legs do they have in total?*

- *Eight.*

- *Eight?*

- *Yes, the dogs have eaten the chicken (Solms, 2021: 73-74).*

Despite the injury, the patient was preserved of basic cognitive functions. However, we see that this person's logic is peculiar. This is probably due to the fact that the frontal lobes could no longer provide logical thinking. And so this subject was forced to indulge in a game of fantasy. However, we consider emotions and images as alternative channels of logical consequence. He still managed to feed the chickens to the dogs and give a less correct picture for solution. That was not a joke, but an indicator of a disintegrated psychic mechanism.

Next, we consider the case of Mr. T., who suffered anosognosia due to hemiplegia after a stroke. This left him paralysed on one side. He denied any fact of his paralysis, each time coming up with more excuses, such as: "this part is tired", "I just don't want to move it". So we see that unconscious, unwilling and rejecting the heavy information, puts itself in a bubble of interpretation. In this bubble, it feels comfortable, and the traumatic experience follows a parabolic trajectory. In the Lacanian view we see an ordinary case of symbolic reinstruction of the traumatic event into the imaginary. So we obviously understand what the importance of confabulation for maintenance of the self looks like.

Solms explains how anosognosia involves a failure of self-awareness and self-monitoring. Mr. T.'s denial of his paralysis illustrates the brain's ability to create false narratives to constitute the self: "Anosognosia shows that consciousness is not only about perceiving the external world, but also about having an accurate sense of one's own body and abilities" (Solms, 2021: 44). Thus, we see the possibility of the mind comfortably accommodating the subject in a more optimistic Natural Attitude, an iconic example that seeks to remake the fact of inaccess to the body as a more preferable understanding.

Something different happened to Mr. G. After his injuries, he began to show impulsive and antisocial behavior: "Mr. G's personality change highlights the importance of the frontal lobes in controlling impulses and making reasoned decisions. Without this control, behavior becomes erratic and socially disruptive" (Solms, 2021: 75). This case highlights the importance in self-regulation of the frontal lobes: "... are essential for integrating emotional and rational aspects of consciousness, allowing us to act in socially appropriate ways" (ibid). By being destroyed they imposed a discrepancy in the neural network that we assume took out the patient of symbolic order that made impossible the adequate behaviour. Mr. G's became more and more increasingly impulsive and inappropriate, yet he was unaware of these changes, demonstrating a lack of insight into his condition.

The case of Mr. P. told us that he was a patient who suffered from a condition known as akinetic mutism following damage to his anterior cingulate cortex. This condition left him awake and responsive to basic stimuli, but unable to initiate voluntary movements or speech. Despite his apparent wakefulness, this man was completely absent and at the same time unable to maintain everyday coexistence with others, as being out of the symbolic. His consciousness could not manifest itself because of the damage, indicating the disappearance of both the reasonable perception and intersubjective consciousness from the patient's experienced horizon. He had neither interest nor desire, he was simply a pure presence. This

example supports the broader argument that consciousness is deeply intertwined with the motivational and emotional systems of the brain: "Consciousness is not just about being awake; it is about the capacity to feel and the subsequent drive to act on those feelings" (Solms, 2021: 327). Mr. P.'s case demonstrates that being awake alone, without integrating feeling and communication, does constitute partial consciousness. The essence of consciousness is based on active perception and participation of the symbolic, but as we can see in this case, unfortunately, it is futile.

Finally, let us recall the case of Mr. S. mentioned in the introduction to this paper. This patient suffered from Korsakoff's syndrome as a result of memory loss following brain surgery. An anecdotal narrative is that he does not realise that he is in London, he confidently and competently says to the doctor: "If you eat pizza, it does not mean you are in Italy". An interesting example of how a person, despite having no memory access, manages to modulate states of consciousness that can still accommodate him in everyday life. In another event, when the same patient met the doctor, he automatically touched the medical scar on his forehead. While touching it, he said that "he was missing a memory cassette". Strangely, his mind was trying to express metaphorically that something was wrong with him as he couldn't remember that in kindred image. If this was considered as the structure of the metaphor, we can assume that in this case we are dealing with the mind trying to somehow fit lost perception into a consistent justified series. In this case, confabulation could be seen as not a pathological phenomenon but a compensatory one. Under normal conditions, consciousness maintains itself. However, in extreme self-manifestation, this consciousness shapes itself in a certain way. That is, the pattern of consciousness that emerges for the sake of balanced integration. As a result of the possibility of compensating for the pathological decomposition, the body uses all implicit and passive systems to continue living. This suggests that despite the fragility and transience of subjectivity, structures of consciousness firmly maintain balanced rootedness in the world as far as that is possible.

In his study Solms has explored the numerous neural underpinnings for psychoanalytic concepts such as the role of the brain in dreaming, unconscious, Id, the neural mechanisms underlying motivation and emotion, etc. His work emphasised the connection between subcortical structures, such as the limbic system, and higher cognitive functions, their reciprocal activation. Interestingly, the brain stem, particularly the region known as the *mesodiencephalic tegmentum*, plays a crucial role in the generation of dreams (Solms & Turnbull, 2018). Of course, the general scope of how dreams are formed would still hardly be

accessible to science. Nevertheless, understanding the neurobiological basis of motivation contributes to a more integrated view of the mind, it should have excellent implications. Although neuropsychanalysis is a young discipline, it may in the future provide useful insights. In such a case, it is necessary to forget the methodological quarrels and to explore consciousness by different methods in order to form a more comprehensive case of understanding the human mind.

Thinking of consciousness as its embodiment inverts and reverses phenomenology's demand for the adequacy of the subject's experience. However, this is true in severe cases of brain damage. The unconscious and its inherent logic can still be considered phenomenologically, but on the borderline between phenomenological and psychoanalytic thinking. Thinking that sees consciousness as an integrative function of various parts of the brain can indeed provide perfect intuitions of pathologies, but such a study cannot fully reach the depths of subjective experience and leaves us face to face with a modified perceptual consciousness. This integration was also intended to enhance the efficacy and relevance of psychoanalysis in the context of contemporary neuroscience. Rather than viewing the mind as separate, it seeks to understand how the structures and functions of the brain give rise to mental processes and subjective experiences.

§4.2 The Chiasm and the Lack

Maurice Merleau-Ponty's idea of the "chiasm" is interesting for the philosophical elaboration on the embodied experience. The term "chiasm" refers to an intersection or intertwining, and in this context it denotes the fundamental intertwining of the body and the world (Merleau-Ponty, 1968). He rejected the traditional Cartesian separation of mind and body. Instead, he insisted that perception is not a one-sided act in which a detached mind perceives an external world. Therefore, perception is a reciprocal and dynamic entanglement of the perceiving body and the perceived world. The body is not a neutral instrument, but an integral part of the perceptual process. The body is not just in the world. It is of the world and it is through it that the body that we perceive and make sense of our surroundings. It is a chiasm involving the entanglement of the senses.

Merleau-Ponty argued that our senses are not isolated channels of information, but are interconnected and work together to provide a holistic and meaningful experience of the world. The same thought arrangement as in contemporary enactivist thinking, the update of

cognitive science by embodied cognition (Newen et al., 2018). Perception is unfolded as a synaesthetic experience in which different sensory modalities blend and interact with the environment. The chiasmatic entanglement is pre-reflective and pre-conscious. This means that before we consciously reflect on our perceptions, there is a more immediate and lived experience as the intertwining of the body and the world. It happens at a level that precedes reflective thought.

Merleau-Ponty's chiasm has ontological significance. Since our being in the world is always intertwined with our perception and physical engagement with the environment. Merleau-Ponty's concept challenges traditional dualistic views, highlighting the embodied and lived nature of our perceptual experiences. He wants to resolve the old problem of *res cogitans* and *res extensa* using a *chiasmic* structure.




Figure 11: Chiasm

This diagram represents the chiasmatic link. The original meaning of the chiasmatic connection is to consider something as "cross-meaning". For example, consider the connection between the brain and the body. The left hemisphere controls the right and vice versa. The idea is to show that all dimensions are intertwined. So the mind is connected to the world through the body. The world, in turn, is mediated by the body and is connected to the mind. Indeed, it becomes its inseparable element. The body is permeated by nodes of language and implicit memory.

Examples of such memories are the famous episodes of Proust's Madeleine Biscuit or his Fall at Combray. In the first case, the Madeleine cake evoked deep memories for Proust because of its taste and context. It took him back to the time of his youth and brought memories of visiting his aunt (Proust, 2013). In the second case, the novel's hero accidentally recalls a similar fall in Venice after tripping in Combray. In the end, this is no different from Swann's case. Here we have Proust's attempt to show how the mind remembers the world through the body and, on the other hand, how the world disperses the personal semantic biography of each individual and links the individual to arbitrary objects of the outside world. Likewise, Merleau-Ponty emphasises the difference between the visible and the invisible as a

deep connection between the body and the world. The visible results from everything that is mixed into an experience. This literary example could serve as an excellent model for what embodied cognition does. It thinks about how levels of corporeality and rationality legitimised in the world. Merleau-Ponty consistently repeats his reflections to make explicit his intuition of the multilayered nature of perception (Merleau-Ponty, 2000). The body is both phenomenal and objective and it gains the reality in both ideatic and muscular action. The body is not matter, spirit or substance - it is flesh, a first element, unique in its nature and being. It seems that Descartes' attempted to introduce the concept of the "corpus" or the human body, but did not elaborate it sufficiently as flesh (Descartes, 1984). Congenially, Merleau-Ponty took up this task, made in line with the phenomenological arguments on perception.

There is also assumed connection with others with whom we are woven into the world; here, chiasm appears as an intersubjective desire. For Merleau-Ponty, there is no banal flesh in philosophy, it is an irreducible unity of being. For him, Marcel Proust, Charles Swan and the short sentence of Ventail are examples of complex structures of being - the image of love as the symbol of the resulting suffering in the most unexpected places (Merleau-Ponty, 2012). The human being is woven into reality, where some parts of it live their own life that might be opened only to *intuitus mentis*, with language as a sign of the other and of infinite dialogue, as the place of existence, the house of being.

Finally, we could assume that this chiasm appear at the level of embodiment; the stream of consciousness should be understood as the result of the flow of blood through the brain, providing fuel for the electrochemical formation of the sequence of flashes in neurons that appear in some sense as phenomenal or conscious experience. The bilateral synchronicity of flow of consciousness and flow of oxidised blood. At this point, we would assume a certain lack of brain matter would affect a certain form of disorganisation of non-stoppable conscious experience. As we could see, a lack or dysfunction in the body leaves a person with no chance of full coexistence and presence.

Lacan's *lack* is seen as part of the larger picture, *unattainable* in the structure of the symbolic. However, if we can transfer it to the human level, a lack will also mean a change in organising structure. Disruptors in the structure of subjective represent inconsistency of chiasmatic connection. The strive for balance becomes physical *unattainable*. A symbolic deficiency is typical, but a physical deficiency is not. Therefore, mentioned disorders of the mind can be seen as cases and impossible to generalise in any way, each person is different.

However, as that is still present as a phenomenal experience, this alternative consciousness would remain to preserve the monadic subjective trend in a slightly different modulation. So some explanations would be possible in a phenomenological sense. It depends on what shadow factors are involved in each case. This otherness of the other at the same time could be confronted and never be reached totally because of the limits of Symbolic, to be an existential expression, a way of revealing and articulating the Being-in-the-World.

There will always be a gap in the relationship between physicality and consciousness. Building a bridge between them will be challenging. This complicates the study of the body and creates different methodologies for the study of consciousness. Differences lead one to move in different directions. After all, as has been shown, the determination of the world and its meanings occurs only in the quality of corporeality. Therefore, the body as a constitution of consciousness serves as an excellent philosophical concept. Corporeality, *res extensa*, expresses the comprehensiveness and totality of human experience, consisting of the ideas or *res cogitans*, represented in complicated unity of intersubjective. Therefore, when considering any pattern of consciousness or thought, it is necessary to meet it with corporeality.

Chapter V. The Conscious Multiverse and the Ultimate Self-Reflection

*E Bēatrice: "Forse maggior cura,
che spesse volte la memoria priva,
fatt' ha la mente sua ne li occhi oscura.
Ma vedi Eūnoè che là diriva:
menalo ad esso, e come tu se' usa,
la tramortita sua virtù ravviva"¹*

The original intention of this chapter was to review the initial conditions for the constitution of experience, to consider views of the stages of individual formation, and at the same time to discuss the stages of self-consciousness and concepts of self-knowledge that emerge in phenomenological philosophy and psychoanalysis. For example, Lacan's theory of the mirror stage, John Bowlby's theory of attachment, Melanie Klein's insights on ethics and many others provide us with numerous concepts and theories that ultimately point to the certain dependence or rupture for consciousness in experience. Both disciplines ultimately point to two poles: the dependence of consciousness on singular acts of experience and those embodied in different instantiations such as the unconscious, the language, the body, a family, politics, etc.

However, another critical consideration arises: why question and discuss different concepts if a more general question does not simply summarise them? What is the fate of human consciousness in the midst of all these definitions, what is the goal of passing through all these stages of development? In order to answer this question, this research proposes a thought experiment to answer the following argument: Who would be the "last" philosopher to be able to master life in its immediacy and in such a way that the above-mentioned moments of the subject's state of dependency and rupture are not rejected, but at the same time implicated in such a thought? What kind of conscious pattern might one gain by adapting hybrid methods for self-reflection? The question of this chapter will therefore be what philosophy, in the sense of phenomenology and psychoanalysis, should bring to life, so that in the end this life can become what it is. What if the opposite is true? If they bring nothing to the end and thus limit the inherent philosophical thinking.

European culture has established a standard for understanding the self by placing its thinking within the framework of the Cartesian-Newtonian tradition. It encompasses a wide

¹ And Beatrice: Perhaps a greater care, Which oftentimes our memory takes away, Has made the vision of his mind obscure. But Eunoe behold, that yonder rises; Lead him to it, and, as thou art accustomed, Revive again the half-dead virtue in him. (Dante, 1984)

range of different philosophical, scientific and intellectual traditions. Consciousness appeared here at the centre of the coordinates. However, as we considered in the third chapter, in a situation of omnipresence on the Big Other, the possibility of developing philosophical anthropology was limited by the boundaries of monadic discourse. Which reveal the peculiarities of the constitution of the mind in such a way that the threat to the discourse of universalism would be replaced by a broader study of subjectivity.

What is the fate of human consciousness in the midst of all these definitions if we do not try to make the argument? Why develop theories of development, especially those that focus on deconstructing the subjective, instead of asking what the ultimate goal of this development should be? By doing so, we change the optics of the study to ask what all these phenomenological and psychoanalytic patterns of consciousness, especially those that present subjectivity as a specific entity, an ideational structure in a specific relation, will tell us. The situation in which the subject finds himself at a time when his life as continuous being is dismembered for notions. The differences between society and nature primarily determine his experience. A perspective that requires effort and contradicts the simple principle of energy conservation. If we continue with the logic of developmental theories, the question arises as to why someone would undergo psychoanalysis and delve into subjectivity, as opposed to simply living. Where will this dynamic lead in defining the nature of human existence? Will this approach really help to master life in its immediacy?

In this way, under the conditions mentioned above, the subject's state of rupture is the very destiny of man. The difference derives between the natural and the symbolic. What if improvements are not rejected but at the same time implicated in such a thought? Therefore, the question of this chapter is repeated: what should philosophy, in the sense of phenomenology and psychoanalysis, bring to life so that it is finally seen for what it is? If they are inadequate, they may end and limit the philosophical thinking inherent in them. What should psychoanalysis advance, and what must appear after this "advance"?

§5.1 The Multiplicity of Conscious Experience

When thinking about the mind, the focus is usually on logic, cognition or consciousness. When we talk about development, however, the focus is on different kinds of intersubjective experience and their influence on the formation of consciousness and thus a specific intentionality. This can serve as another way of looking at patterns of consciousness.

John Bowlby's theory of attachment provides a particular case of how early relationships constitute pre-set modes. In this case we are faced with a situation where a double scale of trust is presented to determine the level of attachment to the world: trust in oneself and trust in another (initial caregiver). If a person answers both questions in the affirmative, then they have a secure attachment to the world - a securely attached child constitutes an internal working model. Having a responsive, loving, reliable caregiver will bring these settings to bear on all other relationships (Pietromonaco and Barrett, 2000). This then also creates a maladaptive pattern of behaviour. There are four patterns of attachment and only one is well adapted. These attachment patterns create a unique and personal working model. This would eventually form a relationship with others if they were considered to have a healthy attachment. A securely attached child can explore, play and develop other relationships. In other cases they will make destructive attachments to the world and to themselves. This attachment goes very deep into the psyche. So the pattern of consciousness that includes attachment is the key to intersubjective experience. Then, whether an attachment pattern is inherited or not, it stays for a long time. It has already become part of the constitution of the body. From what we can assume, it creates a pattern of pre-interpretation of others. Thus, a natural attitude towards opposing subjectivities could be defined as a premise for psychic intersubjective interpretation and a kind of the passive synthesis for transference. We have already discussed the influence of transference via the symbolic equations of passive synthesis and proposed a model for transferential interpretation. In this case we could also assume that Bowlby's theory is more about mutual recognition than about repression and complexity. He believed that the need for attachment was a primary and evolutionary drive, not just a means of satisfying libidinal desires. On the other hand, it is a kind of Oedipal complex because it shows the dynamics between the child and the mother (caregiver). So it shows how complex it is to appear in the initial scene. Bowlby wrote: "What cannot be communicated to the mother cannot be communicated to the self" (Ainsworth and Bowlby, 1991). This nature of the complex suggests that both interpretations are possible. Although the coincidence with the Oedipus complex. Bowlby's describes it at the level of intersubjectivity. In this case, the function of the passive synthesis will already appear from two sides: symbolic and intersubjective. On the one hand, it will correspond to the levels of interpretation and, on the other, to the perspectives transference.

Melanie Klein's approach is similar to Bowlby's in considering intersubjective connections. For Klein, these links form two patterns of behaviour. A mother who does not

provide enough care creates a primal bad image and vice versa. As with the negative transference in the breast example. These primary relationships also form the first value system and lay the foundations of the personality. These coordinates ultimately lead a person to the trajectory of choosing between two possible positions: the paranoid-schizoid and the depressive positions. The first is the initial split; children see the objects as the shadows of two opposing values, partial representation of the objects. These forces see the world as black or white, an ethical natural setting. The second position is accepting that there is one object that possesses qualities, and that good and evil are part of the same whole. Klein writes: 'The interplay between love and hate, and the process of integrating these feelings, is central to human development' (Klein, 2018: 311). Here we already see the theory of development - a depressive position. As well as these relationships are to come, they also bring with them the same structure.

So psychoanalytic thinking is a standard way of staying between intersubjectivity and values. Donald Winnicott worked with the idea of true and false selves; he, like Klein, distinguishes between two positions: the authentic self and the false self. One develops as authenticity, the other as a defence mechanism. This is reminiscent of Heidegger's philosophy, but adapted to psychology (Winnicott, 2018: 140). He also emphasises the transitional object, which is the object that installs an immediate secure connection with the world. It could be a toy or some other substitute object. Its purpose is to prepare the child for authentic communication and re-intersubjectivation.

Wilfred Bion's work is also interesting. Among his ideas, we should highlight the theory of alpha and beta elements (Bion, 2018). This is an interesting way of interpreting intentionality. According to this theory, the experience of the psyche goes through several stages. In the beta-element stage, the pure physical data of perception are present, just as in Husserl's objectifying function of intentionality. As a result of the so-called alpha function, these beta elements later appear as alpha elements or elements of complete perception, such as concepts or ideas. To what constitutive function of intentionality would it correspond to. It is interesting to see how the observations of people from two disciplines coincide. Especially when their methods of observation are different. So if the conclusions are the same, then both methods are correct, or this correctness is a consequence of the congruence of the experience of consciousness and therefore coincides. Popular psychoanalytic ideas are repeated in one place or another. Developmental theories unfold their investigation in the context of the Oedipus complex and intersubjectivity. And the idea of the true and false self is recalled in

the discourse of the Principle of Reality. This is the primary process, a paraphrase of Bion's theory, corresponding to the unconscious processes of the rudimentary states of consciousness.

It corresponds to the pleasure principle. The primary process is concerned with satisfying instinctual urges and desires. The secondary process represents the more mature, conscious, logical, reality oriented, planning and problem solving thinking. It operates according to the reality principle. Different theories form different concepts to explain human development. Despite the variety of theories and approaches, they reflect the general tropes of psychoanalytic thought: intersubjectivity, the symbolic and the reality principle. In the case of personality disorders, they represent a poorly attuned set of values and attitudes for assimilation into the world. They are also the result of a particular unconscious pathological synthesis.

The psychoanalytic method is based on respect for the subject and allowing possible experiences to happen. Each one should be itself. This means that analysis takes into account the individuality and uniqueness of each subject. The definition of the self is problematic in analysis, for how can the autonomous dynamic function of cognition become the normative self? In this case, the ego emerges as a fundamental denial, implicit freedom of diversity. The fundamental split of the human subject occurs at the so-called mirror stage. The child gains its disintegrality as an impression in the mirror, a fundamental gap is balanced with fantasy. The rupture of the ego through contradictory phenomenal superimpositions, such as when one desire is fulfilled and followed by guilt. It is as if this creates perpendicular vibrations in the fabric of consciousness, creating ruptures at their intersections. Could we not compare consciousness to ripples that form on water: on the one hand we have a picture of the world, on the other the connections defined in it are a kind of wave.

It is interesting to pay importance to the structure of personality as a single fact. After all, it is the first natural fact of the world. It is also unique as a reflection of the other. There is only one constituent, the world of life. Phenomenologically, we can always agree, to a certain extent, that such properties of consciousness as intentional, ideational, other intellectual acts and interpretations of discourse should be inherent in everyone. Witnessing atypical acts of consciousness or rare psychotic episodes, which occur from time to time, only indicates that mental strangeness is more common and familiar than unfamiliar to everyone without exception. Conscious diversity transcends imagination and constitutes the infinite possibility of being the other.

§5.2 Ultima Personae Philosophiae

A phenomenologist must have the courage to take everything seen in a phenomenon exactly as it is, in order to describe and reinterpret it. Therefore this research is concerned with the possibility of interpreting consciousness in terms of personal development. This section discusses the hypothetical image, the "thought experiment" of a conscious pattern, an "ultimate" philosopher, and the overall idea of what this certain self-knowledge should become, as we consider consciousness in the double perspective represented by phenomenology and psychoanalysis.

In order to consider such subjectivity, we should start from the postulate of its inherent freedom. However, such an action could be taken in order to preserve the inconsistency of thought. In fact, by postulating non-freedom, any freedom becomes impossible, and this leads to contradiction. Therefore, it would be disappointing to consider a particular way of thinking as dehumanising, such as deterministic or structuralist thought. Postulating the existence of transcendental freedom, existentialism will interpret trauma as something that has to happen, as a givenness or a contingency of "abandonment". It will not give it the attention it deserves. We can make a similar attempt through psychoanalysis. To do this, we reinterpret Dasein as Schattendasein, the state of post-questioning and analysis. Schattendasein is also realised in the framework of authenticity. In this case, however, the subject that questions the meaning of its being now encounters the Big Other and inner passivity. Nevertheless, through its double, its little other, the demand for authenticity moves to a new stage - the goal of meta-authenticity. An additional argument for this category having a special place is *jouissance* itself. This is because the perspective of Dasein is incapable of revealing *jouissance*. After all, it does not include psychoanalytic thinking. Its own method may struggle to the end to prove itself right, but the question of individual rightness does not mean its objective reality. To take this step, we will again use the ontological categorisation of human existence presented earlier:

Hegel	the Universal	the Individual	the Particular
Heidegger	Das Man	Dasein	Schattendasein
Lacan	Symbolic *S	Analysand	Passent

Figure S: Schattendasein

As mentioned in this interpretation, the particularity of Dasein, as alternative to Das Man, is perfection and concentration on the choice in favour of oneself, on the clarification of one's existence. The authentic choice is to turn away from the collective world, from Them. However, this situation, associated with courage and denial, gives the impression of an initial stage, where the subject finally expresses his desire to become an analyzand. However, later on, after going through the stages of analysis and gradually getting to know his specific individualisation and uniqueness, the subject ends the analysis and assigns his own symptoms.

Metaphorically we can say that the subject illuminates his own shadow of being an individual and the shadow of his trauma. This shadow is symbolised and interpreted. In this way, at the end of the analysis, they can distinguish between power identifications, fictions and other structures that impose guilt, duty and responsibility. These structures also guarantee adaptability to reality and, ultimately, a state of radical alienation. When one considers the Big Other as one of the alternatives, any obligation or any social requirement falls away, as does any other necessity. Because at that moment there is an encounter with the absolute nothing within subjectivity. The prevailing frustration is a kind of emptiness that haunts the subject after the realisation of the cause of a particular desire and often makes it repeat itself. It forces the state of consciousness that throws the subject to the edge of the conceivable and the inevitable. The indefiniteness of the future brings him to the edge of existence, challenging him as the master of being. A kind of *for-future-being*, being before the future, where time is not an environmental factor but existence itself. Heidegger understood time not as something that happens in the world, but as the thing to be constituted, together with man as meaning. The Constitution is the truth of the subject.

The discussed problem is to identify the true self, as in Plato's dialogue on the Sophist. Who should this philosopher be? Cartesian certainty is rejected, so what is the next step? Although Heidegger criticises Descartes for doubling the world, he remains similar to Descartes himself. He still wants to be capable of radical clarification. Therefore, he is not radically different in thought, but a modified version of him, and the one that is necessary for the ultimate figure definition. The ultimate philosopher must therefore be someone who is in the position of the passent, that is, someone who has come to know his own trauma and the sinthome. This consciousness we are looking at would have to be in a final state of analysis, a state of familiarity with the structures of its passive synthesis, the structures of culture, etc.,

which imposes on it the duties of being.

In this situation, the subject is uncertain. However, this was initially defined as an implicit figure of thought in existentialism. As a result, existentialists could be observed as thinkers with optimistic attitudes and implicitly developed expectations. Their subjective seems to be deployed in a future progression. According to psychoanalysis, the truth can be an unbearable image of the world that is displaced, and the philosopher can thus be the subject of his own deconstruction. Although it is not always socially comfortable to tell the truth, this is a fundamental question related to the transparency of the function of socialisation and adaptation. Another fundamental question in this case is whether we can really state the state of non-sovereignty of the subject without succumbing to the temptation to become hostage to another mythology. Subjectivity has been often re-deconstructed and, as stated in Gödel's theorem, the most general set cannot include itself. Similarly, subjectivity cannot describe itself, being content with partial descriptions and self-reflections as sets of deconstructions. Of course, the language of philosophy has a wider range of concepts than mathematics. That is why philosophy compensates for the inadequacy of any other definitions by universal concepts of being, consciousness, etc. On the other hand, the permanent insufficiency of a universal description has led to a continuous process of reflection and has created a space for freedom and universal creativity: the rupture that creates the possibility of the otherness of everyone else. Similarly, if such degrees of freedom were not realised in the essence of human nature, then the very possibility of consciousness as a certain transcendental freedom would not be possible. The world would form a fundamentally different picture and understanding if it were subordinated to radicalised orders of causal relations. No final definition of human nature then can be grasped, and man has thrown *Geworfenheit* into an endless world of dialogue with himself and others. The dimension of trauma explores itself through a continuous series of intersubjective presences. The Big Other has presupposed the trauma, and the small other only coincidentally fits in between and carries it out. This coincidence is also one of the cases of initial disruption, a conflict based on the agents of the power of discourse. All the actors are separate and together at the same time.

In this paper we mainly limit specific phenomenology of these structures as they fit the world as a comprehensive, in which the idea of transcendental ego has only the value of example for pure possibilities. Only through the phenomenology of the genesis of the ego is it possible to find a way. At the same time, the philosopher is not a representative of science; as

a spy of an unknown homeland, the philosopher is forced to bear witness to it, and no one else. Like a veiled image of an omniscient and judging God, the world of truth becomes the philosopher's sole source of inspiration and concentration. However, the question of the world of truth is linked to issues of logocentrism, objective idealism, etc. In this case it should not be understood as a separate reality, but as part of the symbolic - an internal moral imperative.

How self-knowledge should be organised in order to deconstruct cultural, historical, individual and other features of our cognition. As shown in the section on passive synthesis, a significant part of our experience is provided by structures outside our competence and responsibility. Thus, whole sets of perceptions and thoughts become an integral part of the human personality. These perceptions can place subjectivity in a self-constructing horizon of meaning, reforming and producing meanings contrary to common sense and logical thinking.

What should the new anthropology of self-knowledge look like? What should be the guide to avoid getting lost in the maze of misleading thoughts and impressions? What if it is impossible to be misled? How can we postulate the need for a philosopher to speak the truth? But also according to certain criteria as a factor in telling the truth. When philosophers determine the method by which they will understand the truth, they coordinate several rules and laws of their thinking. Most of the time in the history of philosophy we see the importance of truth above all other things, or, as Aristotle rightly noted, Plato is his friend and truth is more precious. But how far can this primacy of truth go when we consider the philosophical categorisation of subjectivity and its ethical guidance? This follows from the statement that if man had a final explanation of the nature of things, freedom would not be possible and development would not be possible - humanity would be frozen in determinism. Therefore, it is necessary to say that the uniqueness of human destiny is only possible because it exists as a being separated from nature and therefore insufficiently self-fulfilling. In a sense, this coincides with the motifs of medieval ontology, where only God is perfect and complete by nature; man is a fundamental incompleteness, a vessel of being.

Stoicism came close to this, realising that it would be impossible to enjoy or fulfil the soul in the end, so one should be content with little and practise restraint of the soul, *ataraxia*. On the contrary, the peculiar desire for self-fulfilment that grows in subjectivity generates cycles of adaptive actions to achieve the result of compensation - in other words, to satisfy a passion and achieve completeness. Finally, we are faced with the question of who this so-called last philosopher should be identified as. Many images of philosophers - Socrates,

Stoics, theologians, Cartesian philosophers and others - embody the symbol of self-knowledge within different epistemologies and ethics. After the cognition of things, of oneself, a paradigm of cognition and life must emerge. And in what system will it evolve, whether would it be a system of idealism, where life must meet certain criteria and goals and not deviate from them? On the other hand, one can criticise the goal from the point of view of its usefulness. However, this question is also problematic because it coincides with the question of the supreme good, which is speculatively diminished.

The constitutive elements of modern human self-consciousness are often closely linked to the tradition established by Descartes. This thinking ego, the rational function of the human mind, should be taken as a universal measure of the sovereignty of the subject, because everyone, no matter who he is, can think of himself as a cognitive agent, the owner of his subjectivity. But can we rely on such a thesis to define contemporary anthropology? After all, if we define human subjectivity in terms of corporeality and extend this corporeality with the concepts of analysis, then human subjectivity must constitute itself as a particular individuality and, from the point of view of desire, as a particular characteristic, e.g. gender, class or other dependence. Suppose a particular person has feminine or masculine structures inherent in desire. This should be understood as a specific cultural discourse. In this way a person moves away from the objective and remains in the state of post-truth. He discovers that the whole human being cannot be found in the human being. A truth that belongs only to the subject. Bion proposed to call this singularity *Point O*. It reflects the ultimate reality of truth that can be approached, although unconscious truths will remain partial.

First of all, we are witnessing the abolition of the destruction of the subject as such. The subject is not cogito, but it is transformed into a palimpsest mixture and acquires the characteristics of nothing, a decapitated subject, a subject that no longer has an ego, a subject beyond the ego, part of the other, as happens to the Hegelian subject. To transcend the paradoxical Schattendasein. This hypothetical personality learns to live in their own way, which is in no way inherent. To eventually choose how to be and how to live.

The change of perspective for subjectivity means its fundamental rejection of subjectivity as projectivity. Finally, the reduction of desire leads to the awareness of choice. Or, instead, the curse of having to make a choice. This places the subject in the position of a particular phenomenological contemplation. Where a committed, forced state of suspension is formed in the midst of symbolic orders, phenomenological reduction of multiple degrees of subjective. A mixture of the Nietzschean infant, yet born as wise as Confucius.

Consciousness through the symbol of the union of opposites: completeness and incompleteness, perfection and freedom, strategy and spontaneity, certainty and methodological ignorance. The "ultimate" philosopher is an image of a subject that can accommodate itself in paradox, in disruption. Nietzsche's dancing philosopher, for whom paradox became life. A consciousness in which mind and will are in a state of synchronisation, like the state of an ancient hero traversing the aporia of life. Perhaps this is why Odysseus saved his life and returned to Ithaca for his kingdom and his family, because he could live in paradox. Consciousness must be in a state of *here* and *now*, in a state of confident readiness that transcends repetition. However, the conditions of this readiness are as uncertain as the future itself, thus perpetuating the paradox of this consciousness. Ultimately, the uncertainty of the future must be understood by this methodology as the basis of its own thinking.

At first glance, it seems impossible to exist and be in conditions of fundamental unpredictability of the future. Therefore, in order to avoid wrong actions, we can discuss something like a categorical imperative to be guided by a universal rule in every situation. For example, in answer to the well-known question: what should you do if a stalker and murderer has come to your door and you are hiding those he is pursuing? Should you tell the murderer that they are in your house? Of course, if you always tell the truth, you will be forced to say that you have them in the basement. But would this not be a paradox, a situation of an unpredictable future? In this case, it would be enough for the bearer to implement an established imperative of honesty.

In terms of meaning, at some point the situation would reveal the desire to tell the truth as nothing more than hidden fear and selfishness. It is not difficult to hide behind a universal truth. It is more difficult to combine perfection and incompleteness, because in this case it is on the edge of uncertainty. On the other hand, the empirical situation of stubbornness will deprive someone of life. Therefore, the "ultimate figure" of philosophy will have to resort to finding an alternative solution. But also there is no need to do so, because the question of preserving one's own life does not lose its importance either. This is the beauty of chance and contingency, because they can ultimately realise the most unpredictable situation, which requires a particular state of consciousness to master. The demand to do more, or what is known in philosophy as excessive action or supererogation, can also serve as an argument against excessive heroism. However, by initially protecting someone from a persecutor, one also agrees to continue to protect them.

This situation is difficult to define because it is in the realm of pure reasoning, so we can stop considering this example. After all, many other factors will determine the outcome of the situation, such as the presence of weapons in the hands of the person hiding people, his ability to defend himself, etc., and at the same time many other reasons and contingencies that make it impossible to analyse the situation from the point of view of the present. In this case, however, we must point out that exceptions will always follow any rule that claims to be universal, because the mind cannot foresee anything, which indicates the fundamental unpreparedness of subjectivity to face certain moments of its destiny. Uncertainty and trauma are therefore intertwined as an ontological perspective of existence, because existence and the future in which it unfolds are fundamentally unpredictable. Ultimately, the meaning of life is torn in the future, and it is only from the future that assessments and analyses of situations are possible, that the fate of the subject can be thrown into retrospect. This is why the figure of the last philosopher should be associated with the Stoic ideal. The thinker is defined by uncertainty as a fundamental guideline. At the same time, however, it reinforces the need for phenomenological reduction or further hermeneutical clarification of the act of being.

As it happens, the psychoanalytic process also resolves paradoxes, and often these paradoxes reveal that specific psychoanalytic interpretations are as unobvious as possible and fall outside the general logic. The apparent completeness of conscious experience and the so-called transparency of consciousness in psychoanalytic interpretations also seem paradoxical to standard logic, and it is not surprising to observe the criticism of science that is raised against some aspects of psychoanalysis. While it is true that certain generalisations may be rather metaphorical and imprecise, the tendency to preserve the method in psychoanalytic practice is stable, despite the frequent changes in general classifications over the last 50 years.

As we have seen, the situation with the determination of consciousness by language is no less problematic and paradoxical, and here too we fall into a paradox: the non-communicative experience of consciousness, generalised in language and culture, reflected in the intersubjective world, comes back to itself. The historicity of subjectivity also confines it to a specific historical framework and prevents it from ever entering the future, leaving it only room for fantasy, which it finds in science fiction novels. This hypothetical figure would therefore always have to be between the poles of the determinate and the indeterminate.

The act of reduction is a method of being in the shadow and looking out of it. It is important to note that shadow is not in the sense of not knowing, but as the ability to get through by recognising the shadow. *Schattendasein* should be understood as the acquisition of selfhood. At this point, shadow existence appears as meta-authenticity. A state of inner estrangement from the historical and personal leads to a state of impossibility of authentic existence, because in this case we are confronted with the moment of the now. Time itself does not allow us to move on, and truth only reveals itself in the future. Therefore, we find ourselves in the situation of another paradox: in order to avoid being trapped in trauma, historicity, etc., we have to give up any claim to understanding, while maintaining the importance of devotion to oneself. Richir pointed out that suspension is a crucial step on the way to understanding the essence of phenomena (Richir, 1996). Completeness again colliding with incompleteness. The final figure of philosophy should be on the border between definition and indefiniteness - a state of excluded inclusion, absent presence, slipping stability and suspension.

By distinguishing the patterns of consciousness and their transformations in this study, we can observe the strange fate of human nature: in order to gain oneself, one must necessarily lose oneself. Only in this case, if we consider the hypothetical figure of the ultimate philosopher, instead of a nihilistic negation for the sake of freedom, we arrive at a more positive affirmation of the self in the existence of a subject that is more hypothetically inherent in the possession of itself, even from a position of visible impossibility. The moment of contact between the present and the future, pure becoming, requires readiness and attentiveness. The emerging consciousness is not determined as before, except by the surrounding becoming. One's consciousness must be able to decide independently about existence in its own situation, because, as we have argued, any rule may ultimately be inadequate. The transformation of the patterns of consciousness, or rather of the patterns of European self-consciousness, should lead to a self-consciousness that not only makes possible the theoretical aspects of understanding or interpreting a particular phenomenon, but also leads the subject to their readiness. It is an active engagement, never a concept to compensate for potential solipsism. The situation is similar to the exit from Plato's cave - the state of hybrid positionless consciousness. The human being, as we have already established, or consciousness, is a discursive-temporal multiplicity open to the world. The moment the openness of the world overcomes the discursive possibilities, creates a rupture in the system of the symbolic and the imaginary until it finds something to fill itself with. Somehow the

symbolic, as an instrument of interpretation, tries to repeat itself and select the necessary understanding, the insistence of language, that is, the modulation of the unconscious.

As in the analyst's discourse, consciousness shifts to an autoreferential level. In this way it removes itself from the chains of symbolic discourse, as exemplified in Lacan's graph of desire. The resulting horizon of meaning can lead to suspended contemplation as the key to understanding that transcends it. Desire and its associated intentionality are forced to change. As if knowledge destroys other knowledge, embodying the infinite *jouissance* of knowledge. Perhaps this leads to a "reassessment of all values" and to a derealisation, or rather to a falling out of the established order through re-symbolization. This could lead to affective confusion. The realisation of a meta-neurotic structure. It can also lead to the subject's inability to act because the initial impulse can no longer be focused on a specific semantic structure. His consciousness is alienated from the "here and now". Ethically, such a questioning resembles the Epicurean reflection on the place of pleasure and desire in life and the ability to control them.

To revitalise philosophy, which has unwittingly begun to return to metaphysical silent notions. In search of a way of self-understanding that does not ignore the dialectic of desire and discourse. Who should such a person be, and in what position should this thinking unfold, if this questioning develops retroactively? It is no longer a project perspective, but simply a clarification of the world. Would such thinking, directed towards the other, change our horizons of awareness and perception? Who is the philosopher and what should he ask? In this case, he will most probably appear as the stranger, but not in the sense of Camus. Traumatic situations create holes in the discourse. Detachment and a preference for solitude reflect a deep sense of alienation; action can be seen as a response to the absurdity of desired existence. Nevertheless, there is an opportunity to transcend reality in time. By eliminating the layers of history, man must be able to escape the experience of the infernal consciousness, the other.

This infernal consciousness comes as an infinite repetition, memory and retelling: "The patient cannot remember the forgotten and the repressed, but enacts it" (Freud, 2024: 288). Thus, it requires a new anthropological gaze. One in which one can simultaneously appreciate the imperfection of the world. Like Japanese *wabi-sabi*, which proclaims the sobriety of life and the beauty of imperfection. The kind of thinking that finds itself at the crossroads of endless choices, where one can safely reject both, and use Bartleby's phrase: "I would prefer not to", refusing to conform to social and historical expectations through

inaction and suspension. This is not melancholy; this is conscious and complete, not dependent, presence. It is enacted without purpose, completely dissolved in paradox, in order to take care of oneself (Melville, 2004).

Conclusion

*Comme on s'est plus ou moins aperçu de tout ceci -
on cherche le moyen de passer, à coup sûr,
du second état dans le premier,
et de transformer à volonté l'esprit inquiet du moment
en le possesseur tranquille de tout à l'heure.
Mais il y a un peu de folie concernant ce désir.²*

As demonstrated at the outset of the thesis, the analysis of consciousness in a dual view of phenomenology and psychoanalysis presents a serious problem because they are methodologically incompatible. On the one hand, phenomenological thinking excludes any reasoning that does not rely on the principle of obviousness. It focuses on pure acts of consciousness in search of a priori. In contrast, psychoanalysis aims to explore unconscious processes and has a therapeutic purpose. Thus, it requires inclusion of psychoanalytic thinking into the register of philosophical reflection to define its elements as a reflective theory of consciousness. It also integrates aspects of unconscious acts to think about them in a phenomenological way. If we approach their consideration ontologically, based on the fundamental phenomenality and singularity of the content of consciousness, we bypass the methodological difference and end up thinking of consciousness in itself as the experience of subjectivity. Its emanation is realised on many levels of perspectives of conscious experience. Such an approach not only unfolds human self-experience in different horizons, but also makes possible the specific diversity of human experience at the intersection of the individual and the universal, in the sphere of the intersubjective.

When we consider consciousness from different perspectives, especially its relationship to the unconscious, we arrive at a discussion of the impossibility of freedom. The situation in which consciousness is primarily determined by unconscious processes, by numerous types of passive synthesis, leads us to reflect on the fate of man and its limits. Conditioned by the structures of passivity, the existence of the subject begins to deform to a certain extent, proclaiming the pessimism of the future. Although the demand for freedom

²Since all this is more or less recognized
we must now find out how to go back
without fail, from the second condition to the first
how to transform at will the anxious mind of the moment
into the tranquil possessor of a moment ago
But there is a touch of madness in the desire to do this.
in Valéry P. (1949). *Monsieur Teste*. Alfred A. Knopf. New York in regard to the original (Valéry, 1995).

and autonomy can continue to be limited with aspects of the unconscious that could be also related to the delusions of metaphysics. After all, when we consider human existence as a *project*, being thrown forward, we can repeat the error of Zeno's aporia. Do we not substitute the inherent inner concept of consciousness with the false concept of infinity? When we consider consciousness as a potential infinity, we will certainly think of the subject as a project. However, if we make the transition to considering it as an actual infinity, the situation will change. That's to assume that impressions of constitutive acts lead to thinking about openness as *potentiality* because of not seeing the acts of the genesis of consciousness as isolated instances of actual infinity.

In a strange way, this a priori contemplation, which seems to have its foundation in visual perception, constitutes the primary category; the subject reflects itself as the structure of perspective. Spatially, this is perspective, and temporally, it is expectation. It seeks to inlay self-awareness and the becoming of human thinking to emerge as a goal and project. The denial of potential infinity could lead to Kirkegaard's *sickness of death*, an individual's inability to comprehend oneself properly. The substitution of the infinity's premise as a figure of despair repression (Kirkegaard, 1941). This brings us to Kierkegaard's understanding of reversal, namely its impossibility. When his protagonist, Konstantin Konstantius, arrives in Berlin, he finds that his first impression cannot be repeated, giving him an understanding of the unrepeatable nature of the moment (Dolar, 2023). This impossibility of repetition only points to his expectations and the inherent human self-understanding through repeated patterns, revealing the clash of infinities, repeatability of actual infinity in expectation, and worlds as becoming unrepeatable present moment anew. Eventually, Danish thinker *ironically* managed to avoid being overwhelmed and to escape the cycle.

The perspective and its interpretation derive their essence from the symbolic structures of intersubjective. The unconscious and its repetition is better thought as it coincides with the combinatorics of actual infinity. The very constitution of the human being is defined by its temporally enclosed dimension of self-consciousness of identity, affectivity, and agency. This creates a specific horizon for human existence that is distinct from the physical - a particular actual infinity that involves meaning and symbolism. Also if we consider it in the regard to cognitive terms, so-called, *sensory awareness* is good to represent the potential infinity of its unfolding perception, *phenomenal consciousness* is a genesis of subjective experience, meanwhile being grounded on the transcendental categories represents

the repetitive actual infinity of mind. Thus, the position of reflection, holding to streams in *access consciousness*

The primary distinctions between the manifestations of existence are made at the intersection of the symbolic and the imaginary. Similarly to the rift in the mirror stage, there is a rift in self-awareness. This rupture occurs at the expense of the constitution of the human being as a project, a rupture in the possibility of self-determination inherent in the hybridised perspective. Which consists of physical thinking through the imaginary and the symbolic while dominating in self-reflection. It supplements the situation of human existence with increasingly intertwined identifications and ready-made knowledge, forming structures of Natural Attitude. The existentialist interpretation of consciousness encounters a definition of man in such a way that its self-consciousness is thought in terms of *perspective*; one's own existence precedes any essence. This is the case in the analysis of Dasein. However, when we begin to shift this with an alternate premise, considering consciousness as the case of actual infinity, we distort this picture in a radically different way.

As suggested earlier, Schattendasein is a category for unfolding reflection on a human existence that eliminates a *perspective*. It removes the precedence of existence over essence. Obviously, in particular logical reasoning, existence will always precede essence, and specific self-reflection requires the potential infinity for the constitution of being *here* and *now*, or Being-in-the-World. This reduces understanding of conscious acts and thus needs to be complemented. Meanwhile, the enclosedness of the unconscious, the determinism of the human condition as choice, makes it necessary to prioritise hermeneutical acts. The repetition and habit could not be reduced to naturalism and empiricism. They instead represent the hybrid quasi-transcendental structures associated with affect and interpretation, creating a unique subjective temporal singularity. The logic of the unconscious is built within complemented infinity. Therefore, when we consider the subject in after analysis as having undergone a specific archaeology of its subjectivity, we place it at the intersection of symbolically dependent intentionality. Here, meaning ceases to unfold in consciousness as a project but as a hermeneutical genesis regarding infinity in actuality. This makes any expectation to be linked with repetition, memory, and affect. It appears as a choice so that perceptual acts acquire a figure of syllogism connected to Natural Attitude. Thus, in order to be able to make a sure choice, the subject is forced to enter a state of suspension. This choice only makes sense in suspension as it is tangent to aspects of transcendental freedom. Freedom

that might be exemplified in Bartleby's sacramental phrase, "I would prefer not to" (Melville, 2004).

The symbolism of Bartleby's character is productive in clarifying the passage through this issue of human *projectiveness*. On the one hand, it is an attempt at freedom from the so-called Other, from intersubjective dependence; on the other hand, it is damnation and subjective death, hybridity, and the end of life. Behind his phrase, we might see not only the rejection of social norms and the possibility of transcendence but also the venture to dissolve the desire as bordering on pure nothingness. We are not witnessing the replacement of a worse desire by a better one, lesser evil, but rather a falling out of the structure of discourse with the subsequent physical death of the subject. We see that society is unable to accept Bartleby's so-called "madness". It pushes him beyond its horizon. He refuses to act not because he is lazy or unwilling, but because he wants to fall out of this discourse. The paradox is that there is no other way; the usual way is only an inevitable re-entry into the discourse, infinity in actuality. He cannot say why he does not want to because, in this way, language will lead him through successive logical structures and passive syntheses, forcing him to reproduce himself in a renewed way in discourse and desire.

It becomes clear why, for many philosophers, the figure of Bartleby has become the key to unfolding the question of this existential refusal, as there may be no other form of falling out of discourse. Although it ended tragically for Melville's character, this death has a deeper symbolic meaning than a physical one. Bartleby died for everyone, for the law, and for desire, so his behaviour seems as inadequate as possible compared to self-preserving position in life. This consciousness, marked by falling out of the discourse, is an example of a radical alienation of the self, its elimination from the world. From the point of view of life, this position should arouse indignation as to why this person is depriving himself of the joys of life and provoking the rupture of his existence, the absolute death of desire. Someone might say that this is because Bartleby has read thousands of undeliverable texts while working in the Dead Letter Department in Washington. After passing through thousands of pages of desires and dreams, we can assume that the hero experienced thousands of states of consciousness, accumulating the contents of numerous lives as infinite repetition that forced him to give up. The contents of the desires that were not his own were completely alienated from his soul. They could not manifest themselves, affect him, or enliven his consciousness. It is similar to Roquentin's nausea, but its development is much more advanced after a long repetition in the key of radical negation (Sartre, 2021).

Is such a consciousness fruitful if we look at it philosophically? After all, it is not followed by any affirmation. At first glance, the period after analysis projects a state of possession of one's own desire and *sinthome*, a state of desired completeness or self-possession. Bartleby's example, from this point of view, again falls out of this vision. For him, completeness is repetition and imprisonment in desire. But if he died, what could he teach us? Let us assume that Melville is showing us the inherent dissociation of desire, its arbitrariness and relative importance. This means that desire is not mastered by moderation and reason, but by its fundamental rootedness in human existence and its metaphysical absurdity. Working in the Dead Letter Department we assume led to the reading of thousands of letters from the *Schattendasein* of the Other, allowing Bartleby to plunge into the shadow of unattainable in order to finally free himself from his inner and intrinsic desire. Ultimately, the adjective "one's own" is irrelevant because, as we saw in chapter three, there is no such thing as "one's own" in principle, but only as an intersubjective, as something that exists only in between. To break with this in-between would mean a symbolic death, a stopping and an impossibility of existence among humans - as a transcendence of the human as too human. To repeat Bartleby would be tantamount to suicide, so such a pedagogical theme would be counterproductive. However, if we ask what would be productive for consciousness in a philosophical sense, since Bartleby is not verbose, it would not be easy to reconstruct his acts of consciousness as phenomenological reasoning, so we are left to speculate, or at least to give this character our interpretation. If we begin to analyse the refusal as a reduction of Bartleby, it can be perceived as a method of stopping desire. When Bartleby's boss offers him extra money or a place to stay in his house, when even in prison he is provided with food, a reasonable person would be surprised to refuse such privileges, but Bartleby, on the contrary, can refuse the most important thing. The principle of non-action, *wu-wei*, delay. A phenomenological reduction of a new order, where instead of a reduction of the world as given, there is a reduction of a new order, such as a reduction of subjective intervention, a reduction of the noetic correlate as the desire, and a reduction of intersubjective inclusion. It is only for philosophical reasons that this state is perceived as a state of positive counter-reaction, because, as we see in the story, Bartleby throws this state against his neighbours, forcing them to use violence against him.

The reasons for Bartleby's becoming so will remain unclear; perhaps he did not see the point of his actions, a depression in which desire was alienated from its subject to the maximum extent and existed as a separate ideal moment of contemplation. There are no

longer intentional correlates without bringing the noetic structure to the experience. On the one hand, this looks like a depressive disorder; on the other, it looks like a pessimism of the will. However, for the sake of argument, we can turn this into Gramsci's famous statement: 'the pessimism of the intellect is the optimism of the will' into false 'pessimism of will and optimism of intellect' (Gramsci, 2011). In this way, subjectivity becomes more inherent in passing through the desire to unfold the awareness of what is happening. This is achieved by redefining the expectation as the perspective with the necessity of choice and determination. In this way, the immediate reaction or response without delay will not force the subjectivity to move away from contemplating and seeing the actual state of affairs. Therefore, we can see that phenomenology, on the one hand, and psychoanalysis, on the other, intend to reveal consciousness ontologically and psychologically in terms of the logic of potential and actual infinities, respectively. The collision of both for self-reflection can ultimately change the search for a more general understanding of consciousness and, in accordance with it, the construction of anthropology. Thus, like Husserl's scrupulous study of acts of consciousness, it will eventually lead to the study of the *Lebenswelt*. By removing previous interpretations in the Hegelian sense and moving towards new forms of self-consciousness, philosophical thought encounters a constant desire to overcome determinism and gain freedom. Epistemological research often shows the limits of such an initiative: human cognition is limited by structures of passivity and the general scientific picture, which delay human cognition rather than advance it. The same can be said of the structures of repetition in the field of the mental.

Having the quality of being repetitive, the human being is capable of being locked into certain structures of the unconscious, which indicates the limitation of consciousness in passivity and reduces any claim to the constitution of freedom. The demand for freedom can be a metaphysical trap, because the conditionality of everything shows a greater degree of totalisation of values around the subject; it subdues the various forms of passive synthesis. Whether it is the activity of the body, habits or knowledge, subjectivity, nourished by affects, comes to the eternal return of itself. This is a constant encounter with one's double, the alter ego as a passive ego that contains the whole palimpsest of individuality. This double appears in existence and wants to act instead of the subject. A metaphysical shadow of the desire as a permanent structure and composition of the self haunts subjectivity until the last moment, requiring it to be aware and focused on the various emanations of the ego.

Discoveries in various sciences lead us to an understanding of the fundamental fragility and incompleteness of the human being. The relatively short life expectancy and the imperfection of the human body, not only for further development but also, for example, for long space travel or deeper study of the universe, makes us shift our thinking from the individual to the super-individual. This super-individual, which compensates for human incompleteness, is culture, science, and knowledge. Therefore, the metaphysical shadow, which includes cultural conditioning, is an inevitable companion of every consciousness. On the one hand, this shadow limits the awareness of subjectivity within the horizon of the *here* and *now* by relying on the super-individual. On the other hand, progress and intergenerational communication would only be possible with it. Consciousness is, therefore, forced to transcend the paradoxical clash of cultural and individual conditionality. The way out of the paradox can lead to blind conservatism on the one hand and to Bartleby's deadly freedom on the other. Ultimately, human consciousness must inevitably stand at the crossroads of both the finite and the infinite, again as a paradox. It takes us from the distinction of authenticity and inauthenticity, as with *Dasein* and *Das Man*, to the meta-authenticity of *Schattendasein*.

The symbolic and cultural horizon of pre-determined certainty challenges ethics. Finally, the nature of choice has changed: the fall of the absolutism of ideologies has also led to a change in the status of values. They have become indifferent to the concepts of good and evil. Value in such a topology is no longer associated with an implicit reference to the supreme good and the law. This reduces any axiom to the contingency of phenomena or neutral reliability of a fact. Such a transition is dangerous because it makes it possible to choose anything as long as it pursues some significant goal. And this transforms the state of positional consciousness into a state of heightened indifference to the Other. The hierarchy of symbolic is under constant change. Unreflective dissolution contributes to the emergence of evil. At the same time, by contrasting the axiomatics of indifference with variations of passive synthesis, we find ourselves in the anthropology of automated subjectivity. At this point, we have examined the structures of affective, cultural, transference-wised, linguistic, intersubjective, and bodily manifestations of passive synthesis. This has revealed the fundamental limitations of subjectivity on the path to self-knowledge. This leads to the repeated conclusion of the need for reflexive practices as well as complemented methodology to liberate subjectivity from the all-encompassing structure of the repetitive discourse of passive states.

Placing the structure of paradox to understand human existence and consciousness must answer to Gödel's limitation. Expansion of the understanding of the human being as a project to a more complicated temporally logical structure eliminates the models of progress as the eternal return to the Supreme Good. The approach which suffers a fundamental collapse - at the crossroads of infinities, man shrinks to a crumb. However, a more meso-dimensional view, rejects the infinities of micro and macro scales to focus on human life and self-awareness, which shows the extraordinary ability of consciousness to find balance in being ultra-flexible in the world experience. This is how everyday life is created. Consciousness pursues this balance at every step and can be found in the most varied and complex conditions. From the simplest atypical states of consciousness caused by disturbances in the body's physiology to the most complicated forms of its manifestation in art and history, consciousness continues to seek ways to conform. It can accommodate paradoxes as long as it remains alive. To such an extent that, despite the prospects of the permanence of human life and the limitations of human civilisation, it isn't doomed and helpless compared to the scale of the universe. Yet, consciousness finds the strength to fulfill and manifest itself in life and the world, balancing *Χάος* and *Λόγος* until the last moment of existential presence.

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